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Abstract
The thesis investigates the impact of the Indonesian Government’s policies related
to labour, education and health. The thesis consists of three empirical analyses:
first, an examination of the impact of a household conditional cash transfer pro-
gramme on female labour participation; secondly, an investigation of the effects
of the nine-year compulsory schooling law enactment on educational and work
outcomes; and finally an examination of the impact of the national programme of
community empowerment on community participation and health facilities utilisa-
tion and health outcomes. The research employs econometric methods including
difference-in-differences, instrumental variable and regression discontinuity design:
it uses data from two large-scale randomised controlled trials (RCT), data from
the household cash transfer programme and community empowerment programme
and Indonesia Family Life Survey Data (IFLS).
The thesis reveals that the household conditional cash transfer programme does
not have an impact on female labour participation. The CCT programme did not
motivate the women to work, and two years after its implementation it had not
discouraged working in the short run. Six years after its implementation there was a
significant reduction in female labour participation using IV estimation. The effects
of nine-year compulsory schooling law were investigated by employing a regression
discontinuity design. The results show that the compulsory schooling law has an
impact on educational attainment in the fraction of people completing at least nine
years of schooling. In terms of work outcomes, the policy has a significant effect
on the likelihood of working in the formal sectors, but no effect on monthly wages.
Lastly, this thesis evaluates the effects of the Generasi, a national programme
of community empowerment, on community participation and health outcomes.
The results from Generasi community empowerment programme suggest that the
programme does not have an impact on the village decision-making process for
community self-help activities. The programme does not have an impact on the
quality of health facilities as measured by the availability of health personnel in a
village. The programme suggests a marginally significant positive effect on mothers’
health knowledge. Despite the effect on mothers’ health knowledge, the programme
does not have an impact on health facilities use for mothers. The empirical results
for children suggest that the programme had significant positive effects on child
visits to the Posyandu, the monthly health clinic, and whether nutritious meals
were served during Posyandu sessions. However, the programme does not suggest
any effect on children health outcomes.
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One of the most effective ways for a country to alleviate poverty is by breaking the
poverty chain between generations through increasing consumption and inducing
investment in human capital which comprises education and health (Barrientos
and DeJong 2004, Fiszbein et al. 2009). One of the central approaches to advance
economic development is through investment in human capital (Schultz, 1961;
Becker, 1964; Colclough, 1982). This approach can be achieved by improving
the education and health status of the people. The Indonesian Government has
implemented several programmes, including social safety net, energy subsidy and
conditional and unconditional cash transfer to alleviate poverty.
The thesis aims to investigate the impact of labour, education and health-
related policies in Indonesia by applying econometrics methods using data on
Indonesia. The data comprises the household conditional cash transfer programme
(PKH), national programme of community empowerment (PNPM Generasi), and
Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). The findings of this study are important in
adding to the literature the analysis of the Indonesian Government’s investment in
human capital and to inform for future policy making.
1
1. Introduction 2
The research makes three main contributions. First, chapter 4 contributes
to the literature regarding the analysis of household conditional cash transfer
(CCT) programme impact on female labour participation. Chapter 5 investigates
the causal effects of compulsory education on educational attainment and work
outcomes later in life. Chapter 6 focuses on evaluating the impact of Generasi
community empowerment programme on community participation, health facilities
utilisation and the health outcomes of mothers and children.
Indonesia is a developing country in South East Asia, currently the fourth most
populous nation in the world. Indonesia has a population of 266 million with
more than 300 ethnicities living in 34 provinces (World Bank, 2019). Indonesia’s
GDP is currently the 16th largest globally, it is also a member of the G20. The
level of GDP is US$ 1.01 trillion with a GDP per capita of US$ 3,877, which
classifies Indonesia as an upper-middle income country (World Bank, 2019). In the
last two decades, the economy has improved by shifting from oil-based export to
more diverse products, from raw materials to manufacturing and financial services
sectors. Indonesia has been successful in reducing poverty through national poverty
alleviation programmes, which reduced the poverty rate by more than half since
1999, from 24% to 9.8% in 2018 (World Bank, 2018). Despite the improvement
in macroeconomic indicators and poverty, the socioeconomic gap was still wide.
Hence, the Indonesian Government initiated several social assistance programmes
in 2007. The country’s long-term development plan focuses on infrastructure
development and social assistance programmes related to education and healthcare.
This thesis aims to answer the following research questions:
• Does Indonesia’s conditional cash transfer programme have an impact on
female labour participation?
• Does the nine-year compulsory education policy have effects on educational
and work outcomes?
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• Does Indonesia’s National Programme of Community Empowerment have any
impact on community participation, health facilities utilization and health
outcomes?
The objectives of the household CCT are to reduce maternal mortality and to
provide the beneficiaries access to public healthcare services and universal basic
education. It is important to measure the unintended impact of household CCT
on female labour participation. One of the features of Indonesian household CCT
is that the transfer is given to and managed by an adult female in the qualifying
household, which might have implications on women empowerment and their labour
supply decision. The CCT impact on female labour supply is analysed using static
labour supply theory. An increase in non-labour income increases demand for
leisure and thus reduces labour supply or income effect (Blundell and MaCurdy,
1999). The cash transfer is an unearned income which might reduce labour supply
through the income effect. Given the nature of the program, female decision making
on how to spend the money becomes very crucial in achieving the programme
objectives (Attanasio and Lechene, 2002).
A study in Mexico, Honduras, and Nicaragua indicated that the effects of
the CCT programmes on adults labour participation were negative, small and
insignificant (Alzua et al. 2013). Although the transfers were substantial in size,
the programmes did not reduce the labour supply in the short-run. There were
additional findings for the Mexican Progresa, which indicated a small positive
effect on the work hours of female beneficiaries and an increase in household labour
income two years after the programme implementation (Alzua et al. 2013). The
impacts could be attributed to the changes in the adults’ labour supply in eligible
households and to the increased available time of women as a result of higher
children school enrollment rates (Alzua et al. 2013).
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The second study examines the effects of compulsory schooling extension in
Indonesia on work outcomes. The causal effects of education on work outcomes
have been well documented (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Behrman and Deolalikar,
1993; Card, 1999; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Duflo, 2001; Oreopoulos, 2006).
Better education can increase the likelihood to work for pay and earn higher income.
However, examining the causal impact of education on work outcomes is not an
easy task. There is endogeneity of unobservable associated with education which
might also affect work preferences. The study exploits the exogenous variation in
the likelihood to complete at least nine years of schooling and work outcomes
by the change in compulsory schooling law in Indonesia enacted in 1994 as a
source of identification. Currently, few studies evaluated the impact of compulsory
education in developing countries. Several studies examined the impact of longer
school year implemented in all education levels in Indonesia and the impact of
large school construction project in 1970s, but none has examined the impact of
Indonesia’s free nine-year compulsory schooling on working outcomes. Duflo (2001)
investigated the impact of Indonesia’s school construction programme between
1974 and 1978 and found that each constructed primary school per 1000 children
resulted in 0.12 to 0.19 years average increase in education and between 1.5 and
2.7 percent increase in wages.
Oreopoulos (2006) examined the effect of school-leaving age laws on educational
attainment and earnings and compared the returns to compulsory schooling for
the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom using OLS, IV-Difference-
in-Differences and IV-Regression Discontinuity. The findings suggest that the
compulsory schooling has large impact between ten and 15 percent increase in
earnings on both the majority and minority groups who were exposed to the policy.
The Indonesian nine-year compulsory schooling policy mandated children to
stay at school for at least nine years, prior to 1994 children were only required to
complete six years of schooling. This study applies a fuzzy regression discontinuity
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design which exploits the compulsory schooling law enactment as an exogenous
variation. A fuzzy regression discontinuity design is used because the treatment
to completing nine years of schooling is not deterministic. Completing nine years
education is not deterministic since the compulsory schooling policy in Indonesia
means that the government is responsible to provide free basic education for all
the people. However, there were no strict measures to enforce the policy, with no
minimum attendance requirement either. The pupils and parents may decide not
to abide with the policy without apparent consequences.
Lastly, this thesis investigates the impact of a National programme of Com-
munity Empowerment, PNPM Generasi health programme, on the community
participation, quality of community health facilities, utilisation of healthcare fa-
cilities, and health outcomes of mothers aged 16 to 49 and children aged 0 to 36
months. PNPM Generasi health programme was aimed to address the Millenium
Develpment Goasls (MDGs) of reducing poverty, maternal mortality and child
mortality, to achieve universal coverage of basic education, through improving
the health services and education services in the Generasi programme areas. The
PNPM Generasi programme was implemented at a village level. The data employed
are village-level data, household and individual-level data on mothers and children,
health personnel and healthcare facilities data. Health personnel data includes
midwives and Posyandu cadres characteristics data. Institutions characteristics and
facilities data include villages and subdistrict community health centres. Generasi
programme impact is estimated using difference-in-differences specification.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis comprises seven chapters, an introductory chapter which introduces the
research and institutional context, a chapter on Indonesia country profile, data
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and descriptive statistics, three chapters of empirical work and conclusions chapter.
The thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 1 establishes the research background and outlines the structure of the
thesis.
Chapter 2 introduces Indonesia’s country profile including health and socio-
demographic profiles, and provides the institutional background of the policies dis-
cussed.
Chapter 3 describes the datasets and the variables employed in the research and
empirical analysis. The chapter also illustrates the data in the descriptive statistics.
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of programme Keluarga Harapan, PKH, the
household conditional cash transfer programme on female labour participation as
the programme indirect impact. Empirical strategies utilised are difference-in-
differences and instrumental variable techniques.
Chapter 5 evaluates the effects of Indonesia nine-year compulsory education
law enacted in 1994 on educational attainment and work outcomes later in life.
Using regression discontinuity design, this study exploits the change in compulsory
schooling law in Indonesia enacted in 1994 as a source of identification.
Chapter 6 investigates the impact of National programme of Community Em-
powerment, a village block grant, on community participation, the quality of
health providers, health facilities utilisation and health outcomes by employing
difference-in-differences. Furthermore, it investigates the relevance of political
economy implication on village budget allocation.
Chapter 7 summarises, interpret the findings from empirical chapters and con-
cludes the thesis. Finally, it discusses the implication of the policy in a broader
context and opportunity for further research.
2
Country Profile
This chapter provides Indonesian country profile as institutional background which
serves overview to the results findings. First, it describes the economic growth and
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) followed by the labour situation which describes
the labour force participation of male and female, the gender gap and types of
employment. Subsequently, the chapter discusses Indonesian education system, en-
rolment rate and educational attainment of its people followed by health situation.
Lastly, it discusses the village government.
2.1 Indonesian Economy
Currently, Indonesia’s GDP at nominal of US $ 1.06 trillion is the 16th largest and
the seventh in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing
power parity (IMF, 2016). Figure 2.1 shows Indonesia’s GDP levels in current
US$ billions over the last 18 years. Indonesia’s GDP had increased substantially
from US$ 165 billion in 2000 to US$ 893 billion in 2011, then increased to US$
1.01 trillion in 2018.
Figure 2.2 depicts the levels of GDP of the largest 20 world economies in 2018
which ranks Indonesia as the 16th. Figure 2.3 shows GDP per capita in current
7
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Source: World Bank 2018
GDP Indonesia - Current Price and Constant Price 
Figure 2.1: Indonesia’s GDP over the last 20 years
and at purchasing power parity (PPP) constant using 2011 price, over 18 years
period. Indonesia’s GDP per capita has increased steadily within the last two
decades both at current and constant price with a small decrease between 2012
and 2015. The GDP per capita PPP had increased considerably from US$6,000 in
2000 to US$ 8,000 in 2010. In 2018, the GDP PPP at constant price is US$
12,000 (World Bank, 2019).
Table 2.1 presents the GDP by components in 2017 and 2018. Household
consumptions share was 57% of GDP and government expenditure accounted share
was 9% of GDP. Investments, exports and imports share were 34%, 21% and
22%, respectively.
Table 2.2 presents the GDP share by sectors in 2017 and 2018. The top five
shares of GDP are the manufacturing sector, 20.7%, followed by wholesale and
retail trade, 13.5%, agriculture, forestry and fishing, 13.3%, construction, 11%,
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Source: World Bank 2018
GDP of G20 Countries in 2018
Figure 2.2: GDP among G20 Countries
and mining and quarrying, 8.4%. The rest sectors made up 33% of GDP.
Figure 2.4 shows the share of GDP by islands, with Java had the highest
share of 58.5%, followed by Sumatra (21.6%), Kalimantan (8.2%), Sulawesi (6.2%),
Bali and Nusa Tenggara, and Maluku and Papua (2.5%). Java island has highest
population and the most developed region with manufacturing industries, business
and financial services. Whereas Sumatra and Kalimantan are still dominated by
agro-industry and mining.
Figure 2.5 depicts the government budget by sectors in 2019. The total budget
is 1,600 trillion rupiah. The highest sector share is general public services (32%)
followed by economics affairs (24%). The share of social protection programme
budget is 12.3%. The social protection includes the conditional cash transfer
programme, PKH, health insurance subsidy, rice and food subsidy for the poor,
education assistance and community empowerment programme. The fourth highest
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Figure 2.3: Indonesia’s GDP per capita











Private Expenditure (households) 7,788.2 8,450.6 57.3 57.0
Government Expenditure 1,234.6 1,332.5 9.1 9.0
Investments 4,581.2 5,129.2 33.7 34.6
Export of Goods and Service 2,743.1 3,110.8 20.2 21.0
Imports of Goods and Service 2,605.2 3,272.5 19.2 22.1
adjustment -154.7 86.8 -1.1 0.6
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 13,587.2 14,837.4 100.0 100.0
Note:
Source: BPS, 2019
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Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1,787.3 1,900.4 13.68 13.35
Mining and Quarrying 1,029.6 1,199.0 7.88 8.42
Manufacturing 2,739.7 2,947.3 20.97 20.70
Electricity and Gas 162.4 176.4 1.24 1.24
Water and Waste Management 9.4 10.0 0.07 0.07
Construction 1,410.5 1,562.3 10.80 10.97
Wholesale and Retail Trade 1,768.9 1,931.9 13.54 13.57
Transportation and Storage 735.2 797.3 5.63 5.60
Accommodation and Food 386.9 412.5 2.96 2.90
Information and Communication 513.7 559.1 3.93 3.93
Financial and Insurance 571.2 616.3 4.37 4.33
Real Estate 382.5 406.6 2.93 2.86
Business 238.2 267.1 1.82 1.88
Public Administration and Defence 498.2 541.7 3.81 3.81
Education 446.3 482.1 3.42 3.39
Human Health and Social Work 144.6 157.9 1.11 1.11
Others 239.3 268.6 1.83 1.89
Gross Value Added 13,063.9 14,236.5 100.00 100.00
Tax 523.3 600.9
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 13,587.2 14,837.4
Note:
Source: BPS, 2019
Figure 2.4: Indonesia’s GDP by Islands
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Government Budget by Sectors in 2019
Figure 2.5: Government Budget Based on Sectors
share of 9.3% is allocated to education sector followed by health sector, 4%.
Figure 2.6 presents the top ten export products in 2018. The figure shows that
Indonesia’s top ten exports worth 62.6% of Indonesia’s total exports in 2018. In-
donesia shipped US$180.2 billion worth of goods around the globe in 2018. Around
72% of Indonesian exports value were delivered to neighbouring Asian countries.
About 11.3% were sold to North American customers followed by European im-
porters at 10.6%. Smaller percentages were shipped to Africa (2.6%), Australia
and Oceania importers (2%) and to Latin America (1.5%).
Figure 2.7 shows that Indonesia’s top 10 imports US$ 188.7 billion worth of
goods from other coutries in 2018. Indonesian imports represent approximately
1.1% of total global imports with the amount of US$17.788 trillion in 2017. Around
74.9% of Indonesia’s value of total imports in 2018 were purchased from neigh-
bouring Asian countries. European nations supplied 9.5% while 6.5% worth of
2. Country Profile 13
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Source: worldstopexports.com, 2018
Top Ten Export products in 2018
Figure 2.6: Top Ten Export Products
goods originated from North America. Smaller percentages of overall Indonesian
imports came from Australia and Oceania (3.6%), Africa (3.4%) and from Latin
America (2%).
Figure 2.8 presents the economic growth and inflation rates outlook in ASEAN
countries for 2019. Indonesia’s GDP growth is projected the same as previous year,
5.1%. Compared to other ASEAN countries, Indonesia’s growth rate is moderate.
Indonesia still has positive real economic growth.
2.2 Labour
There has been a substantial gender gap in labour force participation between
men and women since early 1990s. Figure 2.9 shows that male labour force
participation has been stable and almost twice as much that of female. Male
labour force participation has been steady above 80%, while female labour force
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Figure 2.7: Top Ten Import Products
participation had increased steadily from 45% to 50% between years 1990 and
1998. The rate fell again to 45% in 2005 and increased steadily to 52% in 2017.
There is gender gap in terms of formality, vulnerability, wages, and labour force
participation. The gender gap is contributed by education, job, time, and gender
discrimination (ILO Jakarta Office, 2013). Indonesia ranked 97th out of 142
countries with 0.67 gender parity (out of 1) according to the Global Gender Report
(2014). Its low performance was shown by the increase in the gender-gap in labour
force participation above 30 percent from early 1990s which peaked to 37 percent
gap in 2006. This gender gap in labour participation reveals the limited link of
economic outcomes on women empowerment. However, this fact is in line with
the narrative of structural transition faced by countries as they progress through
the stages of development. In the first stage, both men and women are forced to
engage in economic activity, mainly in the primary sector due to low household
2. Country Profile 15
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Figure 2.8: GDP Growth and Inflation in ASEAN Countries
incomes. Later, as the economy moves from agrarian to manufacturing sector,
women withdraw from the labour force to take care of domestic responsibilities
due to a lack of social infrastructure (Mammen and Paxson, 2000).
Unemployment rates in Indonesia were relatively low until 1997 when the
monetary crisis struck. Figure 2.10 shows that unemployment rate was 2.5% in
1991 and increased to 4.6% in 1997. In 1999, the unemployment rate remained
high at 6.3% and continued to increase and peaked at almost 8% in 2005. After
the crisis, job creation in lndonesia’s labour-intensive manufacturing industries
generation declined in 2005 more than before the crisis (Aswicahyono et al, 2011).
The unemployment rate decreased again to 6% in 2009 and continued to decrease
to slightly above 4% in 2018.
The unemployment rate by gender is depicted in Figure 2.11. The gap between
female and male unemployment widened from 1994 to 1997 with female unemploy-


















Labor Force Participation by Gender
Figure 2.9: Labour Force Rate
ment being higher. The gap widened again in 2001 and peaked in 2005. The
gap between female and male unemployment narrowed since 2011 and in 2013 the
situation flipped making male unemployment greater than that of female.
Youth unemployment for labour force participation aged between 15 and 24
years has been considerably higher than total unemployment rate. Figure 2.12
presents the youth unemployment rate by gender between 1995 to 2019. Female
youth unemployment has been higher than that of male.
Labour force especially female is more concentrated in part-time employment.
Figure 2.13 depicts the part-time employment rate by gender. Female part-time
employment rate was as high as 50% in 2000 after the monetary crisis. The rate
fluctuated to around 40% in 2018. On the other hand, male part-time employ-
ment rate has been more stable and remains at around 25%. Figure 2.14 shows
employment of people who completed secondary school by gender.






























































Unemployment Rate in Indonesia
Figure 2.10: Unemployment Rates
Female family workers has seen a considerable decrease since early 1990s, from
above 40% to below 25% in 2018 as shown in Figure 2.15. On the other hand, the
rate for male decreased steadily from 11% to about 6% in 2018. Women are more
likely to work for family although the trend is decreasing.
Figure 2.16 presents male and female workers by age distribution. The number
of males who work are much higher than females in all of the age groups. The
largest age group who work are between 20 and 45 years. The surprising trend is
that for age groups above 60 have more people work although the retirement age is
55. This trend suggests the improvement in health, so they are still able to work.
Figure 2.17 presents the workers distributions based on education by gender.
The number of male workers is higher than female workers for every education
level. Most of the workers have primary education, followed by junior secondary
and senior secondary education. The number of male workers with vocational































































Unemployment in Indonesia by Gender
Males Females
Figure 2.11: Unemployment Rates by Gender
secondary education is more than female workers with vocational schooling.
2.3 Education System and Level of Attainment
Indonesian education system consists of formal education, non-formal education,
and informal education. Formal education comprises early childhood education,
basic education which consists of primary and junior secondary schools henceforth
compulsory education, senior secondary education, and tertiary education. Home-
schooling is considered as informal education.
(i) The early childhood education can be found in the form one-year or two-year
of kindergarten in the formal education where children can start at the age
of 5 or younger. Children’s playgroup is the form of non-formal education
which can be administered by training or community organisations.





























































Youth-Unemployment Rate in Indonesia by Gender
Males Females
Figure 2.12: Unemployment Rates by Gender
(ii) Basic education is the compulsory part of Indonesian education system. It
consists of six years of primary school and three years of junior secondary
school. Before 1994, the compulsory education was six years in primary
school. School-entry age for primary school at the age of seven. Pupils
must pass the primary school national examination in order to enter junior
secondary school. For the non-formal education, children who reach the
age of 13 can sit in the Kejar paket A 1 primary school equivalent test and
receive primary school certificate upon passing the test. Children who already
reach the age of 16 can sit in the Kejar paket B 2 junior secondary school
equivalent test and receive junior secondary school certificate upon passing
the test. The government through regional education board works with the
1Kejar paket A or learning package A comprises primary school materials which test is
equivalent to the primary school national exam
2Kejar Paket B or learning package B comprises the three year of junior secondary school
teaching materials which test is equivalent to the junior secondary school national exam
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Part Time Employment by Gender
Figure 2.13: Part Time Employment
local communities to provide tutorials for the equivalent programmes.
(iii) Senior secondary education is three years of schooling following basic educa-
tion. The three years secondary education is provided in public and private
schools for formal education. The senior secondary education also provides
opportunity to study in vocational schools where they can learn technical
work skills such as mechanical, electronics to become technicians, nursery
to become nurse assistants, or in tourism. For the non-formal education,
children who already reach the age of 19 can sit in the Kejar paket C 3 senior
secondary school equivalent test and receive high secondary school certificate
upon passing the test.
3Kejar Paket C or learning package C comprises the three year of junior secondary school
teaching materials which test is equivalent to the senior secondary school national exam
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Figure 2.14: Labour Force Participation of people completed Secondary School
(iv) Tertiary or higher education comprises university and vocational college edu-
cation. University offers a four-year bachelor’s programme, a master’s degree
programmes require two years to complete and doctoral programmes require
three to four years to complete the degree. Whereas in vocational college,
people can study a one year up to four years of studies to obtain a vocational
diploma. High secondary school students must pass the high secondary
school national exam and national university exam to enter public universities.
Private universities organize their own student selection tests.
There has been a steady increase in schooling over the last 20 years. Pre-
primary school gross enrolment in 2017 is 40% with no difference between males
and females. The gross enrolment rate for primary school is 106%, males have a
higher rate of 108% compared to 105% for females. Primary school completion

















Family Workers by Gender
Figure 2.15: Family Worker
rate was near universal by the late 1980s with no gender gap. Currently, the total
completion rate is 99% with 100% and 98% for males and females, respectively.
The gross enrolment for junior secondary school in 2017 was 87%. The rate
was slightly higher for females, 90% compared to that of males, 88%. The nine
years compulsory school policy had been introduced in 1994. Accordingly, the
completion rate for junior secondary school has increased considerably, from 52%
in 1995 to 69.1% in 2002. The current total completion rate for junior secondary
school is 90%, higher than the world average of 75.6%. Females’ completion rate
is 92.7%, higher than that of males, 87.4%. The gross enrolment rate for senior
secondary school in 2007 was 65%. The rate was slightly higher for females, 66%
compared to that of males, 64%.
With respect to tertiary education, the total gross enrolment rate had increased
steadily from 14.9% in 2000 to 36.3% in 2018. The gross enrolment rate was higher
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Workers by Age and Gender
Figure 2.16: Male and Female Workers by Age
for females, 39% compared to that of males, 34 %. However, the rate was still
slightly lower compared to the world average of 40%.
Since 2004, by the constitution, 20 percent of the government expenditure is
devoted to education spending. However, in terms of education spending per capita,
Indonesia’s education expenditure is only 3.3% of its GDP. In 2015, spending for
pre-primary education was 1.8% of the total education spending. For primary and
secondary schools, the numbers were 42.6% and 27%, respectively. The tertiary
education spending was 15.8% of the total education expenditure.
2.4 Health
The health and well-being of the Indonesian people has been improving which can
be seen from the increase in the life expectancy. Figure 2.18 shows that the life
expectancy at birth in 1980 was 58 and 61 for male and female, respectively. The
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Figure 2.17: Male and Female Workers based on School Completed
figures increased steadily in 2000 to 65 for male and 68 for female. In 2017, life
expectancy was 67 for male and 71 for male and female, respectively.
The improved condition in health also saw a steady decrease in both infant
mortality and total mortality rates as shown in Figure 2.19. infant mortality fell
substantially from 148 per one thousand live births in 1960 to 41 in 2000. In
2010, the number decreased significantly to 28 and the current rate is 21 in one
thousand live births. The improvements are attributed to the gains made through
the medical care infrastructure grew from very few health centres to 20,900 centres
between 1960 and 2001 (Agustina et al., 2018). Overall or total mortality rate is
defines as the number of deaths in 1,000 individuals per year.
Figure 2.20 depicts maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births between 2000
and 2017. Despite the fall in maternal mortality rate (MMR) in other low medium-
income countries, Indonesia’s MMR improved from 272 in 2000 to 177 maternal
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Figure 2.18: Life Expectancy by Gender
deaths per 100,000 live births in 2017. The rate was still relatively high compared
to other Asian countries such as Cambodia (160), India (145), and the Philippines
(121) as shown in Figure 2.21. Problems associated with poor quality of care and
delayed referral were revealed in the 2011 National Survey of Health Facilities which
found that only 60% of districts and 85% of cities had basic emergency obstetrical
and neonatal care facilities (Triyana and Shankar, 2017).
Figure 2.22 breaks down the adult mortality rates by gender. Adult female
mortality rate has decreased substantially to less than 141 in 2018, but adult
male mortality rate remained higher at 200 per one thousand adults. One of the
factors to higher mortality rate is behavioural, men are more likely to engage in
risky and dangerous behavior and women more likely to engage in health-seeking
behavior. A study on gender differences in health and mortality, analysing data
from nationally representative sources including China Health and Retirement
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Figure 2.19: Infant Mortality and Total Mortality Rates
Longitudinal Study, Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging, India and Russia World
Health Organization Study on Global Ageing and Adult Health, Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the US Health and Retirement Study,
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS),
Taiwan Social Environment and Biomarkers of Aging Study, and Mexican Health
and Aging Study (MHAS). The study found that overall male life expectancy is
lower than female life expectancy. The study also found that men tend to have
more cardiovascular diseases, more hypertension and women tend to have more
inflammatory-related diseases (Crimmins et al., 2019). The economic structure
also influences men and women’s health because of differences in occupations,
economic well-being, and family responsibilities, which can have long-term health
consequences (Crimmins et al., 2019).
In response to the need of having an adaptable, affordable and accessible health


































































Source: World Bank 2019. Maternal mortality is the number of maternal deaths due to birth
or pregnancy-related complications per 100,000 live births
Maternal Mortality Rate 
Figure 2.20: Maternal Mortality Rates
care for everyone as stipulated by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the
Indonesian Government launched a comprehensive universal health coverage (UHC)
in 2014 as a single-payer UHC scheme. The healthcare services are provided both at
public local and private local health facilities which participate in the programme.
It has 203 million members in 2018 which makes Indonesian UHC the largest in the
world (Agustina et al., 2018). Currently, the number of private healthcare facilities
including private hospitals participate in the programme keeps increasing.
Fertility rates between 1960 and 2017 is depicted in Figure 2.23. Fertility rate
is defined as the average number of children born per childbearing age (15-49)
women. The number of births per Indonesian woman decreased steadily from 5.6
in 1960 to 2.5 births per woman in 2008. The current fertility rate is 2.3, similar
to world average of 2.4. The Indonesian Government established the National
Population and Family Planning Agency in 1987 and had made a considerable





























































source: World Bank 2019. Maternal mortality is the number of maternal deaths due to birth
or pregnancy-related complications per 100,000 live births
Maternal Mortality Rate among Asian Countries
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Mortality Rates by Gender
Figure 2.22: Adult Mortality Rates
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Fertility Rate 
Figure 2.23: Fertility Rates
success in 1997, when 55% of couples used modern contraception increased from
25% in 1960 (World Bank, 2018).
Along with improvements in economic conditions, health spending per capita
had increased steadily. Health spending per capita at PPP current had increased
steadily from $90 in 2000 to $244 in 2010. In 2016, the figure increased to $362.7.
However, the share of health expenditure as percentage of GDP had been very low,
it was 1.92% in 2000 and increased to 3.12% in 2016 (World Bank, 2018).
2.5 Village Government and Health Institutions
Village is the smallest government administrative unit in Indonesia. The larger
administrative units are subdistrict, district/municipality, province and central
government. There are two types of villages based on the rural and urban location.
Desa is a village located in Indonesia’s rural area and kelurahan is a village in rural
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area. Unlike urban village, whose leaders are appointed by district leaders, the
desa leader is elected by its people through local village election.
Indonesia’s political reforms in 1998 have created new opportunities for an
amended relationship between the government and the community. The reform
replaced the dictatorship era’s centralistic government (1967 to 1998) with local-
level institutions that are strong and dynamic (Antlov, 2003). All Indonesian
village have started to hold elections after the reform. Hence, the village is no longer
the single authority in the community. Village governments are provided with broad
autonomy and do not need approval from higher authority in decision making and
implementing policies. Decentralisation and democratization are necessary but
not sufficient conditions for developing country and in poverty eradication (Antlov,
2003). Civil society are engaged with active village government in decision making
process by the presence of village councils. It is expected that ordinary people
are included in the process.
In a village level, the health institutions comprise Posyandu (regular health
sessions) with its Posyandu cadres involving the village government and volunteers,
head of village empowerment unit and village midwife. The posyandu in a village
will be attended by village midwives or occasionally by doctors from subdistrict
health centre (Puskesmas). The Posyandu cadres and village midwife report their
activities to Puskesmas periodically.
The Indonesian Government deployed more than 54,000 midwives to villages
throughout Indonesia between 1990 and 1996 through the Village Midwife Pro-
gramme introduced in 1989 to increase access for women in rural villages to quality
health care (Darja et al., 2004). Under the program, midwives were trained in
nursing and midwifery. The programme was rolled out in phased with priority was
given to poor and remote areas (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2001). Studies have
provided evidence that the programme had successfully decreased infant mortality
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, improving BMI of reproductive-age women, child birth weight and height for age
(Frankenberg, 1995; Frankenberg and Thomas, 2001; Frankenberg et al., 2005).
Indonesian Ministry of Health allocates a designated fund for health which
focus on the readiness of health facilities for expectant mothers and giving birth.
In 2006, the Ministry of Health had educated and assigned more than 54,000
village midwives through Bidan Desa Program (health.bmz.de). In 2013, the
Ministry of Health provided midwives kits and assigned 104,178 village midwives
throughout all Indonesian villages. They claimed that it had contributed to a
substantial decrease in maternal mortality (Performance Accountability Report,
Ministry of Health, 2013)
Since 2014, based on Undang-undang (Law) number 6 year 2014 on the Village
Government (Undang-undang tentang desa) Indonesian Government has initiated
the Ministry of Villages, Development Acceleration and Transmigration (Inter-
island migration). The law instruct the Ministry provides fixed funds to support
all Indonesian villages. The village fund is allocated in Annual State Budget.
3
Data
3.1 Conditional Cash Transfers programme (PKH)
Data
The data on Conditional Cash Transfers programme, PKH 2007, 2009 and 2013
is used for chapter 4, the impact of conditional cash transfer programme on fe-
male labour participation. The Program Keluarga Harapan, PKH, household CCT
programme data is obtained from the World Bank and the National Team for
Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K). The data used for Indonesia CCT
programme PKH is obtained from Survey Pelayanan Kesehatan dan Pendidikan
(SPKP) or Health and Education Service Survey from the World Bank (http://
microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1047) and published data from
the National Team for Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K). The survey
consists of three waves of household surveys conducted by the World Bank in 2007,
2008 and in 2009 and the endline survey conducted in 2013 by the National Team
for Acceleration of Poverty Alleviation (TNP2K).
The baseline survey (2007) was designed as randomised controlled trial (RCT)
in six provinces; DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo
and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). The richest 20 percent of districts in each province
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were excluded from CCT programme. The randomisation is carried out across eligi-
ble subdistricts or kecamatan (World Bank Impact evaluation report, 2011). Selec-
tion criteria for eligible sub-districts was based on special characteristics including
prevalence of malnutrition, poverty rate, school drop-out rate, and availability of
health and education facilities. Subsequently, from the eligible sub-districts list,
two sets of sub-districts were randomly selected to be assigned as treatment and
control groups. From each sample PKH sub-district, households were randomly
sampled based on PKH beneficiary’s criteria. The baseline survey included a
random sample of people who are eligible but are not going to receive PKH (serves
as counterfactuals) in randomly selected PKH treatment sub-districts. The survey
also included a random sample of eligible households as counterfactuals in randomly
selected control sub-districts (World Bank report, 2011).
Table 3.1 lists the questionnaire modules which comprise household core, school-
aged children core, babies and toddler, home-based tests scores data, village char-
acteristics, community health centers, midwives, primary schools, junior secondary
school data, and village health service staff.
3.2 Indonesia Family Life Surveys (IFLS) Data
Chapter 5 on the investigation of the effects of nine-years compulsory schooling
employs Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) data. IFLS is an on-going longitudi-
nal household survey conducted by the RAND Corporation. IFLS is an integrated
socio-economic longitudinal survey comprising wide-range information including
the lives of the respondents, households and their communities. The survey is a
representative sample of about 83 percent of Indonesian population which includes
over thirty thousand individuals. The first wave, IFLS1, was conducted in 1993-
1994. The survey sample represented about 83% of the Indonesian population living
in 13 of the country’s 26 provinces in 1993. IFLS2 followed up with the same sample
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Table 3.1: Survey questionnaire modules
Modules Information_Contents
Household Respondent: Female household head or spouse of a male household
head. Household roster, deaths of household members in the past 12
months, migration, water, receive of government social assistance
programmes, participation in non-formal education, consumption,
assets, morbidity, outpatient care use.
Mothers Respondent: Mothers aged 16-49 years. Fertility history, access to
healthcare services during pregnancy, family planning, health and
education knowledge.
Children School-aged children. Children aged 6-15 years. Respondent:
mother of the child. School enrolment, attendance, cost of schooling,
education assistance, child labour.
Babies and toddler Children aged less than 3 years. Growth monitoring, immunisation
records, moto development, nutritional intake.
Home-based tests Math test and reading skills administered at home (separate test for
aged 6-12 and 13-15).
Village characteristics Respondent: village head. Demography of the village, village
information, access to health services and schools, economic shocks,
community participation, daily wage rate
Community Health Community Health Centers (Puskesmas). Head of facility
information, coverage area, budget, staff roster, time allocation of
lead doctor and midwives coordinator, services provided, fee
schedule, number of patients served during the last month,
medicines and vaccine stock, data on village health staff, direct
observation on facility cleanliness and hygiene
Village midwives Personal qualification and background, location of duty, condition of
facility, time allocation, income, services provided, fee schedule
(public and private), experiences during past three deliveries,
number of patients during the last month, equipment and tools,
medical supplies and stock, village post management, structure of
subsidies received.
Schools Principal qualification and background and time allocation, teacher
roster, school facilities, teaching hours, enrolment records,
attendance records, official test scores, education assistance, fees,
budget, direct observations of classrooms and random check on
classroom attendance.
Note:
Source: World Bank, 2011.
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four years later, in 1997-1998. One year after IFLS2, a 25% subsample was surveyed
to provide information about the impact of Indonesia’s economic crisis. IFLS3 was
fielded on the full sample in 2000, IFLS4 in 2007-2008 and IFLS5 in 2014-2015.
In the compulsory schooling study, the latest wave survey is employed, IFLS-
5 which was conducted in 2014-2015 (https://www.rand.org). In IFLS5 the
recontact rate was 92%. Individual target households (including split-off house-
holds as separate) the recontact rate was 90.5%. These recontact rates are as
high as or higher than most longitudinal surveys in the United States and Europe.
High re-contact rates were obtained in part because their commitment on tracking
and interviewing individuals who had moved or split off from the origin IFLS1
households. High re-interview rates contribute significantly to data quality in a
longitudinal survey because they reduce the risk of bias due to nonrandom attrition
in studies using the data.
In this study, the observations are restricted for year of birth from 1968 to 1989
which includes individuals born 11 years before and after the cut-off date. The
assumption is all individuals from 1979 birth cohorts entered junior high school in
1994 or later. This is a reasonable assumption as most children in Indonesia enter
primary school at the age seven and thus would enter junior secondary school
at the age of thirteen.
3.3 National Programme of Community Empow-
erment (PNPM) Data
Chapter 6 on the evaluation of the Generasi National programme of Community
Empowerment data uses data obtained from Survey Pelayanan Kesehatan dan
Pendidikan (SPKP) or Health and Education Service Survey from the World Bank
(http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1047) wave I in 2007
and wave III in 2009. All the villages within treatment subdistricts receive the
fund. PNPM Generasi programme fund is administered within a village-level. In
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2007, PNPM Generasi provided 1,605 villages in 129 subdistricts with an annual
block grant (Olken et al., 2012). The Generasi treatment receive a block grant
with an average amount of US $100,000 for each subdistricts. Of the total Generasi
subdistricts, 90% are in rural areas. Generasi targeted rural subdistricts which have
participated in the KDP, Subdistrict Development programme (KDP)1 for a mini-
mum of two years and have certain experience with village-level planning (Sparrow
et al., 2008). There are no supply-readiness requirements since Generasi intended to
improve less supply-ready areas2. The randomisation for the treatment and control
groups was done at subdistrict levels. The randomisation process involved drawing
300 subdistricts to be assigned as treatment and control subdistricts. There are 200
subdistricts assigned as treatment areas and 100 subdistricts assigned as control
areas. The individuals that are used for impact evaluation purpose are sampled
from five provinces (West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, and East
Nusa Tenggara) in 3000 villages and 12 thousand households that were randomly
selected from the 300 Generasi programme subdistricts.
Figure 3.1 depicts the the distribution of number of children based on mothers’
age in 2007 and 2009 and figure 3.2 depicts the distribution of toddlers based on
their age (months) for both boys and girls in 2007.
In terms of healthcare providers, Generasi programme surveys 300 Puskesmas,
one Puskesmas was randomly selected from each subdistrict, 696 midwives and
1200 Posyandu. Sampling frame for midwives was from list of midwives who
work in Puskemas and list of private practice midwives. Two midwives were
selected from the Puskesmas list and two from private practice list (Sparrow et
al. 2008). Health providers were asked about medical supplies, equipment, staff
and services provided.
1Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP), initiated in 1998 is subdistrict development
programme which provides financial support to build infrastructure and capacities in rural areas.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Children and Age of Mother Year 2007 to Year 2009
3.4 Village Potential Data (PODES)
Village potential data is a village population census which is conducted three
times every ten years which comprises of more than 65 thousand villages. The
first survey was conducted in 1976 called Village Facilities. The Village Potential
Statistics (PODES) dataset provides information about village (desa) character-
istics across Indonesia.
Information collected in Podes comprises village characteristics, employment,
housing and environment, natural disasters and natural disaster mitigation, edu-
cation and health facilities, social and cultural facilities, sports and entertainment
facilities, transportation facilities and infrastructure, information and communi-
cation facilities, economy and finance infrastructures, security, village community
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Figure 3.2: Height and Age of Toddler in Year 2007 to Year 2009
the periodic censuses (Agriculture, Economy, Population). The Indonesia National
Statistics Agency (BPS) has collected village-level data since 1980. PODES activity
has been conducted in-line with the implementations of the Population Census,
Agriculture Census and Economic Census.
The latest 2018 PODES data shows that there are currently 83,931 village
administration units which consists of 75,436 desa and 8,444 kelurahan (National
Statistics Agency, 2018). Podes also recorded 7,232 subdistricts and 514 dis-
tricts/municipals. Indeks Pembangunan Desa or village development index shows
the development progress with category as “left behind”, “developing” or “devel-
oped”. village development index comprises five dimensions: basic services, infras-
tructure condition, transportation, public services and the village governance (Na-
tional Statistics Agency, 2018). The village development index results categorised
14,461 villages (19.2%) as “left behind”, 55,369 villages (73.4%) as “developing” and
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5,606 villages (7.4%) as “developed”. The 2014 village development index improved
compared to 19,750 villages (26.8%) as “left behind”, 51,026 (69.2%) as developing"
and 2,894 villages (2.9%) as “developed”(National Statistics Agency, 2018).
Descriptive Statistics
Village Data 2006 and 2011
The Generasi programme is village-based community CCT programme which sam-
pled from five provinces which randomised 2,306 villages from 264 Generasi subdis-
tricts. As the fund was administered at the village level, the village potential data
are shown to give a broad picture of village characteristics and facilities.
Village potential data is a village population census which is conducted three
times every ten years comprises of more than 54 thousand villages. The first
survey was conducted in 1976 called Village Facilities. Table 3.2 shows the villages’
characteristics in terms of education facilities in all Indonesian villages in 2006 and
2011. The questionnaire asks the village the number of schools in each level and
category, public and private. The average number of kindergartens in a village was
one in 2006 and 1.5 in 2011. The average number of public primary schools was
two in every village in 2006 and 2011 and the number was one in two villages for
private primary schools. The average number of public junior secondary schools
was one in five villages in 2006 and almost one in three villages in 2011. The
number was one in three villages for private primary schools in 2006 and 2011.
The average number of public senior secondary schools was one in 12 villages in
2006 and 2011, and the number was twice as many for private primary schools.
The average number of vocational high schools was as low as one in 45 villages in
2006 and increased to one in 29 villages in 2011.
Table 3.3 shows the villages’ characteristics in terms of health facilities and
health personnel in 2006 and 2011. The questionnaire asks the village the number
of health facilities for each type, the number of health personnel in each category
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Table 3.2: Villages’ Characteristics-Education in 2006 and 2011
Year 2006 Year 2011
Variables No Obs Mean No Obs. Mean.
Kindergarten 54,107 1.056 54,107 1.473
Primary school _public 54,107 2.044 54,107 1.933
Primary school _private 54,107 0.472 54,107 0.508
Middle school _ public 54,107 0.213 54,107 0.285
Middle school _ private 54,107 0.304 54,107 0.376
High school _ public 54,107 0.075 54,107 0.085
High school_ private 54,107 0.144 54,107 0.176
Vocational school 54,107 0.022 54,107 0.034
Note:
Village Potensial Data 2006 and 2011
and the number of people covered by the regional health insurance. Public hospital
is available in district level, at least one RSUD (district public hospital) present
in each district, less than 3% of the villages have hospital. The average number of
community/subdistrict health centres or Puskesmas was one in 8 villages in 2006
and 2011. The number was one in three villages in 2006 and 2011 for support
subdistrict health centres, while the number was one in six villages for nurse’s
clinics in 2006 and 2011.
Less than fifty percent of the villages have general practitioners and only fourty
percent of the villages have village maternal centres. The average number of
midwives in a village was 1.2 in 2006 and increased to 1.7 in 2011. The average
number of neighbourhood monthly health centres, Posyandu, was 3.6 in every
village in 2006 and increased to 4.7 in 2011. The average number of male doctors
was one in every 2 villages in 2006 and 2011, and the number was one in 4 villages
in 2006 and increased to one in 3 villages in 2011 for female doctors. The average
number of people covered by regional health insurance in a village was 186 in 2006
and increased considerably to 705 individuals in 2011.
The report from World Bank on insights into health provision in Indonesia
confirms that health facilities are facing distributional issue. Despite the average
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Table 3.3: Village Characteristics-Health Facilities in 2006 and 2011
Year 2006 Year 2011
Variables No Obs Mean No Obs. Mean.
Nbr of Hospitals 54,107 0.028 54,107 0.031
Nbr of Birth Hospitals 54,107 0.089 54,107 0.084
Nbr of Com. health centers (Pusk) 54,107 0.125 54,107 0.125
Nbr of Support Com health ctr 54,107 0.315 54,107 0.303
Nbr of Nurses clinics 54,107 0.169 54,107 0.156
Nbr of GPs 54,107 0.495 54,107 0.505
Nbr of midwives 54,107 1.189 54,107 1.676
Nbr of Vill health centers 54,107 0.397 54,107 0.401
Nbr of occasional Health services (Posyandu) 54,107 3.606 53,314 4.732
Nbr of male doctors 54,107 0.422 54,107 0.425
Nbr of female doctors 54,107 0.232 54,107 0.296
Nbr of birth assistants 54,107 1.555 54,107 1.875
Nbr of people-regional health insurance 54,107 186.580 54,107 704.920
Note:
Village Potensial Data 2006 and 2011
number of doctors per Puskesmas has grown since 1996, there are more Puskesmas
without doctor, especially in rural areas. Moreover, in terms of the ratio of private
doctors to population, the rural-urban gap has widened (Rokx et al., 2009).
Table 3.4 shows the villages’ characteristics in terms of general facilities in 2006
and 2011. The questionnaire asks questions on several village facilities (dummy
variables), including whether there is any post office, village unit cooperatives,
saving and credit cooperatives. Besides, the questionnaire collects data on the
village’s leader and deputy’s education level and qualification. The average number
of households connected to self-provided electricity in a village was 17 in 2006 and
increased to 194 in 2011. The average number of households connected to the
land-line phone in a village was 109 in 2006 and fell to 88 in 2011, which might
be due the emerging use of cellular phones. The average number of post office was
one in 15 villages in 2006 and fell to one in 16 villages in 2011, which might be
due to the fall in the use of conventional mailing services and the rise in private
delivery services. The average number of mobile post office in a village was one in
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5 villages in 2006 and fell to one in 6.8 villages in 2011. The average number of
village cooperatives was one in 8 villages in 2006 and fell to one in 10 villages in
2011. The average number of saving and credit cooperatives was one in two villages
in 2006 and increased to one in 1.7 villages in 2011. The average number of small
business credit units in a village was 3.7 in 2006 and increased to 5.7 in 2011. The
average number of conventional banks was one in 6 villages in 2006 and increased
to one in 4 villages in 2011. The average number of community credit banks was
one in 10 villages in 2006 and increased to one in 9 villages in 2011.
In terms of education level of village leaders, the proportion of village heads who
completed elementary school or less, completed junior secondary school, completed
senior secondary school and completed college or higher were 33.74 percent, 48.46
percent, 4.65 percent and 15.15 percent in 2006. The village leaders’ education level
increased considerably in 2011. The proportion of village leaders who completed
elementary school or less was 2.8 percent, completed junior secondary school was
16.13 percent, completed senior secondary school was 55.24 percent, completed
college was 4.03 percent and 21.79 percent completed a university degree.
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Table 3.4: Village Characteristics-Facilities in 2006 and 2011
Year 2006 Year 2011
Variables No Obs Mean No Obs. Mean.
Electricity by govt 50,755 620.413 54,107 744.561
Electricity self_provided 54,107 17.546 54,107 194.857
Nbr of HHs with land line phone 54,107 109.51 54,107 88.370
Any post office (dummy variable) 54,107 0.065 54,107 0.061
Any mobile post office (dummy variable) 54,107 0.18 54,107 0.146
Village unit cooperatives 54,107 0.118 54,107 0.102
Comm. Small industry coop. 54,107 0.0176 54,107 0.021
Saving and credit coop. 54,107 0.467 54,107 0.584
Small business credit 54,107 3.761 54,107 5.759
Nbr of conventional banks 54,107 0.157 54,107 0.224
Nbr of community credit banks (subdist) 54,107 0.094 54,107 0.113
Village head education (ordinal) 53,406 3.889 53,254 5.243
Year 2006 village head education level Freq. Percent
No schooling (1) 846 1.58
Not comp. Elementary sch. (2) 4,884 9.15
Completed Elementary sch. (3) 12,288 23.01
Completed Junior high sch. (4) 24,814 46.46
Completed Senior high sch. (5) 2,482 4.65
Completed college or higher (6) 8,092 15.15
53,406 100
Year 2011 village head education level Freq. Percent
No schooling (1) 179 0.34
Not comp. Elementary sch. (2) 471 0.88
Completed Elementary sch. (3) 843 1.58
Completed Junior high sch. (4) 8,591 16.13
Completed Senior high sch. (5) 29,419 55.24
Completed college (6) 2,147 4.03
Completed university (7) 11,604 21.79
53,254 100
Note:
Village Potensial Data 2006 and 2011
4
Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer
Programme on Female Labour Force
Participation
4.1 Introduction
One of the most effective ways for a country to alleviate poverty is by breaking the
poverty chain between generations through increasing consumption and inducing
investment in child education and health (Barrientos and DeJong 2004, Fiszbein
et al. 2009). One of the principal approaches to advance economic development
is through investment in human capital (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1964; Colclough,
1982). This approach can be achieved by improving health and education level of
the people. The Indonesian Government had implemented several programmes,
including social safety net, energy subsidy and unconditional cash transfer to
alleviate poverty.
The Indonesian Government has implemented several programmes, including
social safety net, energy subsidy and unconditional cash transfer to alleviate poverty.
In 2007, the Indonesian Government launched a large-scale pilot programme of
conditional cash transfer with objectives to reduce poverty, improve beneficiaries’
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health outcomes and to provide universal basic education (Alatas et al., 2011).
This chapter’s research objective is to investigate the impact of Indonesian Gov-
ernment conditional cash transfers (CCT) programme, Program Keluarga Harapan
on female labour participation using clustered randomised control trial (clustered-
RCT) data from years 2007, 2009 and 2013. Banerjee et al. (2015) studied seven
CCTs in six developing countries; Honduras, Morocco, Phillipines, Mexico, In-
donesian, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Using randomised controlled trial data, they
performed difference-in-difference regressions. They did not find any significant
effect on work outcomes by receiving treatment. In the study, Banerjee et al. (2015)
evaluated the impact of Indonesian PKH on work two years after the programme
implemented. A finding on CCT impact on fertility showed that in Honduras,
the CCT had a small impact in the short-run by 2-4 percentage points. It may
due to one of the requirements that new households could be registered if they
gave birth to a child, and the transfer amount depended on the number of young
children (Stecklov et al., 2006).
This chapter contributes to the literature by evaluating the impact of household
conditional cash transfer programme on female labour participation as an unin-
tended effect, six years after the programme implemented. This study specifically
investigates labour participation of the mothers who receive the cash transfer in the
household because the role as a household manager may give her more authority
within the household. Later, the fertility rate among the mothers from treatment
and control areas are evaluated for the unintended effect of the programme.
The programme features involve quarterly payment through post offices, con-
ditionality and cash penalty, field facilitators, and area supply-readiness of the
health and education facilities. Another characterising feature of this programme
is that it is given to and managed by the adult female in each qualifying household.
There is a large body of literature that shows if mothers are given greater control
over resources, more resources will be allocated to children’s health and education
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(Thomas, 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Lundberg et al. 1997; Attanasio and
Lechene 2002, Schady and Rosero, 2008). This feature might have implications on
women empowerment and their labour supply decisions. Given the nature of the
program, female decision making on how to spend the money becomes very crucial
in achieving the programme objectives (Attanasio and Lechene, 2002).
A study in Mexico, Honduras, and Nicaragua indicated that the effects of
the CCT programmes on adults labour participation were negative, small and
insignificant (Alzua et al. 2013). Although the transfers were substantial in size,
the programmes did not reduce the labour supply in the short run. There were
additional findings for the Mexican Progresa, which indicated a small positive effect
on the work hours of female beneficiaries, a considerable increase in wages among
male beneficiaries, which resulted in an increase in household labour income two
years after the programme implementation (Alzua et al. 2013). The impacts could
be attributed to the changes in the adults’ labour supply in eligible households
and to the increased available time of women as a result of higher children school
enrolment rates (Alzua et al. 2013).
While the programme was designed as a direct incentive to improve health and
education outcomes of the beneficiaries, it is expected that the programme would
affect female labour participation. The analysis and motivation of this study is
focused on the latter.
This study attempts to test hypothesis that the CCT may increase female labour
participation due to an empowerment effect and the cash transfer may reduce
participation through an income effect. Thus, the sum of the effects depends on
which effect is stronger. The total effect can be positive if the empowerment effect
is greater than the income effect.
This research is important for the following reasons. First, few studies exist
to date in Indonesia female labour supply and women empowerment such as con-
ducted by Samarakoon and Parinduri (2015), Schaner and Das (2016). Therefore,
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this study is going to add to the understanding of female labour supply decision
making in Indonesia. Second, this study also aims to provide policy implications to
improve programme effectiveness of the ongoing poverty alleviation programmes,
particularly in empowering women.
In modeling female labour supply in a developing country, the relationship
between female labour force participation (FLFP) and development needs to be
analysed. The relationship is complicated and reflects changes in education levels,
economic activity, social norms, fertility rate and other factors involving other
members of the household such as spouse’s income (Verick, 2014). FLFP in
Indonesia has been well documented (Smith, Thomas, Frankenberg, Beegle and
Teruel, 2002; Schaner and Das, 2016). The decision making is influenced by
several factors including individual preferences, family composition, labour demand
conditions, as well as the types of jobs available and matched for women with
education, which collectively play a crucial role in determining the labour and
supply conditions. However, the above relevant variables are often correlated
with one another, and the direction of causality is mixed. For example, having
children may either encourage or discourage females’ decision to work. It may
encourage women to work because of the needs that arise due to having a child,
but it could also prevent them from working due to the time constraints (Klasen
and Pieters, 2015).
FLFP plays a significant role in economic development in Indonesia. Micro-
level evidence shows that the high participation rate in low-income countries is
attributed to inadequate income of household heads. Therefore, women need
to work to earn additional income. The women work mostly in informal jobs
particularly in agriculture which remuneration takes the form of unpaid, in-kind
only, cash, or a combination of these (Rodgers and Zveglich, Jr., 2012). High
female labour force participation rates in developing country could also reflect
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poverty which implies women work to respond to family income shocks such as
spouse’s wage decrease.
The economic downturn in 1998 has led to Indonesia’s political shift from
a president dictatorship era to a reform era. The changes severely affected In-
donesia’s political, economic, and social structure. Unemployment rates, school
dropouts, malnutrition incidence and poverty rate increased (National Statistics
Agency data). The economic crisis was triggered by Asian monetary and financial
crisis in 1997 when the Indonesian currency, rupiah, depreciated from an average of
2,300 per US dollar from mid-1996 1997 to 10,000 per US dollar in 1998. Due to the
considerable amount of private foreign debt that was not hedged, this consequently
led to bankruptcy in banking sector.1 Plunge in market confidence led investors
to withdraw their investment along with foreign capital flight. Many factories had
to shut down and lay off employees because their product goods had high import
content. Unemployment surged, and most people experienced lower purchasing
power. At the same time, many government projects including infrastructure
projects were cancelled.
As a response to the crisis, between 1998 and 2005, the government gave more
attention to people who lost their jobs by creating labour intensive jobs and social
safety net programme. Since the neediest households did not have access to credit
markets to cope with the crisis, the government responded by launching several
programmes to assist the poor. The programmes include a Social Security Net in
the form of unconditional transfer in 1998, health insurance for the poor, a national
fuel subsidy programme in 2002-2005 and rice for the poor in 2005.
1One of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations was to liquidate banks in
Indonesia and Thailand due to of high internal group lending and non-performing loans. Several
major banks had been taken over by the Indonesian Banking Restructuring agency, 16 banks in
November 1997 and 7 more in January 1998 due to insolvency (Smith et al., 2002). The IMF
recommendation in liquidating those banks was without any knowledge that there was no deposit
insurance which led to customer panic and a bank run until January 1998 when a depositor
guarantee institution was finally established and announced.
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After enduring the Asian Financial Crisis, macroeconomic growth saw a steady
improvement with annual GDP growth from minus 13% between 1997 and 1998 to
4.9% between 1999 and 2000. Despite the improvement in macroeconomic indica-
tors, microeconomics indicators particularly health and education have lagged the
macroeconomic indicators (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2007). A conditional cash
transfer programme, Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), launched in 2007 as a
pilot project, was designed as direct incentive to improve health and education
outcomes (TNP2K).
Smith et al. (2002) found that the Indonesia female labour force had a significant
role in participating in the job market during the crisis. This role was particularly in
the informal sector shown by an increase in female labour participation rate by three
percentage points between 1997 and 1998. Whereas, male labour participation
decreased by 3.5 percentage points in the formal sectors. Official Indonesian labour
force statistics and ILO estimates show that FLFP rates have been roughly constant
throughout the last two decades. Figure 4.1 shows an illustration of Indonesia
labour force participation in 2006 by age and gender. The data is obtained from
2006 Survey Angkatan Kerja (Sakernas) employment data. Figure 4.1 shows that
female labour force participation was considerably lower than that of male for
all age groups.
This study will explore the impact of the CCT programme, PKH, in affecting
the female decision to enter the labour market. The study is intended to answer
the research question of whether the CCT programme had impact on female labour
force participation. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section
4.2 describes the PKH CCT programme. background on labour supply. Section
4.3 discusses the theoretical background on labour supply. Section 4.4 discusses
previous studies on conditional cash transfer programmes and the effects. Section
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Figure 4.1: Labour Force Participation by Age and Gender, Source: National Labour
Force Survey, Indonesia National Statistics Agency
4.5 describes the data employed and section 4.6 discusses the empirical specifica-
tion. Section 4.7 presents the results and section 4.8 discusses the results and
concludes the chapter.
4.2 The CCT Programme: Program Keluarga
Harapan (PKH)
Poverty alleviation programmes in Indonesia are divided into three different clus-
ters, with the objectives to improve the health and education of the households,
including, economic wellbeing both individuals and the community. PKH is one of
the programmes in Indonesia’s social programme Cluster 1.2
2Cluster 1 programmes target individuals and households. Other programmes in cluster 1 are
Raskin (subsidised rice), Jamkesmas (health insurance) and BSM (education assistance) or now
Smart programme. Cluster 2 comprises several PNPM programmes, a set of community-driven
development programmes to empower the people and improve the welfare of the poor communities.
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Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) is an Indonesian household conditional cash
transfer programme. It was first introduced in 2007 as a pilot project in six
provinces with objectives to reduce maternal mortality and to provide the beneficia-
ries access to public healthcare services and universal coverage of basic education.
The programme was then launched as a national programme in 2012. PKH is
administered by Indonesia Ministry of Social Affairs with supervision from the
National Planning Agency (Bappenas).
The short-term objective of the programme is to reduce the burden of poor
households, whilst the long-run goals are to break the poverty chain between
generations, to improve the quality of human resources and to change health-related
behaviour. The change in the behaviour is expected through tying the cash transfer
with behavioural compliance. The cash transfer is conditional upon enrolment
of school aged children, 85% monthly attendance in school, toddlers visits to
monthly health care facilities for growth monitoring, immunisation, and nutrition
supplementation, expectant and nursing mothers visit to subdistrict health care
facilities to receive pre-natal checks, newborns and infants receiving post-natal
care and health check-ups.
The implementation of PKH also supports the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). Five components of MDGs are anticipated to be achieved by PKH,
i.e. eradicating poverty and deprivation; providing universal basic education; pro-
moting gender equality and women empowerment; reducing baby and child mor-
tality; improving maternal health and reducing maternal mortality.
The payment mechanism is through cash transfer to the mother or adult female
(grandmother, aunt, sister) who is then called a family manager. A female family
manager is considered more effective in improving the quality of education and
health of the beneficiaries. Exceptions are possible in a certain situation, such
Cluster 3 is the development of micro and small enterprises programme through the microcredit,
a credit guarantee programme administered by participating public and private banks (National
Team for Acceleration of Poverty Alleviation,TNP2K).
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as when there is no adult female in the family, then the male household head
can receive the transfer. First, the cash is paid to mothers from the nearest
post office in the area. The transfer amount is between 15% and 20% of the
estimated consumption of low-income households with rules on how the money
should be spent. Second, PKH was designed to enforce conditionality with a cash
penalty for non-compliance. Cash penalty will be imposed if the beneficiaries fail
to comply with the conditions. Beneficiaries will get warning on the first breach, a
10 percent cash penalty on the second breach, and removal from the programme on
the third breach. PKH beneficiaries are also eligible to receive other social benefits,
including education assistance for poor, community health insurance, and rice for
the poor programmes. Third, the presence of field facilitators who were trained to
advise household regarding conditionalities, including their rights and obligations
and eligibility monitoring. Lastly, PKH is mostly implemented in supply-ready
urban areas. Supply-readiness is assessed based on existing education and health
facilities and infrastructure.
The target of the programme is poor households that were identified through
a proxy-means test (PMT). The PMT has been used before in Mexican Progresa
and Colombian Familia in determining poor households. PMT comprises 29 vari-
ables on assets and demographic characteristics including housing characteristics
(construction materials), education attainment levels, sources of energy, types of
employment and access to health and education services. The method aims to
address the unobservable income problem, which targeted the lowest 7-10% of the
population. The income of lowest income population is not recorded since the
people mostly hold informal and precarious job. Sometimes they earn money but
sometimes they do not earn any money.
The rank of welfare was determined using Proxy-means testing (PMT) model
constructed using Susenas data (TNP2K, 2014), which statistically represents house-
hold characteristics in each city/district in Indonesia. In addition, the enumerators
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also collected other households considered poor based on the referrals and consulta-
tion with neighbours and field observations. PMT is used to determine households’
socio-economic condition based on household characteristics, namely the number
of family members, education levels, housing conditions and assets owned. The
method is confined to the PMT method widely used in other developing countries
to rank household welfare.
Having been identified as eligible by PMT, each household should at least meet
one of the following eligibility programme criteria:
1. Having expectant/nursing mother within the last 24 months
2. Having a child aged 0-5 and 5-7 who has not entered primary school
3. Having primary and secondary school-age child (7-15)
4. Having a child aged 16-18 who has not finished the mandatory 9-year basic
education including children with disabilities
As a conditional programme, PKH links the programme benefits to the bene-
ficiaries’ compliance upon required conditions:
• School-aged children need to be enrolled in school
• School-aged children minimum monthly attendance rate is 85%
• Expectant/nursing mother minimum visit to subdistrict health facilities
• Toddlers and pre-school aged children are required to be present in subdistrict
health service or monthly health facilities for growth monitoring
Table 4.1 shows the original plan for PKH location and participant from 2007 to
2014. When it was first launched in 2007, the programme target was the poorest
5% of the population. However, after 2011 the target was expanded to 25% of
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Table 4.1: PKH participants and location by year of participation 2007-2013
Programs Y_2007 Y_2008 Y_2009 Y_2010 Y_2011 Y_2012 Y_2013
Target benefiiaries 500000 642000 720000 816000 1116000 1516000 2400000
Realization 387974 620848 726376 774294 1052201 1492473 2326523
Additional participants 232874 105528 47917 277908 440272 834050
Number of provinces 6 13 13 20 25 33 33
Municials/Districts 48 70 70 88 166 166 333
Sub-Districts 337 637 781 964 1387 2001 3417
Note:
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and National Team for Acceleration of Poverty Alleviation (2014).
the lowest income groups of the population, which makes the near-poor families
were also included. In the expansion phase in 2012, PKH was implemented in all
Indonesian provinces. The number of beneficiaries or PKH participants gradually
increased to reach all the low-income families in poor households contingent upon
the government financial ability. In 2014, 3.2 million beneficiaries from the poorest
households were targeted.
With regards to implementation, monitoring and evaluation purpose, the Min-
istry of Social Affairs established PKH implementation unit or UP-PKH at the
district level. Facilitators are the resources who work closely with the PKH ben-
eficiaries in sub-district levels. The duties of facilitators ranging from programme
socialisation, facilitation including holding monthly group meetings for validation
and case reporting. Other resources in higher levels are districts/cities coordinators,
region coordinators, district technical staff, province’s staff and experts. The
monitoring is performed using a computerised management information system
(MIS) which had been gradually adopted by all sub-districts. The cash transfer is
paid every quarter in February, May, August and November each year, while the
prior two months are the data update and verification month followed by request
month for beneficiaries with valid payment data.
Although PKH CCT is intended as a long-term programme, each household
participation is expected to be up to six years or shorter if participating households
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no longer meet the conditions (natural exit). For beneficiaries who do not exit natu-
rally, they are expected to improve their behaviour towards education, health, and
welfare. After six years, the participation will be recertified with data recollection.
Current PKH guidelines are designed to alleviate short-term poverty and, there-
fore, allow the removal of beneficiaries for three reasons:
1. They no longer satisfy eligibility conditions;
2. They are no longer poor; or
3. They have reached the time limit of six years as a recipient.
Exiting the programme because of the first reason is natural. For example,
a beneficiary’s child has completed nine years of education and hence will no
longer receive support from PKH. However, the second reason is not that obvious
because the programme needs constant monitoring to identify graduating/exiting
households. A scheduled recertification activity can be an option for monitor-
ing. There is another reason why exit by graduation due to income may also
be problematic since some households’ incomes fluctuate around the poverty line.
Hence, the households are still very vulnerable to economic shocks. PKH should
not graduate any household from the programme when there is a high chance
that the household may fall below the poverty line again as they will be unable
to support themselves after leaving the programme. The third reason for exiting
the programme is the six-year limit, unless the households are recertified as still
eligible to receiving the benefits.
4.3 Theoretical Background
The economic literature provides a rich discussion on the determinants of FLFP
and the relationship between FLFP rates and economic development. Based on
the theory of time allocation (Heckman, 1978; Killingsworth, 1983), a woman’s
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decision to join the labour force is the result of bargaining and collective decision-
making process in the household. The time allocated to housework, paid work and
leisure for the individuals are determined by maximisation of the household’s joint
utility function subject to the constraints it faces.
The research question will be addressed by applying the static labour supply
theory. The basic static labour supply model is used in analysng FLFP with an
application of basic consumer theory which comprises a substitution and income
effect (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). The substitution effect results from an
increase in the wage rate reducing the demand for leisure, thus increasing labour
supply. The income effect results from an increase in non-labour income that
increases the demand for leisure, assuming leisure to be a normal good, and thus
reduces labour supply. In the static labour supply model, non-labour income
is the sum of two components, asset income and other unearned income. This
also works as an increase in non-labour income or income earned by another
member of the household which creates income effect and therefore reduces labour
force participation.
The neoclassical labour-leisure trade-off model provides the principal properties
of labour supply. Labour supply is a non-monotonic function of wages. The
principle suggests that labour supply increases when the wage is low, and it later
diminishes as the wage is sufficiently high. The basic model, the notion that
everybody has the possibility to allow trade-off between consumption goods and
leisure arises from the traditional approach of labour supply. The analysis of
choice between consumption and leisure enables identification of the labour supply
determining factors both at the individual level and aggregate level, including
family-level. Utility functions represent an individual’s preferences for consumption
and leisure trade-off.
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Utility is defined over money spent on consumption and hours spent on leisure.
Suppose an individual’s utility function is U (c, l), where c is consumption of
goods and l is hours spent on leisure.
The budget constraints of the individual is given by:
c = wh + M (4.1)
Consumption cannot exceed the total income comprises labour income, wh and
nonlabour income, M. The total income can be spent on consumption or leisure.
The individual has total available of T hours per week to use for working,
h and leisure, l.
T = h + l
c = w (T − l) + M
c = wT + M − wl
(4.2)
An individual problem is to maximise utility over consumption, c, and hours
of leisure, l. The individual is endowed with unit of time, T, which represents the
constraint of how to allocate to working h and leisure l. Let M represents the
total unearned income available for consumption and w the real wage rate, then
the optimal choice for c and l is given by the solution to the individual’s problem
subject to budget constraint in equation (4.1)
Max [U(c, l) | c − wh = M ; c ≥ 0; l ≥ 0] (4.3)
The maximisation problem is solved by maximising the Lagrangian:
max Ω = U(c, l) + λ (wT + M − c − wl) (4.4)
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The first order conditions (FOCs) are
∂Ω
∂c
= Uc − λ = 0 (4.5)
∂Ω
∂l
= Ul − λw = 0 (4.6)
∂Ω
∂λ
= wT + M − c − wl = 0 (4.7)
The ratio of the FOCs in equations (4.5) and (4.6) provides an interior solution






The work hours decision determined by the solution to the constrained utility
maximisation problem, an interior solution, a combination of consumption goods
and leisure, the hours of work or labour supply decision in response to changes in
the exogenous parameters, w and M. The questions formulated are: What happens
to labour hours when nonlabour income changes? and What happens to labour
hours when hourly wage changes?
Change in labour hours resulted from a change in hourly wage can be decom-
posed by the Slutsky equation into a substitution and income effects which can be
derived by combining the constraints from the the FOCs in equations (4.5) to (4.7)
with the second-order conditions of the maximisation problem. The neoclassical
labour-leisure model with two choice variables, c and l can be rewritten as a single-
variable maximisation problem without constraints. Assuming there is an interior
solution, the individual’s maximisation problem is:
max µ = U(c, l)
max µ = U(wT − wl + M, l)
(4.8)
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= Uc(−w) + Ul = 0 (4.9)
Rearranging equation (4.9) yields the ratio of marginal utilities Ul
Uc
= w. As a
standard single-variable maximisation problem, the second-order condition (SOC)
for maximum requirement is that the SOC, ∂2µ/∂l2 is negative.
∂2µ
∂l2
= −w [Ucc(−w) + Ucl] − wUcl + Ull = ∆ < 0 (4.10)
The Slutsky equation can be derived in three different steps. When nonlabour
income M changes, holding the wage constant, find out what happens to leisure
by using total differentiation of the FOC in equation (4.9). The FOC’s total
differentiation resulted from a change in M is:
−w Ucc [−w dl + dM ] − w Ucl dl + Ulc[−w dl + dM ] + Ull dl = 0 (4.11)
By rearranging the above equation resulting in the following equation:
∂l
∂M
(holding dw = 0) = w Ucc − Ulc
∆
(4.12)
The sign of the above equation is still unknown although the denominator is
negative. As previously defined, leisure is a normal good, then dl/dM > 0. Subse-
quently, to determine what happens to leisure if wage changes, holding nonlabour
income constant, M which will theoretically move the individual’s indifference
curve. The individual will be better off if the wage increases and vice versa. FOC
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in equation (4.9) is used to derive the expression for dl/dw and totally differentiate
the equation, holding nonlabour income constant, will result the following equation:
∂l
∂w
(holding dM = 0) = Uc
∆






(holding dw = 0)
(4.13)
The effect of hourly wage change on the leisure amount can be written as the
sum of two terms from the above equation with the first term must be negative
since Uc > 0 and ∆ < 0, and the second term is positive under the assumption
that leisure is a normal good. The first term in equation (4.13) demonstrates the
substitution effect, while the second term demonstrates the income effect. The
substitution effect quantifies the change in the demand for leisure when wage
changes and the individual has to stay on same indifference curve at the utility
of U∗. The individual can stay on the same indifference curve after a wage drop
if the individual is compensated for the loss through an increase in nonlabour
income to keep utility unchanged.
The amount of compensation can be solved by holding utility constant, in other
words, if the wage change, how much nonlabour income need to change to stay at
the same indifference curve? When both w and M change, holding utility constant,
the equation (4.13) is differentiated resulting:
Uc [h dw + dM ] = 0 (4.14)
Thus, dM = −h dw is the compensating change in M.
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The first term in equation (4.15) is the substitution effect, as the denominator in
equation (4.13) is negative, a wage increase makes leisure relatively more expensive,
thus the individual reduces the quantity of leisure and increase the labour supply
hours. The second term is the income effect which sign is negative if leisure is
a normal good.
Turning to previous studies on female labour supply, Mincer (1962) contributed
two original ideas to female labour participation and income relationship. First, the
female choice is not only between leisure and paid work, but also home production
or family chores. Secondly, Mincer (1962) based on Friedman’s consumption theory,
claims that people adjust their consumption to their permanent income, instead of
current income. The results of his cross-sectional studies also showed a negative
relationship between female labour participation and husband’s income, and a
positive relationship between female labour participation and her earning’s power.
However, the higher the husband’s education, the more likely the wife will enter
the labour force. Mincer’s findings also support his hypothesis that a woman is
keen to work when the husband’s income is less than permanent income, and in
this case, her labour force response to the transitory income is stronger than to
permanent income. The woman labour force response is weaker as the husband’s
education is higher.
Mincer and Polachek (1974) in Blau and Kahn (2007) analysed gender differ-
ences in qualifications using human capital model. They argue that compared to
men, women tend to accumulate less labour market experience. In addition, due to
the traditional role of women, they anticipate shorter and discontinuous work life,
thus women have lower incentives in investing in formal education and training.
The women’s lower investments in human capital which will in turn lower their
earnings compared to those of men. Also, Blau and Kahn (2007) argued that the
more hours women spend in housework, may reduce their effort in the job market,
which could decrease productivity and wages.
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There is considerable empirical evidence to suggest a U-shaped relationship of
FLFP with the process of economic development (Kottis, 1990, Schultz, 1991 and
Tam, 2011). The evidence of a U-shaped relationship is based on the historical ex-
perience of developed countries and in multi-country studies. In the United States,
the pattern is U-shape, FLFP fell during the initial stages of economic growth and
began to rise later as its growth continued (Goldin,1995). Mincer (1985), Pampel
and Tanaka (1986) argue that high-income and low-income countries have the
highest FLFP, while middle-income countries have the lowest.
In the emerging of industrial and service sectors, women may not be able to
compete with men due to their lower educational attainments. Social customs or
employers’ preference may also deter women’s employment in the manufacturing
sector. Women may also be held back by tradition, culture and household responsi-
bilities (Klasen and Pieters, 2015). Conversely, as women’s education improves and
their wages relative to the price of goods rise, their participation in the labour force
increases. Goldin (1995) and Tam (2011) consider the income effects (change in
labour supply as household income changes) and substitution effects (female wages
change but income remains constant) that contribute to the U-shaped pattern. The
declining part of the U-shaped curve suggests that a strong income effect dominates.
In the rising part, the substitution effect of higher wages dominates the small
income effect (Mincer, 1962; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Goldin, 1995).
Labour supply models and previous research on FLFP and economic devel-
opment (Mammen and Paxson, 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2007) argue that higher
education and growth in white-collar services employment would give more incen-
tive for women to enter the labour market. While, on the other hand, a rise in
household income works as income effect that would lead to female withdrawal from
the labour market. Several studies also show a U-shaped relationship between
FLFP and per capita income level (Mammen and Paxson 2000). Tansel (2001)
argues that education significantly affects an individual’s decision to participate
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in the labour market (extensive margin) and also in deciding how many hours
to supply (intensive margin) in the labour market. In Japan and Korea, there
have been significant increases in female educational attainment levels in the past.
Notwithstanding, FLFP remains low despite the higher-level education of women.
4.4 Previous Studies on Conditional Cash Trans-
fer Programmes
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) is one of the most adopted social assistance
programs worldwide within the last two decades (Fiszbein et al., 2009). There
has been substantial growth in social safety programs in developing countries
and the wealthier a country becomes, the more social insurance as a fraction of
GDP increases (Chetty and Looney, 2007). The development in CCT programmes
worldwide was motivated by the success of the Progresa programme in Mexico
(1997). Progresa was one of the first large-scale conditional cash transfer pro-
grammes in the world.
Most of the CCTs aimed at reducing consumption poverty and encouraging
investments in children’s health and education. Turning to evidence from previous
studies on the impact of conditional cash transfer programmes on adult labour
participation and on health and education outcomes. Fisbein and Schady (2009)
found the CCT programmes had positive effects on household consumption and on
poverty reduction, with the largest consumption effects were found in Nicaragua
where the transfer amount was generous and poverty fell by 5-9 percentage points.
Although there was a concern when CCTs were first launched that they would
reduce labour market participation because beneficiaries would like to appear poor
enough to stay eligible or because they would choose to consume more leisure at
higher income levels, the evidence did not support the concern. The results on
Cambodia, Equador and Mexico showed that adult beneficiaries did not reduce
their work due to the CCT programmes. Instead, CCTs had led to considerable
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reduction in child labour as found in Brazil, Cambodia, Equador, Mexico and
Nicaragua. In Cambodia, CCT successfully reduced child who worked for pay by 10
percentage points (Fisbein and Schady, 2009). Other findings are CCTs had a small
impact on fertility in the short-run in Honduras by 2-4 percentage points, because
of the requirement that new households could be registered if they gave birth to a
child, and the transfer amount depended on the number of young children (Stecklov
et al., 2006). CCTs did not have impacts on remittance crowding out (Teruel and
Davis, 2000) or increase in prices or wages (Angelucci and de Giorgi, 2009).
De Janvry et al. (2006) studied Progresa using panel data and test whether
conditional cash transfer programmes can serve as safety nets for children school
enrolment and preventing from child work. They developed a household school
enrolment and child work decision model. The model accounts for schooling as a
programme condition and then looks at the response to shock exposure and the
programme potential mitigating effect. The results suggest that school enrolment
as one of Progresa conditions substantially secured children from shocks. However,
the programme failed to prevent child work from increasing further exposure to
family income shocks. If schooling is a normal good, demand for schooling increases
with income. School subsidy relaxes credit constraint thus allowing poor families
to invest more in schooling (Schultz, 2004). Schultz (2004) estimates child labour
supply with instrumental variable assuming school enrolment is exogenous. The
IV estimates suggest that enrolment had significantly reduced child work. There
are no consistent and statistically significant effects on fertility within short-term.
Schady and Araujo (2006) analysed the impact of cash transfer programme,
Bono de Dessarollo Humano (BHD) on school enrolment and child work among poor
children in Equador using a randomised design. They found the programme had
a pronounced positive impact on school enrolment and a negative impact on child
work, 10 and minus 17 percentage points, respectively. Additionally, the existing
belief among households that the programme was conditional upon enrolment.
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Although the condition was never enforced, it could explain the programme effect
size. Behrman et al. (2005) employed a Markov model of schooling transitions
to assess the impact of Progresa school subsidy programme. A Markov model of
school transitions utilised to empirically differentiate various of programme impacts
comprising effects on early age of school entry, dropout rates, grade repetition rates,
and school re-entry rates among the dropouts. They found that the programme
participation results in higher enrolment rates, less grade repetition and improved
grade progression, lower dropout rates and higher school re-entry rates among
dropouts. Most importantly, the programme had impact in lowering dropout rates
during the transition from primary to secondary school.
Other study found that CCTs led to a significant increase in the use of ed-
ucation and health services (Fisbein and Schady, 2009). School enrolment rates
among beneficiaries had increased in Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bangladesh,
Cambodia and Pakistan and reduced gender gap in enrolment rates in Bangladesh,
Pakistan and Turkey (Khandker, Pitt, and Fuwa, 2003; Filmer and Schady, 2008;
Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2008).Gertler (2000) and Gertler (2004) found that the
social transfer programmes have positive effect on access to health services, while
Schultz (2004) found that cash transfer improved education outcomes.
Despite the positive impacts, studies in developed countries show some of the
transfer programmes have a negative impact on labour supply (Atkinson, 1987;
Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990; Krueger and Meyer 2002; Moffit, 2002). Ashenfelter
and Plant (1990) studied the labour supply responses to a negative income tax
programmed from Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments. It was
found that the experimental treatment resulted in incentive effects working to
reduce labour supply (Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990). Moffit (2002) found that
US federal assistance program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
reduced labor force participation by 10 to 50 percent which was attributed to
its implicit tax on income.
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On contrary, in developing countries there is no evidence that the cash transfer
programmes affecting adult labour participation (Parker and Skoufias, 2000; Sk-
oufias and Di Maro, 2008; Filmer and Schady, 2009; and Edmonds and Schady,
2012). Parker and Skoufias (2000) studied the disintentive effect of Mexican Pro-
gresa on labour supply and found no evidence that the programme reduced adult
labour participation. Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) examined the impact of Mexican
Progresa on adult labour participation in the labour market along with adult leisure
time and relate the programme’s impact on poverty. They employ the Progresa
evaluation of sample’s experimental design and find no significant impact on adult
labour force participation and leisure time. In addition, Progresa outcomes of
poverty reduction support adult work incentives. Edmonds and Schady (2008)
found that the CCT programme in Ecuador had no effect on adult labour supply.
Study on impact of Cambodian CCT found that the programme did not have
significant impact on adult labour supply (Filmer and Schady, 2009).
Banerjee et al. (2015) studied seven CCT in six developing countries; Honduras,
Morocco, Phillipines, Mexico PAL, Indonesian PKH, Nicaragua, and Mexican
Progresa. Using randomised controlled trial data, they performed difference-in-
differences regressions. The results suggested small and negative insignificant
programme effects on work outcomes ranging from the lowest 0.4 to 2.8 percentage
points. Overall, by pooling the the CCT programmes, the finding suggested a
small reducation in work hour of 0.25 hours per week. In the case of Indonesia,
the estimate was 0.7 percentage points of reduction in work probability for men
but statistically insignificant and a negligible positive effect (0.006 percentage
points) for women.
Turning to evidence with different direction, a study in Nicaragua showed that
RPS had a significant negative effect in hours worked of adult men by about six
hours, with no effect among adult women (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). Foguel
and Barros (2010) studied the effect of Brazilian Bolsa Familia on adult labour
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supply and found that the programme slightly increased working probability by
1 percentage point and 2-3 percentage points for women and men, respectively.
However, with regards to labour hour, the programme reduced labour hour by
0.6-2.6 hours and 0.6-1.6 hours per week for women and men, respectively.
Aguiar and Filho (2016) looked at the impact of Brazillian Bolsa Familia
programme on the Brazilian labour participation. They analysed the data from
Brazil Family Budget Survey using Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Model
and Instrumental Variable and found that Bolsa Familia had a strong and negative
effect on the probability of being employed in the labour market. The Brazillian
Bolsa Familia had a negative effect on the likelihood of being employed for the
head of the family and partner by 24 percentage points and 86 percentage points
by the spouse, respectively.
As a conditional programme, a CCT is expected to work when the beneficiaries
comply with the conditions. If conditionality exists but programme recipients ex-
pect that will not be enforced, it will be the same as an unconditional programme. A
study by Brollo, Kaufmann and La Ferrara (2017), using Bolsa Familia programme
investigates how CCT programme conditionality enforcement can affect programme
recipients’ behaviour. The programme is conditional on beneficiaries’ school-aged
children school attendance of 85% of monthly school days. Recipients’ failure to
comply with the requirement results in receiving warning up to five times and
increasing penalty’s severity. The study analysed whether people respond to Bolsa
Familia’s conditionalities enforcement by improving school attendance and whether
there is learning process on enforcement quality from peer’s experience. The study
findings are; school attendance increases after penalties are imposed to the families
for past non-compliance to conditionalities. Families also respond to penalties
experienced by peers, i.e. children’s classmates experienced enforcement.
In the latest study evaluating the PKH programme and using the same dataset,
Cahyadi et al. (forthcoming) found that the program has a long-term effects in
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increasing the childbirth attended by trained health professionals and reduced
children aged 7-15 share who are not enrolled in school, and reduced child labour
wages by one third for children aged 13-15. This chapter contributes to the literture
by evaluating PKH programme impact on female labour participation and fertility
as the programme unintended effects.
4.5 Data
The study employs randomised controlled experiment data from the World Bank
and the National Team for Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K). The data
used for Indonesia CCT programme, PKH is from obtained from Survey Pelayanan
Kesehatan dan Pendidikan (SPKP) or Health and Education Service Survey from
the World Bank (http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1047)
and published data from the National Team for Acceleration of Poverty Reduction
(TNP2K). The survey consists of three waves of household surveys conducted
by the World Bank and an endline survey conducted by TNP2K in 2013. The
baseline survey was conducted in 2007, the second wave survey and the third
wave survey were conducted in 2008-2009 and in 2009-2010, respectively. The
end-line survey was conducted in 2013 by the National Team for Acceleration of
Poverty Alleviation/TNP2K.
4.5.1 PKH Randomisation Process
The baseline survey (2007) was designed as randomised controlled trial (RCT) in
six provinces; DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo and
East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). The provinces were selected to represent Indonesia’s
diversity which have varying characteristics of high, medium and low porverty rates,
urban and rural areas, and coastal and island (Sparrow et al., 2008).
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The wealthiest 20 percent of districts in each province were excluded from PKH
CCT programme, which determined by the districts’ poverty rates, malnutition
incidence, and primary to secondary schooling transition rates.
The randomisation was carried out across eligible sub-districts level or keca-
matan out of 80% poorest districts (Sparrow et al., 2008). Selection criteria for
eligible sub-districts were based on special characteristics, including the prevalence
of malnutrition, poverty rate, school drop-out rate, and availability of health and
education facilities. Originally, 329 and 259 subdistricts were randomly drawn
as treatment and control subdistricts. Then, from randomly assigned treatment
subdistricts, 180 were randomly selected to receive the program treatment. Addi-
tionally, 180 were randomly selected as control subdistrics. Treatment and control
sample subdistricts were stratified by urban and rural category as part as the
sampling strategy.
From each sample sub-district, five villages were randomly selected and house-
holds were randomly sampled based on PKH beneficiary’s criteria. Two from group
of household with expecting/nursing mother or married women who were pregnant
within the last two years and three from group of households with children aged
6-15 years were selected from each village. Finally, over 14,326 households were se-
lected for interview in the baseline survey in 2007 which comprises 7,195 treatment
households and 7,131 control households. In the follow up survey, the attrition
rate was about 2.5% or 350 fewer panel households, leaving 13,970 households in
2009. In the second follow up survey, there were 13,619 households in 2013 or 4.9%
overall attrition rate from baseline survey with the attrition rates almost identical
accross treatment and control groups (Cahyadi, et al., 2018).
The variable for labour participation is obtained from the question of worked
last week. The response to the question ‘What is the main activity performed
last week?’ with options of (1) employed, (2) attend school, (3) look after school
household, (4) retired, (5) unemployed, (6) under 5, (7) other. Dummy for working
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Figure 4.2: Map of district piloting the household CCT, PKH
is coded 1 for those answering (1) employed and 0 otherwise. This paper uses a
panel of about 14,000 individual females age age restricted to between 16 and 49
years old from baseline data 2007, with follow up surveys in 2009 and 2013.
Figure 4.2 shows the map of the plan for district piloting in 2017, of the six
provinces receiving PKH and surveyed for impact evaluation purpose. In terms of
randomisation process, 769 sub-districts were randomly selected as PKH treatment
areas. Treatment area samples were then randomly selected and stratified by
urban/rural classification to get 180 sub-districts. PKH control area samples of
316 sub-districts were randomly drawn, and then 180 sub-districts control areas
sample were randomly selected. In each the treatment sub-district, 40 households
were randomly drawn, and around 20 households were assigned for treatment, and
the rest are the control households. Whereas in control-district, 40 households were
randomly chosen as control households (Satriawan, 2016).
Table 4.2 lists the questionnaire modules which comprise household core, school-
aged children core, babies and toddler, home-based tests scores data, village char-
acteristics, subdistrict health centres, midwives, primary schools, junior secondary
school data, and village health service staff.
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Table 4.2: Survey questionnaire modules
Modules Information_Contents
Household Respondent: Female household head or spouse of a male household
head. Household roster, deaths of household members in the past 12
months, migration, water, receive of government social assistance
programmemes, participation in non-formal education, consumption,
assets, morbidity, outpatient care use.
Mothers Respondent: Mothers aged 16-49 years. Fertility history, access to
healthcare services during pregnancy, family planning, health and
education knowledge.
Children School-aged children. Children aged 6-15 years. Respondent:
mother of the child. School enrolment, attendance, cost of schooling,
education assistance, child labour.
Babies and toddler Children aged less than 3 years. Growth monitoring, immunisation
records, moto development, nutritional intake.
Home-based tests Math test and reading skills administered at home (separate test for
aged 6-12 and 13-15).
Village characteristics Respondent: village head. Demography of the village, village
information, access to health services and schools, economic shocks,
community participation, daily wage rate
Community Health Community Health Centers (Puskesmas). Head of facility
information, coverage area, budget, staff roster, time allocation of
lead doctor and midwives coordinator, services provided, fee
schedule, number of patients served during the last month,
medicines and vaccine stock, data on village health staff, direct
observation on facility cleanliness and hygiene
Village midwives Personal qualification and background, location of duty, condition of
facility, time allocation, income, services provided, fee schedule
(public and private), experiences during past three deliveries,
number of patients during the last month, equipment and tools,
medical supplies and stock, village post management, structure of
subsidies received.
Schools Principal qualification and background and time allocation, teacher
roster, school facilities, teaching hours, enrolment records,
attendance records, official test scores, education assistance, fees,
budget, direct observations of classrooms and random check on
classroom attendance.
Note:
Source: World Bank, 2011.
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4.5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Baseline Data 2007
The descriptive statistics are obtained from the 2007 baseline data. One of the
target criteria to receive CCT program was receiving the previous unconditional
cash transfer (UCT) in 2005. In 2007, the number of households received UCT
was 14,235 and the number of households not receiving UCT was 12,922. The
unconditional cash transfer recipient number was used as consideration to survey
villages for PKH. In terms of the conditions for the transfers programme, in 2007
there are 5,178 or 38.87% households with expectant mothers within the last 24
months, 6,902 or 51.81% households with children up to 15-year of age and the
remaining 1,243 or 9.33%of households do not have expectant mothers nor children
less than 15-year old.
Table 4.3 shows the balance tests between treatment and control group. The
average household size is 5.17 for treated group, is not significantly higher than
that of the control group, 5.12. The average age of the treated female beneficiary
is marginally higher (38.5 years) than that of control group (38.2 years). In terms
of female labour participation, there is no significant difference between average
worked last week for treatment and control group, 34.6% and 34.3%, respectively.
The variable for labour participation is using the question of whether the individual
worked last week, using dummy of 1 for working and 0 otherwise.
Both groups have a similar average years of education completed about 8
years, although the treatment group has slightly lower education. For the housing
materials, brick wall is dummy for wall material, which takes the value of 1 if for
brick/concrete wall. The treated group is slightly worse than the control group
with respect to wall materialss. Similarly, the treated group is slightly worse than
the control group for floor material and cooking fuel sources.
In figure 4.3, the 2007 to 2013 data show the U-shape or feminization-U hypoth-
esis. As the education level completed increases from no education to middle school,
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Table 4.3: Balance Test of Groups’ Characteristics for Baseline Data 2007
Treatment Control
Variables Mean N Mean N Difference SE p-value
Household size 5.12 7,074 5.17 7,153 -0.04 (0.029) 0.1360
Age 38.52 7,074 38.24 7,153 0.29* (0.173) 0.0940
Work 34.65% 7,074 34.37% 7,153 0.002 (0.008) 0.7280
Marrital status 0.931 7,074 0.932 7,153 0.001 (0.005) 0.8540
Wall type 0.439 7,074 0.456 7,153 -0.016** (0.008) 0.0470
Roof type 0.700 7,074 0.705 7,153 -0.005 (0.007) 0.4790
Floor type 0.539 7,074 0.573 7,153 -0.033*** (0.008) 0.0001
Water source 0.785 7,074 0.771 7,153 0.013* (0.006) 0.0540
Electricity 0.866 7,074 0.868 7,153 -0.002 (0.005) 0.6840
Cooking fuel 0.193 7,074 0.219 7,153 -0.026*** (0.006) 0.0001
Insurance 0.514 7,074 0.520 7,153 -0.006 (0.008) 0.4620
Java ethnicity 0.369 7,074 0.379 7,153 -0.01 (0.005) 0.4184
Years of education 8.18 7,074 8.39 7,153 -0.21** (0.104) 0.0180
Note:
The results are balance test of characteristics of female aduts aged 16-64 with total
sample of 14,227 whose role as household’s head spouse or female household head
aged between treatment and control groups calculated by employing PKH Baseline
Data 2007
female labour participation decreases. Conversely, as education level completed in-
creases from middle school to diploma or graduate, the female labour participation
increases again. Overall, female labour participation of the household’s wife and
female household head is lower at around 17.15%.
4.6 Empirical Strategy
The overall determinants of female labour participation will be modelled with
economics theory of utility. A woman maximises a family utility function, a
function of a bundle of goods consumed and the time spent on leisure by every
household member. The maximization problem faced by the woman with a role
as a spouse or household head is constrained to the total income earned by the
family. Observable factors influencing the decision of a woman to work are age,
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Figure 4.3: Female Labour Force Participation Rate by Education Level
education level, number of children as well as social status. Spouse education level
also affects a woman’s decision to work as a substitution effect.
This chapter also hypotheses concerning the mechanism by which the role of
women as house managers have empowerment effect, in terms of authority, may
increase motivation to work. With respect to female authority in household decision
making process. The study will estimate female labour force participation using a
regression model of individual level panel data and household variables.
The identifying assumption is that the female labour participation would be
the same in treatment and control areas in the absence of treatment or the parallel
trends assumption. The intervention is the conditional cash transfer programme
which given to the treatment group after all the eligible households were identified
as explained in the data section. A baseline household survey in both participating
and non-participating sub-districts was conducted in 2007 based on criteria men-
tioned earlier with the Proxy Means Testing method. The same households were
resurveyed in 2009 which produced the full panel in 2009. In 2013, the households
were resurveyed with 4.9% attrition rate.
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The treatment assignment was implemented through randomised treatment al-
location after eligible sub-districts were chosen. The randomisation was performed
at subdistrict level and houshold level, the probability to be selected as treatment
areas across eligible subdistricts is the same, thus receiving the programme must be
orthogonal to expected outcomes (Satriawan, 2016). Therefore, eligible households
who do not receive the cash transfer are able to serve as valid counterfactuals.
This distinct difference for actual treatment is obtained using one of the survey
questions Do you receive PKH CCT?
4.6.1 Difference-in-Differences Specification
In evaluating whether there is an impact of the PKH CCT on female labour force
participation, the impact is measured using the difference-in-differences specifica-
tion using two different types of effects, placement effect and participation effect.
The randomisation of treatment assignment lottery is such that the group of
eligible households in the subdistricts initially scheduled to receive PKH (lottery
L = 1) and the group of eligible households in those subdistricts initially scheduled
not to receive PKH (lottery L = 0). K is the actual treatment status whether
the subdistricts received the cash transfers or not, K = 1 if a subdistrict is a
treatment subdistrict and 0 otherwise.
Placement effect or intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate compares the outcomes be-
tween all surveyed eligible household in scheduled treatment areas L = 1 (regardless
whether they receive the programmeme or not) with eligible households who are
scheduled not to receive the transfer in control areas L = 0. Participation effect is
the outcome difference between actually treated groups in treatment subdistricts
and control groups (the counterfactuals) in control subdistricts. The observations
who finally untreated in treatment areas or L = 1, K = 0 and those who receive
treatment in control areas or L = 0, K = 1 are dropped to obtain this estimate.
Using the difference-in-differences specification by comparing the female labour
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participation from households who actually receive PKH (Di = 1) in treatment
areas with outcome that of non-PKH households (Di = 0) in control areas. ITT
compares individuals in relation to whether they were offered treatment which
comparison is based on randomly assigned treatment (Angrist and Pisckhe, 2008).
The average treatment effect is:
ATE = E[Y1i|Di = 1] − E[Y1i|Di = 1] − (E[Yi|Di = 1] − E[Di = 0, ti = 0] (4.16)
Individual baseline and endline data are used to estimate the following difference-
in-differences specification
Yit = αPostt + βPosttDi + γiXit + µs + ϵi (4.17)
• Yit = 1 if individual i participating in the labour market in time period t,
and zero otherwise
• β is parameter of interest which provides the difference-in-differences estimate
in work outcomes between the treated and control group, or participation
effect
• Di = 1 if individual household receives PKH treatment, and zero otherwise
• Post = 1 is for post-treatment year, in this case year 2009 or 2013, and zero
for 2007 baseline
• Postt ∗ Di is Interaction variable for difference-in-differences estimate
• µs = subdistrict fixed effect.
• Xit is control variables to increase precision, household size, own age, age
squared, dummy whether the female has child age less than 6 years old, years
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of education, marital status dummy, dummies for house materials: wall, rood
and floor and log of monthly expenditure
• ϵit is unobserved idiosyncratic shocks
The following equation (4.5) is intent-to-treat specification which is essentially
difference-in-difference for placement effect with sub-district original treatment
assignment in 2007 as the treatment status.
Yit = αPostit + βPosttTi + γiXit + µs + ϵit (4.18)
where:
• Yit = 1 if individual i participating in the labour market in time period t,
and zero otherwise
• Ti = 1 if the individual lives in treatment areas, and zero otherwise
• Post = 1 is for post-treatment year, in this case year 2009 or 2013, and zero
for 2007 baseline
• β = Parameter of interest which provides the difference in work outcomes
between individuals in treatment and control sub-districts, intent-to-treat or
placement effect
• Postt ∗ Ti is interaction variable for intent-to-treat estimate
• µs = sub-district fixed effect
• Xit is control variables to increase precision, household size, own age, age
squared, dummy whether the female has child age less than 6 years old, years
of education, marital status dummy, dummies for house materials: wall, rood
and floor and log of monthly expenditure
• ϵit is unobserved idiosyncratic shocks
4. Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programme on Female Labour Force
Participation 78
4.6.2 Identification Strategy: Instrumental Variable
In the midline survey by World Bank in 2009, it was found that there has been
conversion in the sample for both sides non-compliance. Out of 180 treatment sub-
districts, one treatment sub-district never received the programme due to supply
side issue, the programme was never implemented in two subdistricts because the
District head refused to participate in the pilot programme for randomly selected
subdistricts only. Households had to abide with the head of the District decision
who refused the program treatment. There are 39 out of 180 control sub-districts
received the programme. When there is contamination, one can no longer sure that
receiving the programme is orthogonal to expected outcomes.
Although compliance with the treatment randomisation was generally high,
there were 39 control subdistricts that finally became treated subdistricts. The
non-compliance issue requires additional efforts for identification. Instrumental
variable technique will be employed to deal with both sides of non-compliance
issue. Since randomisation is no longer perfect, as there were some treatment areas
decided not participate, and there were some control areas that were finally treated.
Subsequently, the households within treatment subdistricts were randomised for
receiving the treatment using treatment/control assignment. From the household
treatment assignment, it can be distinguish who was supposed to receive the
treatment and who was not.
If the randomisation works, subdistrict receiving PKH (K = 1) if assignment
lottery L = 1 and subdistricts not receiving PKH (K = 0) if assignment lottery
L = 0. Non-compliance occurs when the subdistrict is supposed be treated (L = 1)
but became control (K = 0), or the subdistrict is supposed be a control (L = 0)
but became treated (K = 1). Outcomes of households who actually receive PKH
(Di = 1) are compared with outcomes that of actual non-PKH households (Di =
0). The actual received of treatment is instrumented using the original treatment
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assignment lottery status of household. The information on actual received of
treatment (Di = 0 or Di = 1) in 2009 and 2013 is obtained from response to survey
question Do you receive PKH CCT?.
Yi = α0 + δSi + γiXi + µs + ϵit (4.19)
where :
δ is the coefficient of interest or the IV estimator.
• First stage
Si = X ′π10 + π11zi + ξ1i (4.20)
• Reduced form







• Yit = 1 if individual i participating in the labour market in time period t,
and 0 otherwise
• Si = 1 if the household actually receive PKH programme, and 0 otherwise
• zi = the instrument, the original treatment assignment
• Xi= control variable for changes in household size and composition, own age,
dummy whether the female has a child aged less than six years old, own
education and marital status
• ϵit is unobserved idiosyncratic shocks, are assumed to be randomly distributed
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4.7 Empirical Results
4.7.1 Short-run Effect of CCT on Female Labour Partic-
ipation
Regression Results from Panel 2007 and 2009
Several regressions were performed on whether the female work as dependent
variable using OLS and panel difference-in-differences. The sample used is ever
married female adults aged between 16 and 64 whose role either as household
head’s spouse or the household’s head. The dependent variable is worked last week,
a dummy that takes the value of 1 for working and 0 otherwise. The independent
variable is whether the household is a PKH programme treatment or control group
and several household and individual-level control variables, household size, age,
age squared, a dummy for the level of education completed, a dummy for marital
status and log of consumption per capita. For the panel regression, subdistrict
fixed effect is used. Standard errors are clustered at the randomisation unit,
sub-district level.
PKH programme short-run impact on female labour participation evaluated us-
ing difference-in-differences specification is presented in Table 4.4. The table shows
the PKH programme impact by comparing the difference in labour participation
using difference-in-differences specification between groups in treatment areas as
treated and groups in control areas as counterfactuals.
Table 4.4 shows the programme impact in the short run, difference-in-differences
(DID) specification in columns. Column 2 presents the DID estimate of PKH using
specification in equation (4.18). All the estimates including DiD show that there
is small negative programme effect on work outcomes of the mothers between 1
to 1.6 percentage points but not statistically significant. These results are in line
with the findings on CCT programmes in Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua by
Alzua et al. (2013).
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Table 4.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of CCT Programme on work outcomes in
2009
DiD
Work without covariates with covariates
Post 0.081*** 0.129***
(0.010) (0.020)
Treatment effect -0.0106 -0.014
(0.020) (0.020)
Control Mean 0.347 0.347
Control No Yes
No. of Obs. 24526 24514
R-Squared 0.017 0.03
Note:
The table is a result of cash transfer impact on a
dummy for worked last week with control variables
are household size, dummy for having child age <6
years, age, age squared, level of education completed,
marital status dummy and household characteristics
dummies. The sample is female adult between 16
and 64. Standard errors clustered at sub-district are
reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p
<0.01.
PKH programme short-run impact on female labour participation evaluated
using intent-to-treat specification is presented in Table 4.5. The table shows Table
4.5 shows the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimations or placement effect which compares
the outcomes between all surveyed eligible household in the scheduled treatment
areas L = 1 (regardless whether they received the programme or not) with eligible
households who were scheduled not to receive the transfer in control areas L = 0.
Column 2 presents the intent-to-treat estimate of PKH analysed using equation
(4.18). The ITT estimates in columns 1 and 2 show that the CCT program is
small (-0.07 percentage points) and not statistically significant in affecting females’
work outcomes. These results also reflect similarities with findings obtained by
Alzua et al. (2013).
PKH programme short-run impact on female labour participation evaluated
4. Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programme on Female Labour Force
Participation 82
Table 4.5: Intent-to-Treat Estimates of CCT programme impact in 2009
ITT





Control Mean 0.347 0.347
No. of Obs. 24526 24514
R-Squared 0.0131 0.0244
Note:
The table is a result of cash transfer impact
with intent-to-treat using original treat-
ment assignment on a dummy for worked
last week with control variables are house-
hold size, dummy for having child age <6
years, age, age squared, level of educa-
tion completed, marital status dummy and
household characteristics dummies. The
sample is female adult between 16 and 64.
Standard errors clustered at sub-district
are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
using instrumental variable techniques is presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7.
Table 4.6 shows the first-stage IV regression using equation (4.20). The table
shows the first-stage IV regression results, in which receiving PKH programme
in the year 2009 is instrumented with the original treatment assignment in 2007.
The first-stage regression, column 2 shows the likelihood the individual’s household
receive PKH if the household was assigned as treatment household in 2007 is 38.8%
and significant with F-statistics of 272. Thus, the original treatment assignment,
assign, is a valid instrument for actual treatment in 2009.
Table 4.7 presents estimates of the CCT programme impact using instrumental
variable technique. Column 2 shows the effect of PKH using equation (4.19). From
columns 1 and 2, using IV estimates without and with covariates, the estimates
are similar to the ITT effect (-1.4 to -1.8 percentage points) and are not statis-
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Table 4.6: First-stage IV Regression with covariates with original treatment assignment
as instrument for actual treatment in 2009
Outcome: Ever received PKH without covariates with covariates
Treatment effect 0.392*** 0.388***
(0.007) (0.007)




The table reports first-stage regression of PKH programme status
whether Ever received PKH based on original treatment assignment.
The instrument is original treatment assignment. Control variables
include household size, dummy for having child age <6 years, age,
age squared, level of education completed, marital status dummy.
The sample is female adult between 16 and 64. Standard errors
clustered at sub-district level are reported in parenthesis. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
Table 4.7: Instrumental Variable Estimates of CCT programme impact in 2009
Outcome: Ever received PKH without covariates with covariates
Treated -0.014 -0.018
(0.022) (0.022)
Control Mean 0.347 0.347
No. of Obs. 12,263 12,263
R-squared 0.002 0.071
Note:
The table is a result of IV regression on receiving PKH programme
impact on a dummy for worked last week with control variables
are household size, dummy for having child age <6 years, age, age
squared, level of education completed, marital status dummy and
household characteristics dummies. The sample is female adult
between 16 and 64. Standard errors clustered at sub-district are
reported in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
tically significant.
In the short-run, the estimates from difference-in-differences, intent-to-treat
and instrumental variable suggest small negative effect of CCT programme on
female labour participation but the effects are not statistically significant. These
findings reflect similarities to those obtained by Alzua et al. (2013) for CCTs in
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Table 4.8: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of CCT programme on work outcomes
in 2013
DiD
Work without covariates with covariates
Post 0.161*** 0.161***
(0.017) (0.021)
Treatment Effect 0.011 0.008
(0.022) (0.022)
Control Mean 0.347 0.347
No. of Obs. 14178 14174
R-Squared 0.0688 0.0976
Note:
The table is a result of cash transfer impact on a
dummy for worked last week with control variables
are household size, dummy for having child age <6
years, age, age squared, level of education completed,
marital status dummy and household characteristics
dummies. The sample is female adult between 16
and 64. Standard errors clustered at sub-district are
reported in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p
<0.01.
Mexico Honduras and Nicaragua.
4.7.2 Medium-term Effect of CCT on Female Labour Sup-
ply
Regressions Results from Panel 2007 and 2013
PKH programme medium-run impact on female labour participation evaluated
using difference-in-differences specification is presented in Table 4.8. The Table
shows the differences in labour supply between mothers in treated households in
treatment areas with mothers in untreated households in the control areas. using
difference-in-differences. Column 2 presents the DID estimate of PKH analysed
using specification in equation (4.17). From columns 1 and 2, the medium-term
DiD estimates are small positive between 0.8 to 1.1 percentage points but sta-
tistically insignificant.
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Table 4.9: Intent-to-Treat Estimates of the impact of CCT programme in 2013





Control Mean 0.347 0.347
No. of Obs. 24526 24516
R-Squared 0.024 0.075
Note:
The table is a result of cash transfer impact with intent-to-
treat using original treatment assignment on a dummy for
worked last week with control variables are household size,
dummy for having child age <6 years, age, age squared, level
of education completed, marital status dummy and household
characteristics dummies. The sample is female adult between
16 and 64. Standard errors clustered at sub-district are
reported in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01..
PKH programme medium-run impact on female labour participation evaluated
using intent-to-treat (ITT) is presented in Table 4.9. The Table shows the CCT
programme impact using placement effect or intent-to-treat (ITT) which compares
the outcomes between all surveyed eligible household in scheduled treatment areas
L=1 (regardless whether they receive the programme or not) with eligible house-
holds who are scheduled not to receive the transfer in control areas L=0. Column
2 presents the intent-to-treat estimate of PKH analysed using equation (4.18). The
medium-term estimates of the programme ITT on female work participation are
negative between 2.3 and 2.7 percentage points but statistically insignificant.
PKH programme medium-run impact on female labour participation evaluated
using instrumental variable techniques is presented in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11.
Table 4.10 shows the first-stage IV regression using equation (4.20) with the original
treatment assignment as an instrument for actual treatment in year 2013. Column
2 in the first-stage regression suggests the likelihood a household receive PKH
on whether the household was assigned as treatment household in 2007 is 31.2%
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Table 4.10: First-stage IV Regression with covariates using original treatment assign-
ment as instrument for actual treatment in 2013
Outcome: Ever received PKH without covariates with covariates
Treatment effect 0.313*** 0.312***
(0.007) (0.007)




The table reports first-stage regression of PKH programme status
whether Ever received PKH based on original treatment assignment.
The instrument is original treatment assignment. Control variables
include household size, dummy for having child age <6 years, age,
age squared, level of education completed, marital status dummy.
The sample is female adult between 16 and 64. Standard errors
clustered at sub-district level are reported in parenthesis. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
and significant with F-statistics of 209. Thus, the original treatment assignment,
assign, is a valid instrument for actual treatment in 2013.
The second stage estimates of the CCT programme impact using instrumental
variable technique is presented in Table 4.11. Column 2 shows IV effect of PKH
using equation (4.19). From columns 1, using IV estimates without covariates
the program effect is significant negative 7.4. From column 2, IV estimate with
covariates, the treatment effect is significant in reduction in the probability of
work by 6.9 percentage points.
4.7.3 Fertility and PKH Programme
The CCT programme impact is evaluated on fertility since the programme eligibility
criteria are having children aged 1-5 or expecting baby or giving birth within the
last 24 months. Fertility rate is defined as the average number of children born
per childbearing age (15-49) women. Using difference-in-differences of PKH partic-
ipation effect, two years after the programme was implemented, there is significant
increase in overall fertility rates. The treatment effect on fertility is also significant,
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Table 4.11: Instrumental Variable Estimates of CCT programme impact in 2013
Outcome: Ever received PKH without covariates with covariates
Treated -0.074** -0.069**
(0.029) (0.028)
Control Mean 0.3437 0.3437
No. of Obs. 12,263 12,263
R-squared 0.001 0.056
Note:
The table is a result of IV regression on receiving PKH programme
impact on a dummy for worked last week with control variables
are household size, dummy for having child age <6 years, age, age
squared, level of education completed, marital status dummy and
household characteristics dummies. The sample is female adult
between 16 and 64. Standard errors clustered at sub-district are
reported in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
increased by 2.2 percentage points three years after programme implementation.
Similarly, six years after PKH programme implementation, there is significant
increase in overall fertility rates. The treatment effect is also significant, increased
by 4.8 percentage points six years after programme was implementated. These
results are in line with the findings from CCT impact in the short run in Honduras,
increasing fertility by 2-4 percentage points (Stecklov et al., 2006).
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion
This study analyses the impact of PKH, a conditional cash transfer programme
on work outcomes for ever married mothers aged 16 to 49 using PKH RCT data
at baseline 2007, wave II (2008) and wave III data (2009). In 2007, before the
CCT programme was implemented, the female labour force participation rates
were low of 33.3% and 35.3% for treatment and control group, respectively. This
condition is due to the relatively low education of both treatment and control
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Table 4.12: Empirical Estimates of CCT programme impact on fertility in 2009 and
2013





No. of Obs. 16320 16320
Controls No No
Note:
The table is a result of cash transfer
impact on a fertility rate with control
variables are household size, dummy for
having child age <6 years, age, age
squared, level of education completed,
marital status dummy and household
characteristics dummies. The sample is
female adult between 16 and 64. Stan-
dard errors clustered at sub-district are
reported in parenthesis. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
group on average with junior secondary education since the observations come
from low-income households.
The results are aligned with Mincer and Polachek (1974) in Blau and Kahn
(2007) on their analysis of gender differences in qualifications using human capital
model. Compared to men, women tend to accumulate less labour market experience
and due to child-rearing and other household duties. Married women, especially
with children, anticipate more discontinuous work life. Based on static labour
supply theory, the cash transfer is unearned income which might reduce labour
supply through the income effect. An increase in unearned income increases de-
mand for leisure and thus reduces labour supply or income effect (Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999).
This study shows that by employing difference-in-differences, intent-to-treat
and IV techniques, the conditional cash transfer programme has small negative but
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statistically insignificant effect on female work outcomes in short term (2009) or in
medium term (2013). If anything, the treatment effect is significant in medium term
(2013) using IV estimations, reducing work by 6.9 percentage points for IV estimate
with covariates. This study findings are in line with other studies on the impact
of CCT on adult labour participation by Alzua et al. (2013), Parker and Skoufias
(2000), Skoufias and Di Maro (2008), Filmer and Schady, 2009; and Edmonds and
Schady, 2012, and Banerjee et al. (2015). Banerjee et al. (2015) studied seven CCTs
in six developing countries (Honduras, Mexico, Morocco, Phillipines, Indonesia
and Nicaragua). They did not find any significant effect on labour participation
or labour hours.
Further, the analysis on fertility shows that the programme had a positive
significant effect by 2.2 and 4.8 percentage points in 2009 and 2013, respectively.
These estimates are consistent the findings from CCT impact in the short run
in Honduras which increased fertility by 2-4 percentage points (Stecklov et al.,
2006). This may explain why the programme have negative impact on female labour
participation. The empowerment effect might be cancelled out by the increase in
fertility. The policy implication from this finding is that the programme design
details are important since they can provide incentives for unintended outcomes.
The generalisability of these results is subject to certain limitations. First,
it is not possible the disentangle the impact between empowerment and income
effects, this is partly because the information on work participation available is
only at the extensive margin, while work hours data is unavailable. Data on
work intensive margin is required for further study. Second, the beneficiaries are
the five percent of the lowest income population in Indonesia, thus if applied to
different percentile of the socioeconomic status, one would expect different results.
In terms of policy implication, it can be concluded that the government policy of
poverty alleviation in the form of conditional cash transfer programme does not
deter the work of the beneficiaries. If the objective is to empower the women, then
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more interventions need to be considered such as providing workshops and training
related to employment to encourage and accommodate the women to work.
5
Impact of Free Nine-Year Compulsory
Schooling on Educational Attainment and
Work Outcomes
5.1 Introduction
Economists interest in the economic value of education was not sparked until
1960s when a series of aggregate production function studies suggested that a
large part of the growth of the US economy during the first half of the 20th
century was attributable to improvements in human capital (Denison, 1962). It was
logic to translate the implications of Denison’s work on the US to the developing
world where skilled manpower was in critically short supply (Colclough, 1982). In
developing countries, households in total spend roughly hundreds billions of dollars
on the children education, while the governments spend approximately one trillion
dollars in education annually (Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2016). This spending
has led to increases in enrolment at all levels with most children in developing
countries complete primary school and acquire some years of schooling in secondary
education, including in Indonesia. The motivation of the government spending on
education is that the increases in education will enhance economic development and
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growth. This belief was challenged by Romer (1990) with technology-endogenised
theories which argued that cross-country differences in human capital could not
quantitatively explain the differences in the levels and growth rates of output per
capita. Several years later, some empirical studies challenged this belief by showing
that the augmented Solow model which include human capital can explain the large
share of cross-country variance in output per capita (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil,
1992; Young, 1994; Barro, Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
Indonesia as a developing country has been striving to improve its human capital
by increasing the level of education of its people using several policies. One of
the policies is the extension of the free compulsory schooling from six years to
nine years in 1994.
The research objective of this study is to investigate the impact of the change
in Indonesian compulsory education law in 1994, which extended the compulsory
schooling from six to nine years. This study exploits the change in compulsory
schooling law in Indonesia enacted in 1994/1995 academic year as source of iden-
tification. This study makes two main contributions. First, it provides the causal
effects of the extension of compulsory schooling in Indonesia on work outcomes
using a regression discontinuity design. Second, it focuses on a developing country,
while most of the literature examining the impact of compulsory schooling laws
were in developed countries which results may be different.
The study is important as to date there are few studies on the impact of com-
pulsory education in developing countries. Several studies examining the impact of
longer school year implemented in all education levels in Indonesia and impact of
large school construction project, but none has examined the impact of Indonesia’s
free nine-year compulsory schooling policy on working outcomes.
This chapter addresses the question to whether the extension of free compulsory
schooling from six-year primary school to nine-year junior secondary school has im-
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pact on educational attainment and work outcomes later in life namely probability
to be in the labour force and wages.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses
the literature review on the effects of compulsory education on educational attain-
ment and work outcomes. Section 5.3 provides information Indonesian education
system and describes the data employed. Section 4 describes the empirical spec-
ification. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 discusses the results and
concludes the chapter.
5.2 Literature Review
Literature has long documented the effects of education on economic development
both in applied perspectives (Colclough, 1982; Psacharopoulos, 1985; Eisemon,
1988) and theoretical perspective (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen,
1990). Colclough conducted review on the impact of primary schooling and found
that it had increased labour productivity, reduced fertility, improved health and
nutrition, and encouraged behavioural changes which contributed to economic
development. Psacharopoulos (1985) studied and compared returns to education in
different countries based on their level of development and found that women with
primary education had the highest returns to education in countries with relatively
lower income per capita. Indonesia, as one of the developing countries that were
studied, the private returns were 25.5 and 15.6 percent for people completed pri-
mary and secondary school, respectively. Behrman and Deolalikar (1993) studied
the impact of schooling on labour market outcomes in Indonesia controlling for
unobserved community and household variables. The research findings show a pos-
itive relationship between investment in education and work outcomes. Behrman
and Deolalikar (1995) studied the gender differential in returns to schooling in
Indonesian labour markets. The study found that the gender earning differentials
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change more over the course of life due to the gender differences in hours worked
over the life cycle. Substantially higher wage rates and earnings for males than
females are the implied values (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1995). There were striking
evidence of gender differences in the estimated association of schooling with wages
and earnings. The percentage of increases in wages associated with post-primary
schooling are greater for females than that of males by 50 percent (Behrman and
Deolalikar, 1995).
Duflo (2001) investigated the impact of Indonesia large school construction
projects between 1974 and 1978 and found that each constructed primary school
per 1000 children resulted in 0.12 to 0.19 years average increase in education and
between 1.5 and 2.7 percent increase in wages. Duflo (2001) found the returns to
schooling in Indonesia are high between 6.8 and 10.8 percent. The same author
evaluated the impact of the school construction programme on fertility and child
mortality (Duflo, 2001; Duflo, 2004). Breierova and Duflo (2004) studied impact
of school construction project in Indonesia and suggests that education does not
significantly affect fertility. Several studies examined the impact of an unantici-
pated longer school year implemented in all education levels in Indonesia in 1978
on educational attainment and work outcomes. A recent study on Indonesia large
school construction projects examined the long-term and intergenerational impact
of the policy, and found that individuals who were exposed to the programme had
more education with female’s effect were concentrated in primary school. Later in
life, adult males who were exposed to the programme are more likely to be in the
formal employment and to migrate (Akresh, Halim and Kleemans, 2018). Females
who were exposed to the programme have higher probability to migrate and have
fewer children. Parental education benefits are transferred to the next generation
with larger impacts for daughters from mothers. The intergenerational effects for
households whose parents exposed to the policy was evidenced by the improvements
in living standards and the fact that they paid more taxes. The intergenerational
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effects were driven by improved marriage partner’s characteristics who are more
educated and have better labour market outcomes.
A study found that Indonesia’s longer school year reduced the probability of
grade repetition, increased educational attainment (0.7-0.9 year) and the probabil-
ity of working in the formal sectors, and increased hourly wages by 13 to 17 percent
or 18 percent per additional year (Parinduri, 2014). Carneiro et al. (2017) studied
the returns to senior secondary schooling in Indonesia using instrumental variable
technique to evaluate the average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment on
treated (ATT) and average marginal treatment effect (AMTE), with distance to
school as the instrument. The findings are larger than those of Duflo (2001), the
estimate of return to senior secondary school for a random person (ATE) was 13.8%,
the return estimate for individuals who were enrolled in senior secondary school
was 21.8% and to the marginal students who were more likely to be attracted by
the expansion of senior secondary school (AMTE) was 14%. Pisckhe (2007) studied
the effect of short school years in Germany between 1966 and 1967 and found that
reduction in instructional time of 26 weeks over the two years period increased
grade repetition and decreased higher secondary schooling attendance, but it did
not have significant impact on employment or earnings later in life.
In contrast to the limited number of studies on the long-term effects of school
term reduction and extensions, there is large literature exploiting changes in com-
pulsory schooling laws which regulate the minimum years of schooling an individual
must acquire. Card (1999) showed a review of studies that used compulsory
schooling laws, differences in school accessibility and similar features as instrumen-
tal variables for completed education, the return estimates are often larger than
OLS estimates. The upward-bias of the IV estimates were attributed to the fact
that marginal returns to education among the low-education subgroups affected
by the supply side innovations tend to be relatively high (Card, 2001). Belzil,
Hansen and Liu (2017) argue that the IV estimates on compulsory schooling laws
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are uninformative for the average effects of education because they overestimate
the true effect due to heterogeneity of compliers tend to be significantly lower
than IV estimates.
More recent studies the causal effects of extension of the compulsory education
on health outcomes, suggest smaller and often negligible impacts (Meghir, Palme
and Simeonova, 2012; Fabbri and Fort, 2013; Gathmann, Jurges and Reinhold,
2015; Brunello, Braakmann, 2011; Clark and Royer, 2013). Temporary and per-
manent increase in schooling may have different effects on income but temporary
and permanent increase in schooling can affect learning and the ability to process
information (Glewwe, 1999; Lleras-Muney, 2002).
Other outcomes of compulsory education considered in the literature are cog-
nitive abilities (Schneeweis, Skirbekk and Winter-Ebmer, 2014; Crespo, L’opez-
Noval and Mira, 2014), fertility (Cygan-Rehm and Maeder, 2013; Fort, Schneeweis
and Winter-Ebmer, 2016), intergenerational transmission (Oreopoulos, Page and
Stevens, 2006; Piopiunik, 2014; Lundborg, Nilsson and Rooth, 2014; Gunes, 2015),
and crime (Hjalmarsson, Holmlund and Lindquist, 2014). Lleras-Muney (2005)
investigated the effect of education on adult mortality and find that an additional
year of compulsory schooling decreased mortality after age of 35 by three percent.
Oreopoulos (2006) examined the effect of school-leaving age laws on educational
attainment and earnings and compared the returns to compulsory schooling for
the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada using OLS, IV-Difference-in-
Differences and IV-Regression Discontinuity. The law changes in the minimum
school leaving age had a remarkable impact on education attainment, the fraction
of British who left full-time education before at 14 dropped dramatically from 60%
to 10% before and after the law changed in 1947. The findings also suggest that
the compulsory schooling has large effect on earnings between 10 and 15 percent
on both the majority and minority groups who were exposed to the policy.
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Other recent studies on European countries suggest the changes in the number
of compulsory years of schooling have small effects on economic returns (Devereux
and Hart, 2010; Chib and Jacobi, 2015). Grenet (2013) compared similar com-
pulsory schooling reforms of extending school leaving age between England and
Wales and France and found only the former saw an increase wages. Grenet (2013)
found that the main difference was attributed to the sharp decline in the fraction
of individuals without qualifications in England and Wales and concluded that
sheepskin effects could explain the earnings difference. Pischke and von Wachter
(2008) examined effect of compulsory schooling laws in West Germany after WWII
and found a negligible impact on earnings.
A recent study on the very view studies of compulsory schooling in developing
countries, Xiao, Li, and Zhao (2017) evaluated the long-run effects of free com-
pulsory schooling in rural China on educational attainment, cognitive and health
outcomes. The study found that compulsory education combined with school fees
removal had positive impact on educational attainment and cognitive achievement
measured by early adulthood math test scores.
5.3 Indonesian Education System and Data
Indonesian education system and policies since 1970s
The national education system in Indonesia comprises pre-tertiary education and
tertiary education. Pre-tertiary education consists of early childhood with two
years in kindergarten followed by six years in primary school, and three years
each in junior and senior secondary school. Tertiary education comprises two-
year, three-year diploma’s or four-year bachelor’s degree as depicted in Figure 5.1.
Both public and private schools run Indonesian primary, secondary and tertiary
education in Indonesia (OECD, 2015).
Indonesian education system consists of formal education, non-formal education,
and informal education. Formal education comprises early childhood education,
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Figure 5.1: Indonesia National Education System
basic education which consists of primary and junior secondary schools, hereafter
compulsory education, senior secondary education, and tertiary education. Home-
schooling is considered as informal education.
(i) The early childhood education options are one-year or two-years of kinder-
garten in the formal education where children can start at the age of 5 or
younger. Children’s playgroup is the form of non-formal education which can
be managed by training or community institutions.
(ii) Basic education is the compulsory part of Indonesian education system. It
consists of six years of primary school and three years of junior secondary
school. Before 1994, the basic or compulsory education was six years in
primary school. Children can start primary school at the age of seven. Pupils
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must pass the primary school national examination in order to enter junior
secondary school. For the non-formal education, children who reach the age
of 13 can sit in the package A primary school equivalent test and receive
primary school certificate upon passing the test. Children who already reach
the age of 16 can sit in the package B junior secondary school equivalent
test and receive junior secondary school certificate upon passing the test.
The government work with the local communities to provide tutorials for the
equivalent programmes.
(iii) Senior secondary education is three years of schooling following basic ed-
ucation. The three years secondary education is provided in public and
private schools for formal education. The senior secondary education also
provides opportunity to study in vocational schools where they can learn
technical skills such as mechanical, electronics to become technicians, nursery
to become nurse assistants, or in tourism. For the non-formal education,
children who already reach the age of 19 can sit in the package C senior
secondary school equivalent test and receive high secondary school certificate
upon passing the test.
(iv) Tertiary or higher education comprises university and vocational college edu-
cation. University offers a four-year bachelor’s programme, two-year Master’s
degree programmes require two years to complete and doctoral programmes
require three to four years to complete the degree. In vocational college,
people can study from one-year up to four-year to obtain a vocational diploma.
Senior secondary school students must pass the national exam and national
public university exam for admission in public universities. Private universi-
ties organise their own student selection tests.
Primary school enrolment had quadrupled since Indonesia’s independence in
1945 until 1960. Despite the significant growth, the enrolment rate declined in early
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1970s (World Bank, 1989). The Indonesian Government financed a large primary
school construction programme in 1974 using an increase in oil revenues. It built
61 thousand primary schools or 145 thousand school buildings in underserved areas
(Duflo, 2001), it also supplied textbooks and hired new teachers. The programme
was successful in increasing enrolment by 13 million in 1986 or increased primary
net enrolment rate to 91.3 percent (World Bank, 1989).
The Indonesian Government implemented a large school construction project
between 1974 and 1978. The project built 60 thousand primary schools across
Indonesian provinces.
Prior to 1979, academic and calendar years coincided. In 1979, the government
shifted the beginning of school year from January to July. This unanticipated
policy delayed grade progression for all individuals who were in school in 1978
(Parinduri, 2014). In 1984, the Indonesian Government announced the six-year
compulsory education.
In 1989, the secondary school enrollment rates for males and females were 43
and 51 percent, respectively (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1995). The Indonesian Gov-
ernment announced the enactment of nine-year compulsory education law to take
effect in July 1994. The law is Presidential instruction (INPRES) on compulsory
schooling Number 1, dated on 15 April 1994 on the compulsory education extension.
In 2004, the Indonesian Government amended its constitution and stipulated
that 20 percent of the state budget must be dedicated to education expenditure
excluding teachers’ salaries. Subsequently, the junior and senior secondary enroll-
ment had risen considerably and was attributed to the above policy (World Bank,
2013). Twelve-year compulsory education or up to senior secondary school was
finally introduced by the Indonesian Government in 2015.
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5.4 Data and Summary Statistics
This study employs the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), an on-going lon-
gitudinal household survey conducted by the RAND Corporation.1 IFLS is an
integrated socio-economic longitudinal survey comprising a wide-range information
on the lives of the respondents, households and their communities. The first wave,
IFLS is a representative sample of about 83 percent of the Indonesian population,
including over thirty thousand individuals living in 13 of the country’s 27 provinces
in 1993. IFLS2 followed up with the same sample four years later, in 1997-1998.
One year after IFLS2, a 25% subsample was surveyed to provide information about
the impact of Indonesia’s economic crisis. IFLS3 was fielded in 2000, IFLS4 in
2007-2008 and IFLS5 in 2014-2015.
This study uses the latest wave survey, IFLS-5 which was conducted in 2014-
2015 (https://www.rand.org). In IFLS5 the recontact rate was 92%. For the
individual target households (including split-off households as separate) the re-
contact rate was 90.5%. These re-contact rates are as high as or higher than most
longitudinal surveys in the United States and Europe. High re-contact rates were
obtained because their commitment in tracking and interviewing individuals who
had moved or split off from the origin IFLS1 households. High re-interview rates
contribute significantly to data quality in a longitudinal survey because they reduce
the risk of bias due to nonrandom attrition in studies using the data.
The observation is restricted to year of birth between 1972 and 1984 which in-
cludes individuals born 6 years before and 6 years after the cut-off point. There are
10,836 used observations in most specifications. The assumption is all individuals
in the 1979 cohorts entered junior high school in 1994 or later. This is a reasonable
assumption as most children in Indonesia enter primary school at the age seven and
1The data is available from http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics for nine-year compulsory schooling
Older Cohorts(Controls) Younger Cohorts(Treatments)
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean. Std. Dev.
Javanese 0.384 0.486 0.382 0.486
Years of education 8.327 4.512 9.017 4.522
Completed at least 9 yrs of educ. 0.541 0.498 0.640 0.480
Worked for pay 0.730 0.444 0.713 0.452
Worked in formal sectors 0.575 0.494 0.582 0.493
Monthly wages (in Rp 1,000) 1995.000 2674.000 1971.000 2698.000
Birth district 0.371 0.483 0.373 0.484
Birth province 0.190 0.392 0.189 0.392
Age-School entry 6.672 0.689 6.571 0.685
Went to kindergarten 0.211 0.408 0.283 0.451
Age-kinderg. entry 5.026 0.685 4.914 0.711
Type of birthplace 0.236 0.425 0.257 0.437
Note:
The sample is taken from 10,836 observations who were born 6 years before and after the
birth quarter cut-off point
thus would enter junior secondary school at the age of thirteen. Completing nine-
year of education i.e. junior secondary school is used as the educational attainment
outcome, and examine the work outcomes whether the individual worked for pay,
whether the individual worked in formal sectors, and the log of average monthly
wages. Month of birth is selected as the running variable.
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics, including the covariates, gender, the
ethnicity (Javanese), whether current district is the same as birth district, whether
current province is the same as birth province and if the birthplace was a town.
The older cohorts, who were not exposed to the compulsory schooling law, had
lower educational attainment with respect to years of education (8.32) compared to
younger cohorts (9). In terms of completing junior secondary school, the proportion
of older cohorts and younger cohorts are 54% and 64%, respectively. In general,
the older cohorts had higher probability to work for pay than the younger cohorts,
while the probability of working in formal sectors and the earnings of older and
younger cohorts were quite similar.
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5.5 Empirical Strategy
This study exploits the variation in educational attainment with respect to the
change in compulsory schooling law in Indonesia took effect in July 1994 academic
year to investigate the causal relationship between education and work outcomes.
Examining the causal impact of education on work outcomes is a complicated task.
There is endogeneity of unobservables associated with education which might also
affect work preferences. To overcome this issue, the policy of extended compulsory
education will be exploited as a source of exogenous variation in a regression
discontinuity design.
The change in compulsory schooling law was an unanticipated policy so parents
would not be able to strategically plan their children’s birth to adjust with the
policy. The evidence for this will be discussed in the falsification checks.
Regression discontinuity (RD) identification is based on the idea that in a highly
rule-based world, some rules are arbitrary and thus provide good opportunity for
experiment (Angrist and Pisckhe, 2008). In the literature, RD design generally
comes in two types, sharp and fuzzy (Hahn et al., 2001). A sharp design is
used when the treatment is defined deterministically on some observable variable
(Angrist and Pisckhe, 2008). A fuzzy design exploits the discontinuity in the
probability of receiving treatment conditional on a covariate (Angrist and Pisckhe,
2008). A fuzzy design differs from a sharp design in that the treatment assignment
is not a deterministic function of the observable variable.
The compulsory schooling affects educational attainment, which was induced
by the timing of birth as an instrument. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the
probability of receiving treatment of nine-year compulsory education is a function
of continuous running variable, the timing of birth,
A fuzzy regression discontinuity design is employed because the treatment to
completing at least nine years of schooling is not deterministically assigned. Com-
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pleting nine years education is not deterministic because the compulsory schooling
policy in Indonesia implies that the government is responsible to provide free basic
education for the people, while the pupils and parents may decide not to abide with
the rules without apparent consequences. Moreover, some of the younger cohorts
may have dropped out of school before 1994, while some of older cohorts may be
exposed to the policy if they entered primary school at the age of seven or older.
Hence, there is a discontinuity in the probability of being treated. The extension
of compulsory schooling rule was also weakly enforced since there is no minimum
attendance requirements, thus pupils and parents may not abide with the policy.
As the minimum age of primary school participation was seven years old, 30
September 1978 is chosen as the cut-off point as the oldest cohort who were unaf-
fected by the policy, as depicted in figure 5.2. The assumption is most Indonesians
who were born in September 1978 or earlier were not directly exposed to the policy
enactment, with some of the older cohorts born in 1978 were exposed to the policy
because they entered primary school at the age of seven. A fuzzy regression
discontinuity design exploits the discontinuities in the probability of treatment
conditional on the running variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The discontinuity
at the threshold becomes an instrumental variable for the treatment status, thus
a fuzzy RD design is essentially an IV.
Pi(Di = 1|xi) =
g1(xi) if xi ≥ x0g0(xi) if xi < x0 ,where g1(x0) ̸= g0(x0) (5.1)
Where x0 is a known cut-off point or threshold
The following fuzzy regression discontinuity specification will be estimated:
Yi = β0 + β1Di + β2di + δ(Di ∗ di) + γXit + ϵ1i (5.2)
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Where: Yi is the outcome of interest, Di is an indicator variable that takes
the value of 1 if the individual completed at least nine-year of education and
0 otherwise, and di is the running variables which captures the distance from
September 1978 in months. Xit is a set of individual-level covariates: ethnivity
dummy (1=Javanese), birth district (1=current district), birth province (1=current
province), type of birthplace=town, dummy for went to kindergarten, and gender.
The work outcomes later in life are evaluated as the results of completing nine years
of schooling include whether the individual worked for pay, whether the individual
worked in the formal sector, and the individual’s log of average monthly salary.
Outcomes of interest chosen is whether individuals worked for pay obtained
from survey question of During the past week, did you do any of these activities?.
The response options are (1) Yes (3) No. Individual answering yes will be marked
as worked for pay. The response rate is high of 94.4%.
The second outcome is whether individuals worked in the of formal sectors
is obtained from survey question of What is the sector of the company you are
working?. The response options are (1) Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting;
(2) Mining and quarrying; (3) Manufacturing; (4) Manufacturing; (5) Construction;
(6) Wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels; (7) Transportation, storage and com-
munications ; (8) Finance, insurance, real estate and business services; (9) Social
services; (10) Activities that cannot be classified. Response rate for the question
is 77.2%. The sectors that considered formal sectors if the response is betwen (3)
and (8). The total number of individual classified as work in the formal sectors
was 5,982 or 55% of the overall sample.
The other outcome is the average monthly wages, obtained from survey question
of Approximately, What was your monthly salary/wage during last month (includ-
ing the value of all benefits)?. The response rate is 44.5% or 4,553 responded, 1.6%
or 166 responded zero, leaving 4,387 non-zero responses.
The corresponding first-stage regression is:
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Figure 5.2: Age and Birth date Cut-off
Di = α0 + α1Ti + α2di + α3diTi + αlXit + ϵ21 (5.3)
The birth date cut-off used 30 September 1978. Since Di, whether individual
had completed at least nine years of schooling is endogenous, it is instrumented
with time of birth dummy Ti = 1 if the individual was born after September
1978 in equation (5.3). They are the cohorts who were exposed to the nine-year
compulsory schooling policy. While the older cohorts were born on 30th September
1978 or earlier who were not exposed to the policy. The running variable used
is month of birth.
The average causal effect of nine-year compulsory schooling, β1 or the coefficient
of interest, at the cut-off x0 is given by:
β1 =
E[Yi|x0 < xi < x0 + di] − E[Yi|x0 − di < xi < x0]
E[Di|x0 < xi < x0 + di] − E[Di|x0 − di < xi < x0]
(5.4)
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β1 is the local average treatment effect (LATE), the coefficient of interest (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). Equation (5.2) will be estimated using local polynomial
regressions of order one and two.
Equation (5.2) is estimated around narrow bandwidths below and above the cut-
off. Bandwidths are selected based on data-driven procedures approach following
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2017).
The allocation of individual across treatment and control groups is as good as
random around at the cutoff point. The implication allows us to use of outcomes
just below the cut-off as valid counterfactual for those just above the cut-off (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). Bandwidths selected in this analysis are varied between 22
and 48 months.
Recent studies defend the use lower order polynomials in regression discon-
tinuity of observed outcomes on the running variables (Skovron and Titiunik,
2015; Gelman and Imbens, 2017). The use high-order polynomials in regression
discontinuity is flawed which leads to noisy estimates and sensitivity (Gelman and
Imbens, 2017). Local linear and quadratic regressions will be used in the analysis.
The model is estimated using triangular weights for the running variables as the
Statistics literature (Fan and Gijbels, 1996) shows that triangular kernel is optimal
for local linear regression estimations at the boundary. Triangular kernel puts more
weight on observations closer to the threshold (Fan and Gijbels, 1996).
Falsification checks are then performed where individuals near the cut-off month
of birth differ on several covariates. The placebo test is aimed at testing the validity
of the estimation design. The variables such as ethnicity and place of birth should
not be influenced by the policy. The placebo regressions are performed on control
variables as the outcome variables using the following reduced-form equation (5.5):
Yit = β0 + β1Ti + β2di + δ(diTi) + γXit + ϵi (5.5)
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Figure 5.3: Educational Attainment by Month of Birth
5.6 Regression Discontinuity Plots
The RD plots for work outcomes are presented in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5 and Figure
5.7. Local polynomial regression discontinuity is employed. The local polynomial
regression can capture the discontinuity around the cut-off. The local linear and
quadratic regression are employed using “rdrobust” Stata command developed by
Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrel and Titiunik (2017).
5.7 Results and Discussion
The results of the placebo regression are shown in Table 5.2. The table shows
that the timing of birth after September 1978 does not have discontinuities on the
ethnicity (1=Javanese) or the birthplace (1=town).
Month of birth is selected as the running variable in the basic specifications.
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Figure 5.4: Educational Attainment by Month of Birth
Table 5.2: Placebo Estimations
Treatment Dummy Javanese Place of birth town





Standard errors are clustered at the discrete value of the running variables
Parametric estimations with IV 2SLS will used in the main analysis and non-
parametric estimations using local linear regression will used as the robustness
check.
5.7.1 First Stage Results
The impact of the of nine-year compulsory education policy on educational at-
tainment is evaluated by observing the RD plot first-stage outcome of individuals
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Figure 5.5: Work for Pay by Month of Birth
Figure 5.6: Plot of average monthly wages by years of education
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Figure 5.7: Proportion of Individuals who Worked in the Formal Sectors by Month of
Birth
who completed at least nine years education or junior secondary school. Plots
are drawn using triangular kernel with local linear and local quadratic regressions.
The dots in the plots are the local average value within each bin, bin range is
evenly spaced chosen by-data driven methods mimicking the underlying regression
function (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014). Figure 5.3 shows the proportion
of individuals who completed nine years education in relation to individual’s month
of birth. The local averages are plotted for individuals who were born between
1972 and 1984 using IFLS wave 5. The figure shows that while the proportion
of individuals who completed junior secondary school increases gradually, there
is a discontinuity in the proportion after the cut-off point when the first cohort
exposed to the nine-year compulsory schooling law enactment in 1994. The figure
depicts the proportion of individuals completed junior high school saw an increase
5. Impact of Free Nine-Year Compulsory Schooling on Educational Attainment
and Work Outcomes 112
by 5% from 54% to 59%.
The polynomial regressions of order 2 also shows discontinuity in the proportion
of individuals who completed junior secondary education using month of birth as
the running variable with evenly spaced bins.
Table 5.3 presents the first stage regression outcome of completed nine years
of schooling from three different 2SLS specifications: working for pay, working
in formal sectors and log of monthly wages. The first-stage estimates confirm the
discontinuity depicted in the previous figures. The first-stage outcome of completed
nine years of education is instrumented with whether the individual was born in the
month after the cut-off point, September 1978. All estimates are significant at 1%
level and the estimates confirms the RD plot, about five percent. In other words,
the instrument of whether the pupils were born just after the cut-off increased the
likelihood to complete at least nine years of education by 5.4 percent compared to
those who were born just before the cut-off.
5.7.2 Second Stage Results
Table 5.4 presents the second stage estimates of 2SLS regressions for three work
outcomes, work for pay, work in formal sectors and log monthly wages. The
estimates for work for pay and work in the formal sectors due to completing nine-
year education are 30.6 and 48 percentage points, respectively. The estimate for
log of average monthly wages due to completing additional three years of schooling
is 30 percentage point or 10 percentage points per year. Although not statistically
significant, the estimate is comparable to that of Duflo (2001) who estimated
between 1.5% and 2.7% increase in wages per 0.12 to 0.2 additional years in
primary school or 12 to 13 percent increase in wages per additional school year.
The estimate also reflects similarities to those obtained by Oreopolous (2006) who
found the effect of minimum school leaving age change in the UK on wages increase
were between 10 and 15 percent.
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Table 5.3: First-stage estimates of 2SLS regressions: Completed Nine Years Education
Work Work in Log Monthly
Treatment for Pay Formal Sectors Wages
Born after 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.081***
September 1978 (T=1) (0.019) (0.018) (0.028)
No. of Obs. 10,836 10,836 4,387
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.010 0.015
F-statistic 31.07 31.07 17.65
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Note:
First-stage estimates are obtained from 2SLS regressions. Control
variables are ethnicity dummy (Javanese), birth district=current
district, birth province=current province, age of school entry, and
gender. Standard errors are clusters at the discrete value of
running variable (distance from month of birth cut-off). *p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
Table 5.4: Second stage estimates of 2SLS regressions: Completed Nine Years Education
Work Work in Log Monthly
Treatment for Pay Formal Sectors Wages
Nine-year education 0.306 0.485 0.300
(0.298) (0.355) (0.664)
No. of obs. 10,836 10,836 4,387
Note:
Estimates are obtained from 2SLS regression. Control vari-
ables are ethnicity dummy (Javanese), birth district=current
district, birth province=current province, age of school entry,
and gender. Standard errors in parenthesis are clusters at
the discrete value of running variable (distance from month
of birth cut-off). *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
5.7.3 Robustness checks
Table 5.5 presents the RD estimates for work outcomes, using local linear regres-
sions using “rdrobust” Stata command with distance from month of birth cutoff
as the running variable. Using ’rdbwselect" Stata command, th optimal order is
at degree 1, so only local polynomial regression is used. The probability to work
for pay range between 4.5% to 5.5% of increase, with the bandwidths 24 and 48
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BW= 22 months 0.055 -0.001** 0.012
(0.036) (0.033) (0.088)
RD robust p-value 0.126 0.023 0.914
No. of Obs. 3264 3264 739
BW=24 months 0.050* 0.004* 0.003
(0.035) (0.032) (0.086)
RD robust p-value 0.099 0.061 0.589
No. of Obs. 3576 3576 1420
BW=36 months 0.045 0.017 0.038
(0.029) (0.028) (0.071)
RD robust p-value 0.191 0.672 0.978
No. of Obs. 5304 5304 2141
BW=48 months 0.047* 0.026 0.036
(0.024) (0.052) (0.063)
RD robust p-value 0.051 0.987 0.763
No. of Obs. 7256 7256 4387
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Note:
BW is bandwidth in months. Control variables are ethnic-
ity dummy (Javanese), birth district=current district, birth
province=current province, age of school entry, and gender.
Standard errors are clusters at the discrete value of running
variable, distance from month of birth cut-off. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
months are significant at 10 percent level. Working in the formal sectors estimates
range between -0.1% to 2.6% of increase as effect of the compulsory schooling
policy although only the ones with bandwidths of 22 and 24 months are statistically
significant. All log monthly wages estimates suggest positive effect ranging between
1.2 and 3.6 percentage points although none are statistically significant.
5. Impact of Free Nine-Year Compulsory Schooling on Educational Attainment
and Work Outcomes 115
5.8 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter investigates the effect of Indonesia’s free nine years of compulsory
education law enacted in 1994 in all Indonesian provinces with fuzzy regression
discontinuity design using the fifth wave of Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS)
data 2014/2015. This study exploits the policy of extending compulsory education
from six years to nine years in 1994/1995 academic year as an exogenous variation
to identify the effect the compulsory schooling policy on educational and work
outcomes. Month birth is used as the running variable in the main analysis. The
cut-off point is the date of birth of 30th September 1978. It was the last cohort
not exposed to the policy.
The compulsory schooling policy increases the proportion of cohorts who com-
pleted at least nine years of schooling. The results show that the proportion of
individuals who completed at least nine years of schooling were 55% and 60% before
and after the cut-off or went up by 5% for the cohorts who were first exposed to the
compulsory schooling law. These results are not as large as in developed countries
such as US or UK which had 50% drop in the fraction of people left school by the
changes in the minimum school leaving age law. This is mainly due to the weak
enforcement and limited resources of the government. Additionally, pupils may not
be able to easily access secondary schools as the locations are comparativaly more
distant which could discourage children to go to school.
The second stage results from IV estimation present the effect the compulsory
schooing law on three work outcomes. The estimates for work for pay and work
in the formal sectors due to completing nine-year education are 30 and 48 per-
centage points, respectively. The estimate for log of average monthly wages was
10 percentage points per year. Although not statistically significant, the estimate
is comparable to that of Duflo (2001) who estimated between 12 and 13 percent
increase in wages per additional primary school year. The estimate also similar to
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those obtained by Oreopolous (2006) for the effect of minimum school leaving age
change in the UK on earnings, between 10 and 14 percent.
The results from local linear regressions suggest that the estimates are stable
for different bandwidths. The local linear estimates of compulsory schooling on
working for pay are positive ranging between 4.5 and 5.5 percentage points. The
estimates are significant under 24 and 48 months bandwidths. The local linear
estimates of compulsory schooling on working in the formal sectors is range be-
tween -0.1 and 2.6 percentage points and significant under 22-month and 24-month
bandwidths. The results for log of monthly wages are posotive between 0.3 and
3.8 percentage points but none are significant. This study concludes that the
nine-year compulsory schooling policy affects educational attainment in completing
at least nine years of schooling. The effect of compulsory schooling on working
outcomes later in life using local quadratic regression is significant in increasing
the probability of working for pay by 3.6%. No significant effect is found on other
outcomes such as the likelihood on working in the formal sectors, nor on wages.
The limitation of this study is that the compulsory schooling law is not the
same as those in developed countries. First, the degree of the enforcement is
not as strong due to the government’s limited resources. Second, parents have
more rights in deciding whether their children should go to school or not without
apparent consequences. Third, during the time the policy was initiated, education
may not be the priority for people in developing countries, particularly for the
low-income population.
6
Impact of National Programme of
Community Empowerment (PNPM)
Generasi on Community Participation
and Health Outcomes
6.1 Introduction
The concept of people as an important part of nation’s wealth has long been
understood by economists, the differences between developed and less developed
countries can be explained by the investment in human capital (Schultz, 1961).
One of the solutions for a country to break the poverty chain is by improving the
quality of its human capital, which can be achieved by improving the education
and health outcomes of the people. Despite the fall in maternal mortality rate
(MMR) in low medium-income countries, Indonesia’s MMR remained high at 230
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births between in 2014. The implementation
of Generasi, the National programme of Community Empowerment was partly
aimed to address the high maternal mortality rate. The programme was aimed
at improving health and education outcomes of the beneficiaries who live in rural
areas where healthcare and education facilities require improvement.
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In 2007, the Indonesian Government launched the National programme of Com-
munity Empowerment, PNPM Generasi as a community cash transfer programme.
The programme was intended to improve the quality of human capital through
investment in health and education in rural areas at village level. Generasi health
fund was to be allocated to health facilities in the form of monetary incentives for
health service facilities, namely village midwife clinics, subdistrict health centres
henceforth, Puskesmas, and monthly community health service, Posyandu. There
is also direct assistance for households in the form of transportation allowance
for expectant mothers, and subsidies for childbirth cost. This effort is aimed to
address the financial constraint in accessing healthcare services. The programme
is the only village-level community programme when the programme initiated in
2007, if the villages previously received different programme then the Generasi
programme replaced it. All villages receive funds allocated from the central gov-
ernment and provincial government, however there was no change before and after
the programme so there were no potential confounding policies.
The research objective of this chapter is to investigate the effects of National pro-
gramme of Community Empowerment, Generasi health block grant, on community
participation in village decision making, the quality of health facilities, health care
provision; health facilities utilisation and health outcomes of mothers and children.
This study makes several contributions. First, providing the impact of national
programme of community empowerment on community participation and health
facilities using village potential (Podes) data in addition to PNPM Generasi Data.
Second, this chapter attempts to analyse the village governments with respect to
how the villages manage the health block grant.
In developing countries, 30 percent of expectant women do not receive antenatal
care which can lead to iron deficiency, pregnancy complication and lower birth
weight (Abou-Zahr et al., 2003). Child mortality in developing countries is three
times that of developed countries which caused by diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria
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and undernutrition (Black et al. 2013). Credit constraint, lack of information
on access to healthcare and distance to health care are some of the contributing
factors (Dupas, 2011; Advaryu and Nyshadham, 2015). Nonetheless, the literature
does not give clear picture of the effects of access to health services on health
outcomes. In some settings, access to health services improved health outcomes
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1982; Hossain, 1989). While in other settings, access to
health services did not have an impact on health outcomes (Rosenzweig and Schultz,
1982; DaVanzo 1984; Strauss, 1990). Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) studied the
individual and community effects on child mortality and fertility in Colombia.
It was found that in urban areas, in addition to mother’s education, medical
services availabilities, family planning activities, transportation infrastructure, are
associated with child mortality ratios and fertility. However, there are no effects of
programme interventions and medical facilities found on rural populations (Rosen-
zweig and Schultz, 1982). Although improvements in maternal and child health
care can be achieved through a better public health provision, such provisions
often struggle with low demand, low providers’s effort, absenteeism and corruption
in the recruitment process (Das et al., 2008; Weaver, 2016). Consequently, the
long-run returns to public provisions of maternal and child health care are unclear
(Advaryu and Nyshadham, 2015).
Village is the smallest government administrative unit in Indonesia. The larger
administrative units are subdistrict, district/municipality, province and central
goverment. There are two types of villages based on the rural and urban location.
Desa is a village located in Indonesia’s rural area and kelurahan is a village in
urban area. Unlike urban village, whose leaders are appointed by district leaders,
desa leader is elected through local village election by its people. Since 2007,
all Indonesian villages in Generasi treatment subdistricts receive a fixed annual
grant with an average of US $100,000 from the central government as one of
the Indonesian Government strategies to support village governments and their
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communities. A randomisation process selected 200 subdistricts to be assigned
as treatment and 100 subdistricts to be assigned as control. The programme was
implemented in five provinces, West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo,
and East Nusa Tenggara, which included 3000 villages and 12 thousand households
that were randomly selected from the 300 Generasi programme subdistricts.
The Generasi block grants are aimed at assisting villages to become more
financially independent, and each village can act with greater autonomy to manage
and allocate the annual village budget. Based on Indonesian Home Affairs Minister
Act number 37 in year 2007 regarding village financial administration, 30% of the
fund is allocated for village government, and village consultative operating cost
and 70% of the fund is allocated for community empowerment including initiating
and managing the village-owned business. There are other community empow-
erment programmes implemented in other areas different from PNPM Generasi
areas, namely PNPM infrastructure, PNPM Mandiri urban and rural. The PNPM
Generasi programme is the only village-level community empowerment programme
in the Generasi subdistricts, if a subdistrict received different programme then
the subdistricts would be excluded from this programme. The use of funds for
all PNPM programmes is strictly monitored and audited by the government and
independent auditors.
PNPM Generasi, is specifically targeted at improving health and education
outcomes at a village level. There are eight health indicators target set by the
government to be achieved within the direct control of the village, the health
indicators as the conditionalities below:
1. Expectant mothers attend four health checks at a health facility during their
pregnancy
2. Expectant mothers receive and consume iron supplement tablets
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3. Every childbirth process is assisted by trained health personnel
4. Post-natal mothers and babies attend two health checks
5. Babies receive complete immunisation
6. Weight gain of babies and other growth indicators each month according on
age
7. Children aged 0-59 months are weighed once a month
8. Children aged 6-59 months consume supplemental vitamin A twice a year
Each village can propose funds to address one of the eight health indicators
through various activities training and behavioural change communication, finan-
cial incentives for health workers, health facilities improvement, supplementary
feeding activities, financial assitance for households. The funds will be disbursed
as long as an activity address one of the eight health indicators and can provide
evidence that the activity occured. There is a fund reporting and monitoring system
to ensure that the funds are spent in an appropriate manner. Most villages will
make use of the funds to the maximum amount and when fund uses are evaluated
regularly, the funds that was not absorbed by certain activities could be switch to
different activities when supported by a reasonable explanation.
In 2009, the government increased Generasi fund and encouraged village commu-
nities to allocate most of the funds for refurbishing Posyandu, the neighbourhood
monthly health centres. Trained facilitators help each village elect an 11-member
village management team, local facilitators and volunteers. The trained facilitators
advise village team to decide the funds allocation within the village in meetings.
Communities generate proposals to fund activities required to achieve the target
indicators. As the results of the discussion, the management team will propose
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the final Generasi budget allocation (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2008). Inter-
village meetings and consultation workshops with local health and education service
providers allow community leaders to obtain information, technical assistance, and
support from the local health and education offices as well as to coordinate the
use of Generasi funds with other health and education interventions in the area.
Following these discussions, the elected management team makes the final Generasi
budget allocation.
Two main activities for the community as part Generasi programme’s main
activities are Behavioural Change Communication such as health knowledge cam-
paign for mothers and monthly supplementary feeding programme for mothers and
children. Supplementary feeding fund can be given to particular households in the
case that they have malnourished child based on the growth monitoring charts. Vil-
lage facilitators are formed and appointed by the member of the village community
which empower the community and monitor the programme implementation.
This study is related to a broader literature on the community role in the de-
velopment and in public service delivery (Stiglitz, 2002; Olken, 2007; Banerjee and
Duflo, 2008). Stiglitz claimed that consensus building, open dialog and participa-
tory civil society are fundamental to long-term sustainable development. Pradhan
et al. (2012) studied the role of community participation in improving educational
quality by employing randomised experiment in Indonesia. They found that the
measures to strengthen school committees, grant and training, showed limited
effects. While measures which promoted ties between school committees and other
parties, linkage and election, led to a greater engagement by education stakeholders.
On contrary, Olken (2007) found that increase in grassroot participation in
monitoring Indonesian village road projects had minor impact on corruption, while
on the other hand, substantial increase in government audits reduced corruption.
Similarly, Banerjee and Duflo (2008) contended that the antipoverty policy involv-
ing the low-income beneficiaries to take charge in making the successful change for
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themselves was ineffective. They raised concerns on antipoverty strategies which
gave control to the beneficiaries who may not have the drive to do so.
Olken et al. (2014) analysed the same programme using the RCT data, found
that the incentivised programme improved preventive health indicators at first
predominantly in less-developed areas. However, incentive health effects weaked
over time. In terms of education outcomes, overall school enrollments increased.
This chapter contribution is that this study shows that the weak program effects
may be attributed to the funds allocation priorities since the funds are allocated
mostly to activities that does not have direct impact on the outcomes, at least
in short and medium-term.
6.2 Literature Review
If health is regarded as human capital, individuals will invest in health when
they valued the expected discounted future benefits exceed the costs. Grossman
approach to the demand for health is drawn mainly on the human capital theory
of Becker and Mincer (Grossman, 2000). The difference between health as output
and medical care as an input had not been considered in theoretical and empirical
works until 1972. The household production function model of consumer behaviour
is utilised to account for the mismatch between health as output and medical care
as one of the many inputs into the production function. The “shadow price” of
health depends on numerous variables in addition to the price of medical care, the
shadow price increases with age and decreases with education if more educated
individuals are more efficient producers of health (Grossman, 2000).
Grossman (1972) argued that health capital is different from other forms of
human capital. The major distinction is the primary justification for the demand for
health model (Grossman, 1972). The main proposition of Grossman model of the
demand for health viewed health as a durable capital stock, which yields an output
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of healthy time (Grossman, 1972). Grossman’s model explains the variations in
health capital supply and demand curves. The study discovered upward shifts
in the supply curve in response to increases in the rate of depreciation on the
stock of health with age, and it traced upward shifts in the demand curve in
response to increases in wage rate and education. The model’s first prediction is
that the quantity of demand for health capital declines over the life cycle if the
depreciation rate increase with age and expenditure on health care would rise as
individual ages. The second prediction of the model is that consumers’ demand for
health and healthcare is positively correlated with income. The third prediction
of the model is that more educated individuals demand a larger optimal stock of
health if education increases the efficiency of investment in health. Demand for
health inputs is derived from the demand for health capital. The advantage of the
model is that it allows us to investigate the demographic variables’ effects without
assumptions regarding whether the variables are positively or negatively correlated
with consumers’ taste for health.
One of the channels to achieve targeted health outcomes is through health
knowledge. Knowledge can be built and accumulated through education and
information acquisition. Literature have well documented the causal effects of
education on health (Thomas, Strauss and Henriques, 1991; Strauss and Thomas,
1995). Education is positively related to health and fertility (Strauss and Thomas,
1995). The channel of better education improves health is through increased
productivity (Grossman, 1972). Better education also improves knowledge of
health-related behaviour (Becker, 1960; Grossman, 1972; Thomas et al., 1991).
Thomas et al. (1991) investigated the impact of maternal education on child health
and found that a mothers’ education has a positive significant effect on child height.
Grossman’s (2000) framework of the shadow price of health utilising household
production function model of consumer behaviour depends on numerous other
variables in addition to the health care cost.
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In developing countries, particularly in rural areas where the quality of health
services is lacking, the condition is exacerbated with inadequate financial incentives
for public sector health workers. Hence, incentive-strengthening reforms are re-
quired but also need to vary based on institutional needs (Kremer and Glennerster,
2011). They argue that the reason why some expected health outcomes linked to
a programme might not be achieved is attributable to behavioural factors such as
present bias and limited attention.
Theory of limited attention model suggests that individuals are not fully aware
of all aspects of decision making. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) argue that a
discounted utility model plays a central role in decision making when faced with
an intertemporal choice. As a model of nonconstant discounting, it resulted in
myopia or time-inconsistent behaviour where individuals impose a higher discount
rate between the present and the future with than two periods in the future. This
behaviour may result in procrastinating the activities that can gain a positive
impact on the future, such as immunisation and visiting health facilities for pre-
ventive care. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) found that delaying prenatal care can
lead to unexpected health outcomes of the baby. Delay in prenatal care by six
months resulted in lower birth weight by 45 grams reduced fetal growth by 1.6
weeks (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes
Indonesia healthcare system. Section 6.3 describes data and followed by empirical
specification. Section 6.4 present the estimated programme impact on health
outcomes. Section 5 discusses the results and concluded the chapter.
6.3 Institutional Background - Indonesian Health-
care system
Prior to 2004, not everyone was covered by health insurance. Civil servants,
Army and Police personnel are covered by ASABRI (Insurance of Army forces
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and Police) under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence and public insurance
called Asuransi Kesehatan (ASKES). Employees of private companies are covered
by private insurance. However, there was a large proportion of the Indonesian
population who did not have permanent or formal employment were not covered by
health insurance. Consequently, they must pay for their healthcare costs in both
private and public healthcare facilities as access to healthcare facilities depends
on the insurance.
Referring to the Act. No. 40, 2004 regarding Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional
(National System of Social Insurance), every citizen has the rights of having so-
cial insurance, including health insurance. In 2004, the Indonesian Government
launched the regional health insurance for poor people who cannot afford health in-
surance (Askeskin), provincial, district and municipal government health insurance
(Jamkesda) in 2005, national community insurance (Jamkesmas) in 2008 by the
Ministry of Health, and delivery insurance (Jampersal) in 2011 by the Ministry of
Health where the insurance requires minimum fee through cross-subsidies (Agustina
et al., 2018). In 2009, all the national insurance companies were merged become
National Health Insurance, Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN).
There are several reforms related to midwives. The Indonesian Ministry of
Health also allocates a designated fund for health which focuses on the readiness of
health facilities for expectant mothers and childbirth. A village-based midwife
programme was established in 1989 with targets of training and deploying 54
thousand midwives across the Indonesian archipelago, which was achieved by 1997,
with over 96% of Indonesian population able to access the 54 thousand village-
based midwives who equipped with small birthing units.
In 2006, the Ministry of Health had educated and assigned additional 50,000
village midwives through Bidan Desa programme (health.bmz.de). In 2013, the
Ministry of Health provided midwives kits and 104,178 village midwives throughout
all villages in Indonesia which claimed to have contributed to a substantial decrease
6. Impact of National Programme of Community Empowerment (PNPM)
Generasi on Community Participation and Health Outcomes 127
in maternal mortality (Performance Accountability Report, Ministry of Health,
2013). One of the targets of the Ministry of Health strategic goals is maternal
and child health (MCH). The indicators include the childbirth process assisted by
trained health personnel or midwife, post-maternal and neonatal visits, and baby
and toddler growth checks. Between 2009 and 2013 the Ministry of Health had im-
proved the indicator of childbirth assisted by skilled health personnel and achieved
90.88% of the total childbirths (Ministry of Health, 2013, <www.depkes.go.id>).
The use of health facilities for childbirth also increased from 26% to 63% in 1997
and 2012, respectively (Shankar et al., 2008).
The Government launched the Village Midwife Programme in 1989, which
requires one midwife in every village to provide primary health services for the
village population and maternal and child health services (kesehatan ibu dan anak-
KIA). The programme was rolled out in phased with priority was given to poor and
remote areas (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2001).The services include prenatal care,
child delivery, post-maternal care, family planning services and basic health services
for newborns and children. Several studies have concluded the programme success
in reducing the probability of infant mortality by 15 percent, improving BMI of
reproductive-age women, child birth weight and height for age (Frankenberg, 1995;
Frankenberg and Thomas, 2001; Frankenberg et al., 2005).
The village midwives charge small fees as the equipment and medications are
supplied by the government through the Ministry of Health at district or sub-
district levels. On average, there are two Puskesmas-subdistrict health centres in
each subdistrict, which locations should be accessible by all the villages within
the subdistrict.
Village midwives work as civil servants who are appointed by the Ministry of
Health. The village midwives’ qualification is midwifery academy, a three-year
professional degree after completing high school education. They are also required
to attend one-year midwifery training after completing the degree. On average,
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one village midwife serves a village population of 3500 and assisted 36 births annu-
ally (Indonesia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Midwifery_IND.pdf). In the
past, village midwives can also assist childbirth in their clinic. However, since 2010
they are not allowed to do so. The expectant mother must go to Puskesmas in
the subdistrict for child delivery. This is expected to reduce the risk of maternal
mortality if there are any complications.
6.4 Data and Dependent Variables
6.4.1 Data
The study utilises data from PNPM Generasi programme for both community and
household levels data and household level data on mothers and children who lived
in Generasi programme treatment and control villages.Generasi program data is
the randomised controlled experiment obtained from Survey Pelayanan Kesehatan
dan Pendidikan (SPKP), Health and Education Service Surveys from the World
Bank (http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1047). The first
wave (2007) and the third wave (2009) surveys of Generasi programme are used.
PNPM Generasi programme fund is administered within each village.
Each treatment Generasi subdistrict receives block grant with an average amount
of US $100,000. Of the total Generasi subdistricts, 90% are in rural areas. Generasi
targeted rural subdistricts which have participated in Subdistrict Development pro-
gramme, for a minimum period of two years and have experience with village-level
planning. There are no supply-readiness requirements since Generasi programme
intends to improve less supply-ready areas. The randomisation for the treatment
occurs at subdistrict levels. Randomizing at the subdistrict level is important since
many health and education services, such as community health centers (puskesmas)
and junior secondary schools, provide services to multiple villages within a subdis-
trict. The randomization process involved drawing 200 subdistricts assigned as
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treatment out of 300 original subdistricts. The rest 100 subdistricts were assigned
as control. Randomisation occured at the subdistrict level is crucial as health and
education services, such as subdistrict health centers serve population from multiple
villages within a subdistrict. The individuals for impact evaluation purpose are
sampled from five provinces (West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, and
East Nusa Tenggara) in 2,306 villages and 12,263 households that were randomly
selected from the final 264 Generasi programme subdistricts. The 264 subdistricts
were obtained because 36 out subdistricts were excluded from the programme due
to receiving different community empowerment programmes.Finally 2,306 villages
1,536 treatment and 770 control villages were randomly selected as control areas
which were stratified across districts. Five households were sampled per village.
Attrition rate of households resurveyed in 2009 is 1% with no differences between
treatment and control areas (Olken, et al., 2014).
The sample of mothers is obtained from the module questionnaire of ever
married women or mothers aged 16-49 years old who were pregnant or had been
pregnant within the last 24 months. Mothers who have been expecting within the
last 24 months were asked about pregnancy, prenatal checks in different health
facilities, and delivery records. The total number of ever married mothers aged
between 16 and 49 years was 8,431 in 2007. The proportion of mothers who were
expecting babies was 21.6%. The proportion of mothers who were using any form
of contraception was 60% (3,987). The number of women who had natural delivery
were 6,131 or 93.9% of total while 6.3% had childbirth with complications.
The number of children aged 0 to 36 months old sampled in 2007 were 13,400.
The proportion of babies aged 0-11 months was 44.7%, children aged 1-2 years old
was 34.8% and children aged 2-3 years old was 20.4%. The child module comprises
questions whether they have health monitoring card, whether they visited Posyandu
within the last three months, the number of Posyandu visits and services received,
including supplementary meals and immunisations received (BCG, polio, measles,
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hepatitis B and DPT). In additions, they were asked about the latest acute mor-
bidity of the child and whether they were treated in one of the healthcare facilities.
In terms of healthcare facilities, Generasi programme surveys 300 Puskesmas
-subdistrict health centres-, one from each subdistrict, 696 midwives and 1200
Posyandu. The sampling frame for midwives was from the record of midwives who
work in Puskemas and the records of private practice midwives. Two midwives were
selected from the Puskesmas records and two from private practice records (Sparrow
et al. 2008). Health facilities were asked about medical supplies, equipment, staff
and services provided.
In addition to PNPM Generasi survey data, a Management Information System
(MIS) data, administrative data from the Ministry of Home Affairs during the
first two years of the implementation is employed. The data comprises activities,
number of beneficiaries, and the amount of funds allocation at the village level as
part of the activity report from all of Generasi villages.
The data on all villages in Indonesia is obtained from village population census
called Village Potential data (PODES). Village population census is conducted
three times within ten years which survey more than 65 thousand villages. PODES
data exhibits the characteristics of villages and depicts the development progress
within each village.
6.4.2 Dependent Variables
Dependent variables included in this study are namely community participation in
self-help activities 1, the utilisation of healthcare services by mothers aged between
16 and 49 years, whether expectant mothers visit the different health facilities for
prenatal and post-maternal checks.
1Self-help activities are activities that are initiated and undertook by the people in villages
or hamlets. The activities can range from building community facilities such as sports centres,
roads, bridges and schools.
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Table 6.1: List of Dependent Variables
Dependent Variables Data Level Results
Household community Participation Household aggregated to village-level Table 6.4
Availability Health facilities Village-level Table 6.5
Number of health personnel Village-level Table 6.6
Services provided to mothers in a village midwife Individual midwife-level Table 6.7
Services provided to children a village midwife Individual midwife-level Table 6.8
Services for baby delivery and post-maternal visits Individual midwife-level Tables 6.9 and 6.10
Mother’s health knowledge Individual level Table 6.11
Mother’s prenatal visits to health facilities Individual aggregated to subdistrict-level Tables 6.12 and 6.13
Pregnancy check services received by mothers Individual aggregated to subdistrict-level Table 6.14
Post-maternal checks in health facilities Individual aggregated to subdistrict-level Table 6.15
Post-maternal services received by babies Individual aggregated to subdistrict-level Table 6.16
Baby’s neonatal mortality and livebirths Individual aggregated to subdistrict-level Table 6.17
Child’s visits to Posyandu & services received Individual aggregated to subdistrict-level Tables 6.18 - 6.21
Child’s accute morbidity Individual aggregated to subdistrict-level Table 6.22
Note:
Dependent Variables for different outcomes
The number of prenatal visits is differentiated into the first 3-month, the sec-
ond 3-month and the last 3-month. Other indicators for dependent variables are
whether mothers had assisted childbirth by skilled health personnel, a midwife or
doctor, and whether expectant mothers received different types of standard services
during check-up, iron supplement, and tetanus and toxoid vaccines (TT).
The dependent variables related with children are whether a Posyandu, the
monthly health services present in the neighbourhood, in the hamlet, or in the
village. Other variables are whether a child visited Posyandu regularly for growth
monitoring and obtaining vitamin A, nutritious meal supplementation, whether
they have health monitoring card and had completed immunisation required for
the associated age.
The difference-in-differences estimated for outcomes on mother’s sample in-
cluded a number of covariates to increase precision at individual level charac-
teristics. The control variables are age, age squared, education and dummy for
working. All other estimates involving aggregation from individual-level data to
village level averages do not include covariates. The list of dependent variables
is summarised in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.2: Baseline of characteristics and Balance Tests of Villages’ health services
between Generasi Programme Treatment and Control
Village Characteristics Mean
Variables Control Treatment Difference Std error p_value
Any village maternal clinic? 0.776 0.782 0.006 0.018 0.746
Any Puskesmas? 0.125 0.127 0.002 0.014 0.911
Any Supporting Puskesmas ? 0.365 0.354 -0.011 0.021 0.612
Nbr of active Posyandu 2.439 2.491 0.052 0.089 0.560
Nbr of Village midwives 0.889 0.895 0.006 0.021 0.793
Nbr of private midwives 0.394 0.357 -0.037 0.035 0.290
Nbr of nurses 1.434 1.248 -0.186 0.156 0.232
Nbr of doctors 0.609 0.593 -0.016 0.054 0.770
Nbr of trad’l birth assistants 2.549 2.689 0.140 0.127 0.272
Note:
The results are calculated by employing PNPM Generasi Data 2007 and 2009 at
village-level. Robust standard errors are clustered at subdistrict level. Number of
villages = 2,306. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Baseline and Balance Tests of Villages’ characteristics
Table 6.2 shows village characteristics on the baseline 2007 survey and balance test
between treatment and control groups on several measures for health services. The
measures including the presence of village maternal clinics, Puskesmas (subdistrict
health centre), supporting Puskesmas, number of active Posyandu (monthly com-
munity health service), number of village midwives and private midwives, number
of doctors and nurses and number of traditional birth assistants. The table shows
that the means differences are not statistically significant, which suggests that the
randomisation satisfactorily balanced treatment and control groups for all measures
of health facilities and providers.
Baseline and Balance Tests of Mothers’ characteristics
Table 6.3 presents the balance tests between mothers’ characteristics in Generasi
programme treatment and control areas. The characteristics include age, education,
whether they work or not. Dependent variables tested include a minimum of four
6. Impact of National Programme of Community Empowerment (PNPM)
Generasi on Community Participation and Health Outcomes 133
Table 6.3: Baseline of characteristics and Balance Tests of Mothers between Generasi
Programme Treatment and Control
Village Characteristics Mean
Variables Control Treatment Difference Std error p_value
Age in years 27.400 28.310 0.91*** 0.160 0.000
Education (at least 6 six years) 0.855 0.800 -0.055*** 0.009 0.000
Working 0.206 0.221 0.015 0.010 0.138
Dependent variables
Prenatal check >=4 0.802 0.748 -0.054*** 0.010 0.000
Assisted delivery 0.810 0.782 -0.028*** 0.010 0.006
Facility delivery 0.465 0.451 -0.014 0.014 0.352
Post-maternal check >=2 0.647 0.614 -0.032* 0.018 0.068
Note:
The results are calculated by employing PNPM Generasi Data 2007 and 2009. Number
of mothers = 10,846. The data comprise mothers aged 16-49 who had a pregnancy or
delivery within the past 24 months in 2007 and 2009. Analyses using OLS regression
comparing the means between treatment and control groups at baseline. *p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p <0.01
prenatal checks. The results suggest that there are some significant differences in
mothers’ characteristics between treatment and control areas namely in mother’s
age, education, and for the dependent variables namely minimum of four times
prenatal checks, delivery assisted by health personnel. These results can be ex-
pected as Generasi programme randomisation was performed at subdistrict level
instead of household.
6.5 Empirical specification
The empirical analysis is performed to evaluate whether there is an impact of the
Generasi programme on various dependent variables. The dependent variables
are community participation, quality of health facilities, utilisation of healthcare
facilities, health outcomes of mothers and young children. The impact is mea-
sured by performing difference-in-differences regression, controlling for differences
at the baseline.
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Using the difference-in-differences specification by comparing the outcomes from
Generasi treatment areas (Di = 1) with the outcomes that of control areas (Di = 0).
The average treatment effect is:
β = E[Y1,i|Xi, Di = 1] − E[Y0,i|Xi, Di = 0] (6.1)
The baseline 2007 and 2009 data are used to estimate the following difference-
in-differences specification
Yit = αPostt + β(Postt ∗ D) + γXit + µsϵit (6.2)
• Yit - the community participation, health outcomes for mothers and children
and the quality health facilities
• Di - a dummy variable of whether the village received Generasi treatment
fund, 1 for treated and 0 otherwise
• Post = 1 for after treatment year 2009 and zero for 2007 baseline
• β - the parameter of interest which provides the difference-in-differences in
health outcomes of mothers, children and quality of health facilities between
the treatment and control groups before and after programme implementation
• Interaction variable for DiD estimate = (Postt ∗ Di)
• Xit is set control variables to increase precision at individual level character-
istics, age, age squared, education and dummy for working
• µs is sub-district fixed effect
• ϵit is unobserved idiosyncratic shocks
• The standard errors are clustered at subdistrict level.
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Table 6.4: Difference-in-differences estimates of community participation, village deci-
sion making for self-help activities
Decision by Head of Decision through meeting in
Variables Viilage Hamlet Neighbourhood Village. Hamlet. Neighbourhood.
Post -0.12 -0.105 -0.083 -0.111 -0.033 -0.015
(0.292) (0.028) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.013)
Treatment effect -0.021 0.008 0.02 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.030) (0.017)
No. of Obs. 4612 4612 4612 4612 4612 4612
R-Squared 0.045 0.021 0.013 0.028 0.003 0.002
Note:
The results are calculated by employing household-level data which was aggregated to
village-level. Standard errors clustered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
6.6 Empirical Results
6.6.1 Impact of PNPM Generasi on Community Partici-
pation
The PNPM Generasi programme impact on community participation are evaluated
based on the village decision making for self-help activities. The decision-making
process in self-help activities or gotong royong require households to participate.
The self-help activities are including refurbishing Posyandu clinic, repairing public
facilities, such as roads, bridges, drainage and sewage. The results on whether the
decisions were made by the village head, the hamlet head, the neighbourhood head
and whether the decisions were made through village meetings, hamlet meetings or
neighbourhood meeting are presented in Table 6.4. The results suggests that there
is a small increase in hamlet and neighbourhood (RT) heads in deciding who should
participate in self-help activities but are not statistically significant. Moreover, the
decisions made were not involving hamlet or village meetings.
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6.6.2 Impact of PNPM Generasi on Health Facilities and
Health Providers
The village characteristics module is served to provide information on village char-
acteristics comprise demography information, health facilities, education facilities
and community social participation. The respondents are village heads or the
deputy if the head was not available at the time of interview. In this study, the
difference-in-differences are estimated for health facilities available in every village
and health personnel who provide health services within the village.
The results of villages’ health facilities using difference-in-differences are pre-
sented in Table 6.7. The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on several
dependent variables of villages characteristics for health facilities, the availability
of supporting Puskesmas (subdistrict health centre) in a village, availability of
supporting Puskesmas and village maternity clinic. The sample is villages from
each Generasi treatment and control subdistrict. The estimate for supporting
Puskesmas is significant at 10%, a positive effect on the number of supporting
Puskesmas by 3.3 percentage points, while other estimates are negligible.
The results of the numbers of health provider who provide health services in
a village are presented in Table 6.5. The table is a result of Generasi programme
impact on several dependent variables of Villages characteristics for the number of
health staff using difference-in-differences. The sample is villages from each Gen-
erasi treatment and control subdistrict. The difference-in-differences estimates for
the number of village midwives, private midwives, doctors, nurses and traditional
birth assistants suggest that Generasi programme impact are not significant.
6.6.3 Impact of PNPM Generasi on Midwives Services
Results for Process/ Activities Performed by Village Midwives
The PNPM Generasi programme impact on midwives are evaluated based on the
location she conducted the activities and the services provided both to children
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post 0.0156** 0.018 0.037**
(0.007) (0.015) (0.015)
treatment effect -0.009 0.033* 0.00009
(0.009) (0.019) (0.019)
No. of Obs. 4612 4612 4612
R Squared 0.002 0.011 0.006
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on several
dependent variables of villages’ characteristics for health facili-
ties using difference-in-differences. The sample is villages from
Generasi treatment and control subdistricts. Standard errors
clustered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.









post 0.107*** 0.115** -0.114** -0.221 -0.356***
(0.033) (0.057) (0.055) (0.181) (0.096)
treatment effect -0.003 0.038 0.042 0.133 -0.033
(0.040) (0.091) (0.066) (0.205) (0.128)
No. of Obs. 4609 4597 4604 4598 4604
R Squared 0.014 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.015
Note:
The table is a results of number of health personnel in a village using
difference-in-differences estimation. The sample is villages from Generasi
treatment and control subdistricts. Standard errors clustered at sub-district
are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 6.7: Difference-in-differences estimates of number of children who were given










post -10.78 0.241*** -0.0497
(26.940) (0.062) (0.177)
treatment effect 27.28 -0.041 0.207
(37.640) (0.075) (0.309)
No. of Obs 1249 1392 1180
R Squared 0.001 0.055 0.0009
Note:
The table is a results of services provided for children in a midwife clinic
using difference-in-differences estimation. The sample is panel midwives
from Generasi treatment and control subdistricts. Standard errors clus-
tered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p <0.01.
and mothers. The results for Posyandu visits and services provided are presented
in Table 6.6. The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on dependent
variables for midwife characteristics using difference-in-differences. The sample is
midwives working in government and non-government health facilities. There is an
increase in number of Posyandu visits last week and the number of children given
vitamin A although not statistically significant.
Table 6.8 shows the estimates of services provided by a midwife during prenatal
visits in midwife’s clinics. The estimate of the number of pregnant mothers who
received iron supplementation is positive significant at 10% level. However, other
estimates on whether mothers receive tetanus-toxoid (TT) vaccine, number of
pregnancy visits, are not significant. The estimate on complication cases referred
to doctors is positive but not statistically significant.
Table 6.9 shows the estimates of the number of mothers who gave birth assisted
by midwives in government facilities. The table is a result of Generasi programme
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Table 6.8: Difference-in-differences estimates of services received in midwife clinic
Pregnancy Complication
Dep. Variables Mothers TT vacc iron supp visit handled refer
post -1.971 -3.54 -0.49 -0.237 -0.206
(4.257) (2.695) (2.155) (0.869) (0.676)
treatment effect -2.631 6.288* -2.927 -0.0121 0.175
(6.075) (3.730) (4.414) (1.149) (0.756)
No. of Obs. 1101 1168 1151 1085 1099
R Squared 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.0006 0.0004
Note:
The table is a results of services provided for expectant mothers in a
midwife clinic using difference-in-differences estimation. The sample is panel
midwives from Generasi treatment and control subdistricts. Standard errors
clustered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p <0.01.
impact on dependent variables for services in government health facilities including
subdistrict health centres. The sample is midwives working in government health
facilities. The estimates show that there are negative effects in terms of number
of childbirth assisted by midwives in government facilities, the number delivery
with complication and referred complication due to complication although they
are not statistically significant.
The estimates of services provided during the mother’s post-maternal visits
in midwife’s ward are presented in Table 6.10. The table is a result of Generasi
programme impact on dependent variables for services provided, including neonatal
visits, the number babies whose weight were checked, the number of postpartum vi-
tamin A and iron supplement given in midwife clinic using difference-in-differences.
The estimates show there is a positive programme effect in the number babies
whose weight were checked, post-partum vitamin A and iron provided although
not statistically significant.
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post -1.675 0.039 -0.007
(1.785) (0.431) (0.260)
treatment effect -2.574 -0.539 -0.281
(3.742) (0.732) (0.500)
No. of Obs. 1144 1057 1086
R Squared 0.008 0.003 0.002
Note:
The table is estimates of birth delivery in government facilities
using difference-in-differences. The sample is midwives from Gen-
erasi treatment and control subdistricts. Standard errors clustered
at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p <0.01.
Table 6.10: Difference-in-differences estimates of neonatal visits in midwife clinic
Neonatal Baby weight Postpatrum
Dep. Variables visit checked vit A iron
post -1.882 2.693 -3.257** -3.353**
(2.686) (36.330) (1.564) (1.594)
treatment effect -0.171 30.11 4.768 1.912
(4.577) (43.240) (3.070) (2.140)
No. of Obs. 1137 1104 1133 1142
R-Squared 0.00176 0.00433 0.00308 0.0107
Note:
The table is estimates of neonatal services in midwife clinic
using difference-in-differences. The sample is midwives from
Generasi treatment and control subdistricts. Standard errors
clustered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
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6.6.4 Impact of PNMPM Generasi on Mothers’ and Out-
comes
The PNPM Generasi programme impact evaluated on mothers’ activities and
outcomes. The data on mothers is sampled from mothers aged 16 to 49 years who
were pregnant or pregnant within the last 24 months which collect information
regarding mothers’ health condition, pregnancy history, the use of contraception,
the utilisation of health facilities and health knowledge. All the estimates are
aggregated from individual level data into subdistrict level, with exception for
the health knowledge estimates.
Table 6.11 shows the difference-in-differences estimates of mother’s health knowl-
edge as outcomes. The observations are panel mothers aged 16 to 49 from Gen-
erasi programme wave 1 and 3 who had a pregnancy or delivery within the past
24 months in 2007 and 2009. The correct answers dummy equals to 1 if the
respondent answered at least 50% of the questions correctly. The treatment is
marginally significant on the numbers of correct answers on health knowledge
regarding; number of prenatal checks, when the baby should be breastfed after
birth, at how many days the baby can start drink water, and how much liquid the
baby should have when experiencing diarrhoea. As per column 1, the difference-
in-differences estimate for the numbers of correct answers is marginally significant,
which implied the knowledge of mothers increased by 30 percentage points by
living in a Generasi treatment subdistrict. For individual question responses, the
estimates on knowledge on when to feed babies with water and with liquid food
are positive but only the knowledge on when to feed babies with liquid food is
statistically significant.
In terms of health facility utilisation, health facilities visited by mothers for
prenatal checks are presented in Tables 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14. The table is a result
of Generasi programme impact on dependent variables of mother’s prenatal visits.
The sample comprises mothers aged 16-49 who had a pregnancy or delivery within
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Table 6.11: Difference-in-differences estimates of mothers’ health knowledge
Correct Knowledge
Dep. Variables answers Prenatal Bfed Waterfed Liqfed
post 0.145 -0.314 0.123 -0.019 -0.026
(0.178) (0.442) (0.080) (0.074) (0.098)
treatment effect 0.301* 0.109 -0.046 0.127 0.168**
(0.165) (0.756) (0.068) (0.078) (0.082)
age 0.091 0.062** -0.039 0.023
(0.075) (0.028) (0.032) (0.035)
age_sq -0.0012 -0.0008* 0.0006 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
work -0.151 -0.027 -0.024 -0.072
(0.167) (0.057) (0.056) (0.076)
d_educ 0.216 0.092 0.029 0.035
(0.155) (0.074) (0.058) (0.087)
No. of Obs. 470 454 470 470 470
R Squared 0.047 0.022 0.025 0.018 0.031
Note:
The table is estimates of mother’s health knowledge on feeding babies
using difference-in-differences. The sample is panel mothers aged 16-
49 years from Generasi treatment and control subdistricts. Standard
errors clustered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
the past 24 months. Since there will be high attrition in using panel mothers
who had pregnancy and delivery within 24 months across the 28 months timeline
between June 2007 to October 2009, the outcomes were aggregated into subdistrict
averages. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 show there are small effect in pregnancy check within
the first, second 3-month of pregnancy but none are statistically significant.
Generasi programme impact on dependent variables of services received during
prenatal visits is presented in Table 6.15. The table shows that there are small
and negligible impact of the programme on postmaternal checks in private hospital
and Puskesmas, 40 days after giving birth.
Table 6.16 present the estimates whether the baby’s weight was checked during
post-maternal visits and the weight of the babies. The treatment effect on whether
the baby weight was check is positive, although not statistically significant. In
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Table 6.12: Difference-in-differences estimates of which facilities visited for pregnancy









post -0.002 -0.076 -0.037
(0.010) (0.068) (0.023)
tretment effect 0.019 0.045 0.016
(0.013) (0.079) (0.028)
No. of Obs. 600 600 600
R Squared 0.015 0.007 0.013
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on mother’s prenatal
visits using difference-in-differences. The outcomes are an average for each
subsdistrict from sample of mothers aged 16-49 who had a pregnancy or
delivery within the past 24 months in 2007 and 2009. Standard errors
clustered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01.
Table 6.13: Difference-in-differences estimates of which facilities visited for pregnancy
checks within the first 3 months
Check in
Dep. Variables private midwife trad’l birth attend. Posyandu
post 0.082 -0.031 0.167***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
treatment effect -0.056 -0.026 0.076
(0.06) (0.03) (0.07)
No. of Obs. 600 600 600
R Squared 0.011 0.05 0.128
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on which
facilities visited by mothers’ for prenatal visits using difference-in-
differences. The outcomes are an average for each subsdistrict from
sample of mothers aged 16-49 who had a pregnancy or delivery
within the past 24 months in 2007 and 2009. Standard errors
clustered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
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post 0.226*** -0.013 -0.035 0.186**
(0.022) (0.029) (0.024) (0.080)
treatment effect -0.02 -0.028 -0.043 0.128
(0.028) (0.038) (0.030) (0.097)
No. of Obs. 600 600 600 600
R-Squared 0.453 0.011 0.063 0.111
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on mother’s pregnancy check
services received using difference-in-differences. The outcomes are an average figure
for each subsdistrict from sample of mothers aged 16-49 who had a pregnancy or
delivery within the past 24 months in 2007 and 2009. Standard errors clustered at
sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
Table 6.15: Difference-in-differences estimates of number of post-maternal checks within
40 days after giving birth
Post maternal
Dep. Variables gov hospital priv hospital Puskesmas village midwife
post 0.014 0.008 -0.035 -0.05
(0.029) (0.012) (0.025) (0.066)
treatment effect -0.004 0.005 0.026 -0.013
(0.035) (0.018) (0.027) (0.082)
No. of Obs. 600 600 600 600
R Squared 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.007
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on mother’s post-
maternal check services received using difference-in-differences. The out-
comes are an average for each subsdistrict from sample of mothers aged 16-
49 who had a pregnancy or delivery within the past 24 months in 2007 and
2009. Standard errors clustered at sub-dis trict are reported in parenthesis.
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
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treatment effect 0.035 -16.33
(0.021) (38.780)
No. of Obs. 600 599
R Squared 0.079 0.007
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on baby
weight check during post-maternal visits using difference-
in-differences. The outcomes are an average for each sub-
sdistrict from sample of mothers aged 16-49 who had a
pregnancy or delivery within the past 24 months in 2007 and
2009. Standard errors clustered at sub-district are reported
in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
terms of the baby’s weight, the estimate indicates that there is no significant
difference between treatment and control areas.
Table 6.17 presents the difference-in-differences estimates on the programme
effect on health outcomes in terms of neonatal mortality and live births. There is a
slight reduction in the number of neonatal mortality and an increase in the number
of live births, although the estimates are not statistically significant.
6.6.5 Impact of PNPM Generasi on Children aged 0-36
months Outcomes
The PNPM Generasi programme impact evaluated on children outcomes including
Posyandu visits, services received during the visits and health outcomes. The
sample comprises children aged 0 to 36 months which are then aggregated into
subdistrict level. The difference-in-differences estimates for whether a child visited
Posyandu (monthly health service) and the services received are presented in Table
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Table 6.17: Difference-in-differences estimates of childbirth types
Variables Neonatal mortality Livebirth
post 0.03 -0.02
(0.029) (0.034)
treatment effect -0.005 0.025
(0.037) (0.039)
No. of Obs. 600 600
R Squared 0.007 0.001
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme
impact on childbirth types using difference-in-
differences. The outcomes are an average for
each subsdistrict from sample of mothers aged
16-49 who had a pregnancy or delivery within
the past 24 months in 2007 and 2009. Standard
errors clustered at sub-district are reported in
parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
6.18. The table shows that there is a significant effect in whether a child visiting
Posyandu within the last three months, the difference is 6.4 percentage points.
However, there are no significant differences between treatment and control areas
with respect to whether there is a Posyandu within the neighbourhood, hamlet
or the village. This is partly because the programme focuses on refurbishing
Posyandu that could still be managed and discarding the Posyandu which were
abandoned and not active anymore. The objectives are to improve the services to
the community in the area served by the Posyandu.
Table 6.19 is a result of Generasi programme impact on the number of child’s
visits to Posyandu and services received. The table shows that the estimate for
nutritious meals served during the monthly health services positive significant. As
per column 3, the effect is positive significant by 13 percentage points. These results
can be explained by the high proportion of the health fund which was allocated for
supplementary feeding programmes was 41% of the total fund.
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Table 6.18: Difference-in-differences estimates of whether child ever visited Posyandu
and the Posyandu location
Visit Posyandu Posyandu in
Variables in 3 month neighborhood hamlet village
post -0.011 -0.002 -0.159*** -0.018
(0.016) (0.020) (0.058) (0.028)
treatmet effect 0.064*** 0.0264 0.0453 0.03
(0.019) (0.030) (0.070) (0.040)
No. of Obs. 600 597 596 596
R-Squared 0.081 0.005 0.046 0.004
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on whether a
chilld Posyandu using difference-in-differences. The outcomes are
an average for each subsdistrict from sample of children aged 0-36
months in 2007 and 2009. Standard errors clustered clustered at
subdistrict at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** <0.01.











post 0.01 0.013*** 0.060*** -0.063***
(0.084) (0.098) (0.020) (0.023)
treatment effect 0.171 -0.042 0.134*** -0.044
(0.113) (0.006) (0.028) (0.029)
No. of Obs. 600 600 600 600
R-Squared 0.021 0.041 0.28 0.121
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on services received
during Posyandu using difference-in-differences. The outcomes are an
average for each subsdistrict from sample of children aged 0-36 months
in 2007 and 2009. Standard errors clustered clustered at subdistrict
at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p
<0.01.
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post 0.195*** -0.064** -0.059*** -0.018
(0.036) (0.027) (0.022) (0.017)
treatment effect 0.008 0.022 -0.0003 0.004
(0.049) (0.032) (0.027) (0.020)
No. of Obs. 600 600 600 600
R Squared 0.169 0.037 0.065 0.01
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on the number
of childrem received services during Posyandu using difference-in-
differences. The outcomes are an average for each subsdistrict from
sample of children aged 0-36 months in 2007 and 2009. Standard
errors clustered clustered at subdistrict at sub-district are reported
in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
Table 6.20 shows the number of children receiving Posyandu services during
the monthly Posyandu visits. The programme effects of whether the child re-
ceive immunisation, health check and health advise are small and statistically
insignificant. Immunisation might not increase as expected due to the social and
cultural belief that the vaccines is suspected to have a harmful effect such as fever
(Adato, Roopnaraine and Becker, 2011). This may also be explained by the lack of
awareness on vaccines’ benefits. Immunisation might not increase as expected due
to the social and cultural belief that the vaccines is suspected to have a harmful
effect such as fever (Adato, Roopnaraine and Becker, 2011). This may also be
explained by the lack of awareness on vaccines’ benefits.
Table 6.21 shows the difference-in-differences estimates of whether people need
to pay for Posyandu services fee and whether they had health monitoring card or
mother-child health card. The estimate for whether child has health monitoring
card is positive significant, but the other two estimates are negligible.
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Table 6.21: Difference-in-differences estimates of whether people need to pay for










post -0.049*** 0.052*** -0.113***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.027)
treatment effect 0.005 0.062*** 0.018
(0.018) (0.021) (0.034)
No. of Obs. 600 600 600
R Squared 0.08 0.205 0.112
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on a number
of outcomes using difference-in-differences. The outcomes are an
average for each subsdistrict from sample of children aged 0-36
months in 2007 and 2009. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
Table 6.22 shows that the PKH programme effects on child’s acute morbidity
including, diarrhoea within one month, the number of times had diarrhoea, had
high fever or cough. The estimates for child acute morbidity are small and sta-
tistically insignificant.
The overall results show that apart from positive significant programme efects
on pregnant mothers who received iron supplement, whether the child visiting
Posyandu and supplementary feeding provided, most of other estimates are neg-
ligible. The availability of health providers, availability of health equipment (see
appendix C), services provided, mothers’ and children’s health outcomes are not
statistically significant. These results might be explained by village public spending
allocation in figure 6.1.
There are several channels which can lead programme conditionalities to achieve
targeted health outcomes. The first channel is through improvement in healthcare
facilities, as Generasi programme allocated 16% of the funds to improve infras-
tructure, facilities and equipment. Generasi activities involve in refurbishing and
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post -0.032* 0.069 -0.012 -0.063***
(0.019) (0.160) (0.024) (0.023)
treatment effect 0.001 -0.084 -0.004 0.0126
(0.022) (0.214) (0.028) (0.027)
No. of Obs. 600 600 600 600
R Squared 0.032 0.0005 0.004 0.056
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi programme impact on child
accute morbidity using difference-in-differences. The outcomes
are an average for each subsdistrict from sample of children
aged 0-36 months in 2007 and 2009.Standard errors clustered
at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01.
establishing Posyandu and maternal waiting homes if there was none in a neigh-
bourhood. The second channel is through improving mothers’ health knowledge,
which can be achieved through attending the behavioural change communication
programme that is run by the Generasi village facilitator which coordinate with
Posyandu cadres and the village head.
The third channel is through increasing access to healthcare services by reducing
financial constraint. Over ninety percent of the villages gave financial assistance
to access healthcare for its people. In 2009, there were 1,095 out of 6,182 or about
18 percent of female respondents who received financial assistance to access health
services. About 175 or 17 percent of the mothers who received financial assistance
used it for transportation and health services subsidy.
Generasi Management Information System (MIS) administrative data from the
first two years is obtained from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Figure 6.1 shows
the allocation of Generasi health fund. The figure shows that the health fund was
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mostly allocated to supplementary feeding programmes (41%). The second highest
allocation was for financial assistance to access health services including subsidy
and transportation allowance (27%); followed by infrastructure (16%), facilities
and equipment (9%), financial incentives for health workers (4%), training and
behaviour change communication or campaign (3%). Despite being the second
largest allocation, in terms of the number of women who received it, financial
assistance for mothers to access health services proportion is only about 15 percent
of the total female beneficiaries.
The allocation of Generasi fund could imply the villages’ public spending was
prioritised for activities that is visible. This spending priority can be part of a
moral hazard problem when the head of villages have incentives to allocate the
fund for their popularity, which benefits their interests. As for villages the people
can elect their leader, a popular policy can be used as an incentive by the village
heads to get re-elected. Although there is a supervisory body in villages, the
position is subordinated to the village head.
6.6.6 Impact on Village Health Facilities Based on Podes
Data 2007 and 2011
Difference-indifferences estimates PNPM programme impact on health facilities
and health personnel in 2006 and 2011 are presented in Table 6.22. The vil-
lages in Podes were the ones who were matched with districts of PNPM Generasi
treatment and control areas. The estimates for the number of village maternal
clinics,Posyandu, number of general practitioners (GPs) and number of female
doctors are positive but only the estimates for the number of Posyandu and the
number GPs are statistically significant.
Threats to Identification
This section explores the threat to identification possibilities. First, since there
was a plan to expand the Generasi programmes in more areas, it is possible that
6. Impact of National Programme of Community Empowerment (PNPM)
Generasi on Community Participation and Health Outcomes 152
Supplementary 
feeding programs: 41 %
Financial assistance 





health workers: 4 %
Training: 3 %
Generasi - Health Fund Allocation
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs- Administrative Data, 2008
Figure 6.1: Public Spending Allocation of the Villages
between 2009 and 2011 some villages within a treatment subdistrict changed into a
control subdistrict and vice versa. Second, it is possible that mothers and children
in migrated from non-Generasi programme villages to Generasi treatment villages
between 2011 and 2014. In this chapter, the village status of Generasi programme
treatment assignment in 2011 is used. In this chapter the threats to identification
is acknowledged as part of its limitation.
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Table 6.23: Difference-in-differences Estimates of the Impact of PNPM Generasi on the
Village Health Providers using Podes Data 2006 and 2011
Outcome Variables Control mean Treatment Effect SE
Number of midwives 1.159 -0.024 (0.053)
Number of village maternal clinic 0.501 0.064 (0.051)
Number of Posyandu (Monthly health centres) 3.962 1.285*** (0.423)
Number of traditional birth assistants 1.971 0.124 (0.135)
Number of General Practitioners (GPs) 0.259 0.046* (0.023)
Number of male doctors 0.189 -0.010 (0.020)
Number of female doctors 0.106 0.011 (0.020)
Number of Puskesmas 0.109 0.004 (0.006)
Number of Supporting Puskesmas 0.288 -0.011 (0.012)
Observation numbers 7,318
Note:
Data villages’ number of health providers in Generasi village from Village Potential (Podes)
data year 2007 and 2011. Analysis using difference-in-differences with district fixed effect.
Standard errors are clustered at subdistrict level. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
6.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter investigates the impact of a National Programme of Community
Empowerment, PNPM Generasi health program, on the community participation,
quality of community health facilities, utilisation of healthcare facilities, and health
outcomes of mothers aged 16 to 49 and children aged 0 to 36 months. The PNPM
Generasi programme was implemented at a village level. The data employed are
village-level data, household and individual level data on mothers and children,
health personnel and healthcare facilities data. Health personnel data includes
midwives and Posyandu cadres’ characteristics data. Institutions’ characteristics
and facilities data include villages and subdistrict community health centres. Gen-
erasi programme impact is estimated using difference-in-differences specification.
In terms of community participation, the programme does not have any impact
on the decision-making process for community self-help activities. The dependent
variables are whether the decisions were made by the village head, the hamlet head,
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the neighbourhood head, through village meetings, hamlet meetings or neighbour-
hood meetings. The results suggest that none of the estimates for community
participation outcomes variables is significant.
Several channels can lead programme conditionalities to achieve targeted health
outcomes. The first channel expected to achieve targeted health outcomes is
through improvement in healthcare facilities, measured by the availability of health
personnel, equipment, supplies of vaccines and medicines. The results suggest that
the programme did not have significant impact on the quality of healthcare facilities.
The difference-in-difference estimates also suggest that there was no significant
difference in healthcare facilities utilisation between the mothers who live in the
programme treatment and control areas.
Most of the statistically insignificant estimates suggest that the national pro-
gramme of community empowerment (PNPM) Generasi health block grant does
not have significant impact on the targeted outcomes. The results are aligned
with Olken (2007), Banerjee and Duflo (2008) who found that the low-income
population may not gain control on their communities and make successful changes
by merely participating.
One of the channels to achieve targeted health outcomes is through health
knowledge. The difference-in-differences estimate of health knowledge between
mothers living in Generasi treatment and control subdistrict is marginally signif-
icant which implied that the behavioural health campaign in Generasi treatment
areas increased the mothers’ health knowledge by 30 percentage point. Despite
estimates of health knowledge, there is no appreciable impact on the outcomes of
mothers with respect to prenatal checks in different health facilities within the first
three months, or postnatal checks within 40 days of giving birth.
Overall, there is a significant difference in whether a child visiting Posyandu
within the last three months in terms of child visit to the monthly health service
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(Posyandu), the difference is six percentage points. The empirical estimate nu-
tritious meals served during the Posyandu sessions is always positive significant
both by employing individuals and data aggregated into to subdistricts level. The
programme possibly has heterogeneous effects on Posyandu, there is positive sig-
nificant effect in terms of whether a child attending Posyandu within the last three
months. However, the programme effects on whether there is a Posyandu centres
within neighbourhood, hamlet or village are statistically insignificant. This fact
might be explained by the village administration was trying to improve the quality
of the Posyandu, rather than the quantity. This was done by refurbishing current
Posyandu clinics and discarding the ones that are no longer needed.
In conclusion, the community Generasi programme does not seem to have
significant impact on health outcomes of mothers and children. These results are
not so surprising as the programme had only been implemented for two years and
they are in line with the findings of the literature. The null effects may be due
to the liquidity constraint and information access to quality care (Dupas, 2011;
Adhvaryu and Nyshadham, 2015). Public provision in health facilities also often
suffer from low demand and low efforts from health providers which will adversely
affecting quality ((Das et al., 2008; Weaver, 2016).
The actual programme fund allocation might better explain the above results.
The significant results of supplementary feeding may be attributed to the health
fund allocation for the activities which comprised 41 percent of the total fund and
in terms of the number of beneficiaries who received the programme comprised 36
percent of the total mothers. The second highest allocation was for financial assis-
tance to access health services, 27 percent of the total allocation. However, in terms
of beneficiary numbers, it was only 15 percent of total mothers. These results can
partially be explained by the fact that the funds were allocated mostly to activities
that are visible but may not have direct impact on community participation and
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health outcomes. The allocation of Generasi fund could imply that the villages’
public spending was prioritised for activities that are popular for political reason.
7
Conclusions
This thesis aims to provide an examination of the labour, education and health-
related policy in Indonesia. The thesis consists of three empirical analyses; an
examination of the impact of a randomised controlled trials (RCT) of household
conditional cash transfer programme on female labour participation, an investi-
gation of the effects of the enactment of nine-year compulsory schooling law on
educational and work outcomes, and an evaluation of the impact of a national com-
munity empowerment programme on community participation and health services
utilisation and health outcomes.
The effects of conditional cash transfer programme are evaluated by employing
difference-in-differences specification and instrumental variable technique as empi-
crical strategy to address the endogeneity of conversion from treatment became
control and vice versa. The thesis reveals that the conditional cash transfer pro-
gramme has no impact on female work outcomes in short-term, in 2009, or in
medium-term, in 2013. The treatment effect is only significant in reducing work
in medium term by 6.9 percentage points using IV estimations. The findings are
aligned with other findings on CCT by Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) and Banerjee et
al. (2015) who studied seven CCTs in six developing countries including Indonesia,
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where they did not find any significant effect on work outcomes. The results reflect
similarities to the study in Mexico, Honduras, and Nicaragua which indicated that
the effects of the CCT programmes on adults labour participation were negative,
small and insignificant (Alzua et al. 2013).
Further, the results also suggest that the programme has a positive significant
effect on fertility, both in short-term and medium-term. The results shows that the
programme significantly increased fertility by 2.2 and 4.8 percentage points in 2009
and 2013, respectively. These estimates show similarities to those obtained by CCT
impact in the short run in Honduras which increased fertility by 2-4 percentage
points (Stecklov et al., 2006) which might reduced female labour participation in
medium-term. This may explain why the programme does not have clear impact
on female labour participation. The empowerment effect might be cancelled out
by income effect and the increase in fertility.
Other possible cause is the size of the cash transfer. On average, the annual
cash transfer amount is 15% of the family annualised expenditure. In terms of
the size of the transfer, it is relatively lower than inheritance, hence it may not
provide more authority for the women in the family. A recent study on the effects
of India Hindu Succession Act finds that the policy had positive impact on labour
supply (Heath and Tan, 2018). The policy which enables women in India to receive
inheritance had increased female intra-household bargaining and autonomy thereby
empowered them to decide to enter high paying job. The India Hindu Succession
Act also had seen improvements in women’s health, but not in fertility.
In terms of policy implication, it can be concluded that the Indonesian con-
ditional cash transfer programme did not motivate or deter the work of the ben-
eficiaries. This result is aligned with the previous studies on the effect of cash
transfer programmes in developing countries.
The generalisability of the results is subject to certain limitations. First, it is
not possible the disentangle between the effect of empowerment and the income
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effects, this is partly because the only information on participants’ work is only at
the extensive margin, while work hours data is unavailable. How to disentangle
the effect of empowerment and the magnitude of income effect remains a problem
for further reseacrch. Second, the beneficiaries are within five percent of the
lowest income population in Indonesia, thus if applied to different percentile of
the socioeconomic status, it is not clear whether similar results are expected.
Chapter 5 investigates the effect of the change in Indonesia’s compulsory school-
ing law on educational and work outcomes. The causal effects of education on
work outcomes have been well documented (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Behrman
and Deolalikar, 1993; Card, 1999; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Duflo, 2001;
Oreopoulos, 2006). Better education can increase the likelihood to work for pay and
to earn higher income. The study exploits the exogenous variation in the likelihood
to complete at least nine years of schooling and work outcomes by the change in
compulsory schooling law in Indonesia enacted in 1994 as a source of identification.
There are currently few studies on the impact of compulsory education in
developing countries. Several studies examined the impact of longer school year
implemented in all education levels in Indonesia and impact of large school con-
struction project, but none has examined the impact of Indonesia’s free nine-year
compulsory schooling policy on working outcomes.
This study applies a fuzzy regression discontinuity design which exploits the
compulsory schooling law enactment as an exogenous variation. The policy man-
dated children to stay at school for at least nine years. Prior to 1994, children
were only required to spend six years at school. Completing nine years education
is not deterministic because of the the tenuous enforcement. In addition to no
minimum attendance requirement, parents may decide not to abide with the policy
without apparent consequences.
The treatment of completing at least nine years of education is instrumented
with the time of birth dummy. Individuals who were born just after the cut-off
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point, are 5.2 percent more likely to complete at least nine years of education.
The second stage estimates of 2SLS regressions on log of average monthly wages is
27.3 percentage point due to completing additional three years of junior secondary
schooling or 9 percentage points per year. Although not statistically significant, the
estimate is comparable to that of Duflo (2001) who found that each constructed
primary school per 1000 children resulted in 0.12 to 0.19 years average increase
in education and between 1.5 and 2.7 percent increase in wages which equivalent
to between 12 and 13.5 percent increase in wages per additional year in primary
school. The result is similar to those obtained by Oreopolous (2006), between 10
and 15 percent higher in earnings for one additional year of compulsory schooling.
Subsequently, local linear regressions are employed using fuzzy rdrobust Stata
command. The local linear estimates of compulsory schooling on working for pay
are positive ranging between 2.8% and 3.6%. Significant effect is also found on
the probability of individual worked in the formal sectors. The findings suggest
that the compulsory schooling policy increased educational attainment and the
increase in educational attainment increased the probability of work for pay and
work in the formal sectors.
It is important to note the limitation of this study is that the compulsory
schooling law is not comparable to those implemented in developed countries. The
compulsory schooling is different due to the differences in the degree of the enforce-
ment. There is no minimum attendance requirement. The compulsory schooling
law is more emphasised on the government’s responsibility in providing access to
free basic education for all the people. The government is more encouraging rather
than forcing the pupil to stay in school since the government have limited resources
to monitor the implementation.
Chapter 6 evaluates the effects of the Generasi health block grant, a national pro-
gramme of community empowerment on community participation and the quality
of community health facilities, utilisation of healthcare facilities, health outcomes
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of mothers aged 16 to 49 and children aged 0 to 36 months using difference-in-
differences technique. The results from Generasi community empowerment pro-
gramme suggests that the programme does not have an impact on village decision-
making process for community self-help activities.
The programme suggests a marginally significant positive effect on mothers’
health knowledge by 30 percentage points which implied the health campaign
in Generasi treatment areas increased the health knowledge of mothers. Despite
estimates of health knowledge, there is no appreciable impact in health outcomes
on health facilities utilisation by mothers. The programme is expected to achieve
the targeted health outcomes through the of quality improvement in healthcare
facilities. However, the results suggest that the programme did not have significant
impact on the quality of healthcare facilities which measured by availability of
equipment, supplies of vaccines and medication.
Overall, for children empirical results, with regards to child visit to the monthly
health service (Posyandu), there is a significant difference in whether child visiting
Posyandu within the last three months, the difference is six percentage points.
The empirical estimates for children, nutritious meals served during the Posyandu
sessions are all positive significant.
The findings of this study have several practical implications. First, the time
frame between 2007 and 2009 might not enough to pick up the program’s effect
particularly on health outcomes. Second, the programme fund allocation may
explain why the effects are not significant. The significant results of supplementary
feeding may be attributed to the health fund allocation to the activities which
comprised 41 percent of the total fund. In terms of the number who received
the program, it comprised 36 percent of the total mothers. The second highest
allocation was for financial assistance to access health services, 27 percent of the
total allocation. However, in terms of beneficiary numbers it only comprised 15
percent of total mothers. In conclusion, the community Generasi programme does
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not seem to have impacts on health outcomes of mothers and children. Although
these results are a bit surprising, they are in line with the findings of the literature
(Fiszbein et al., 2009). The insignificant effects may be due to the liquidity
constraint and information access to quality care (Dupas, 2011; Adhvaryu and
Nyshadham, 2015). Public provision in health facilities also often suffer from low
demand and low efforts from health providers which will adversely affecting quality
(Das et al., 2008; Weaver, 2016). The implication for policy maker is how to design
a policy which can induce people’s behaviour not only to the activity indicators
but also to encourage healthier environment which improve final outcomes. The
challenge is to design complementary actions for policies which improve the quality
the supply of education and health services and policies which promote healthier
and more stimulating environment (Fiszbein et al., 2009).
This results may also be explained by the fact that the funds were allocated
mostly to activities that were visible but may not have direct impact on health
outcomes. The allocation of Generasi fund can imply that the villages’ public
spending was prioritised for activities that is visible or popular for political reason.
The interpretation of the results is also subject to certain limitations. The infor-
mation on health facility utilisation such as prenatal checks and postmaternal visits
were self-assessed by the respondents. Similarly, information on health outcomes
such child as morbidity was also self-assessed.
The results of this thesis reveal that the government’s investment in human
capital in the form of cash transfers and community health block grant suggests
no substantial impact on the assessed outcomes. While the nine-year compulsory
schooling has a positive effect on educational attainment and the probability of
working in the formal sectors but does not indicate a significant effect on wages.
These programmes may need to be complemented with other interventions such as
employment-related workshops and trainings programmes. Adequate health and
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education facilities are also need to be available and easily accessed by the benefi-
ciaries. With regards to future research opportunities, latest data collected on the
CCT can be used to evaluate the long-term programme impact as the programme
is still ongoing. Similarly, the effect of nine-year compulsory schooling can be
evaluated in the future when the young cohort are older, as in this study the oldest







Table 8.1: Means of educational outcomes at pre-program by primary and secondary
school
Variable name Primary Secondary
Enrollment 0.970 0.727
Attendance 0.975 0.965
Language test score 71.550 76.650
Math test score 50.450 64.100
Number observation 8457.000 3041.000
Note:
Standard errors clustered at sub-district are re-
ported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p <0.01.
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Table 8.2: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Educational Outcomes for Primary
School Aged Children
Variables Post SE Treatment effect SE
Attendance -0.003 (0.004) 0.008 (0.006)
Attendance (85% attendance=1) -0.035*** (0.006) 0.007 (0.009)
Enrollment -0.046*** (0.006) 0.037*** (0.007)
Maths test scores 0.138*** (0.011) 0.025 (0.017)
Language test scores 0.181*** (0.011) 0.017 (0.017)
Number observation 9070
Note:
The table is a result of cash transfer impact on educational outcomes children
aged between 6 and 12. Standard errors clustered at sub-district are reported in
parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 8.3: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Educational Outcomes for Junior
Secondary School Aged Children
Variables Post SE Treatment effect SE
Attendance 0.021** (0.009) -0.028** (0.011)
Attendance (85% attendance=1) 0.023 (0.033) -0.052 (0.042)
Enrollment -0.168*** (0.014) 0.023 (0.020)
Number observation 5976
Note:
The table is a result of cash transfer impact on attendance and with control
variables are travelling time to school, cost of schooling, wage work. The sample
is children aged between 13 and 15. Standard errors clustered at subdistrict level,




Table 8.4: Difference-in-differences estimates of number of childbirth-related equipment
in the Puskesmas
Variables Post SE Treatment effect SE R-Squared
Number of stethoscopes 0.364 (0.435) -0.101 (0.514) 0.006
Number of forceps 0.796 (0.602) -1.319* (0.727) 0.012
Number speculum -1.313 (0.946) 1.032 (1.237) 0.006
Number vaccine thermos -3.323** (1.558) 1.851 (1.858) 0.023
Number of observations 596
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi program impact on several dependent variables for
Puskesmas characteristics using difference-in-differences. The sample is Puskesmas
from each Generasi treatment and control subdistrict. Standard errors clustered at
sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 8.5: Difference-in-differences estimates of number of child birth-related equipment
in the mid wife clinics
Variables Post SE Treatment effect SE R-Squared
Number of stethoscopes 0.175* (0.091) -0.014 (0.102) 0.027
Number of forceps -0.058 (0.062) 0.108 (0.068) 0.006
Number speculum 0.621*** (0.208) -0.276 (0.276) 0.018
Number vaccine thermos -0.224 (0.310) 0.115 (0.381) 0.002
Number of observations 1384
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi program impact on dependent variables for equipment
in midwife clinic using difference-in-differences. The sample is midwives working in
government and non-government health facilities. Standard errors clustered at sub-
district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 8.6: Difference-in-differences estimates of Puskesmas clinic facilities and coverage
of villages and patients
Variables Post SE Treatment effect SE R-Squared
Bascic Obstetric and Neonatal Emergency units -0.141 (0.126) 0.750 (0.811) 0.028
Number of villages covered by a Puskesmas -0.089 (0.151) -1.424 (0.933) 0.024
Number of existing patients -71.010 (139.8) 209.800 (203.7) 0.004
Number of new patients 105.400 (132.0) 11.400 (173.7) 0.006
Number of contraceptive patients 58.250 (120.3) 179.500 (158.0) 0.021
Number of mother and child health patients 5.417 (48.76) 29.110 (80.29) 0.001
Number of observations 596.000
Note:
The table is a result of Generasi program impact on several dependent variables for Puskesmas characteristics
using difference-in-differences. The sample is Puskesmas from each Generasi treatment and control subdistrict.
Standard errors clustered at sub-district are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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